

THE
NEW ART
OF LYING,
COVERED BY
IESVITES vnder the Vaile of
EQUIVOCATION;

DISCOVERED AND DISPROVED
By
Henry Mason.



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OF LYING

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A SWATH under the Vails of

Revelation

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By

James Mackay



London

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Glasgow, 1844.


TO THE MOST REVE-
rend Father in God, the Lord
Arch-bishop of Canterburie his Grace,
Primate of all ENGLAND, and
Metropolitane.

Most Reuerend Father,

THe first newes that I heard of the Equiuocating Arte, was that which I learned out of your Graces writings. And well might this be to mee the first newes. For, if I mistake not, you were the first Writer, that published those trickes in print to the World: though (as beginnings vse to be) that discouery of this Art was but briefe in comparison, either because that occasion did not admit of any long or full discourse, or because, but little of this mystery could then at the first be discovered; the professors of that Trade, as your selfe also signifie, labouring to hide their secrets from the knowledge of other men. And indeed it may be obserued, that in managing of the Papacy, they haue certaine mysteries of State, which the

a Praefat.
præfixa
Sex Præ-
lection.
cap. 1. &
cap. 1. de
Mendac.
num. 17.
13, 14.

The Epistle DEDICATORIE.

more they use, the more they conceale. One of which, is their power to murder Kings, and blow up Parliaments, & kill all that stand in their way, like the Assassini, who held it a point of great merit to murder all that were their aduersaries in Religion: but yet they are not willing that the world should know that this is any part of their Creede. Another such policy may be that of their Indices Expurgatorii, by which they haue circūcised the lips of such Writers, as spoke any word against the Roman Church: but this they kept as a great mystery among some few of themselves, till misfortune brought it to light, full sore against their wils. And for a third such-like policy, I may reckon also this Art of Equiuocation, which the Masters thereof did keepe secret as long, and as much as they could. And therefore it was no maruell, if your first discouery of this mystery were but brieffe in comparison. But afterward^a another Reuerend & learned Prelate, lighting vpon a more compleate Treatise then formerly had appeared, penned by a Popish Priest in defence of this Arte, and approued by the Arch-Priest, and the Prouinciall of the Iesuits: he pursued the point more fully according as that Treatise gaue him iust occasion. The crye of which pursuit did vnkennell the olde equiuocating.^b Foxe, and

a D. Morton B. of Lichfield and Coventry, Confutar. of Equiuocation.
b Persons, who by occasion of the Bishopps booke wrote a large Treatise in defence of Equiuocation.

hunted

hunted him into the open field, there to display himselfe, and to shew what trickes he could use, for saving his new Art from the infamy of lying. And here I finding him well chased, did by the same follow after him unto his Den, to espie if I might, what he and his Cubs were deuising in the darke. And I found them very busie in hammering Reseruati-
ons and mentall frauds, vpon every occasion and in all kindes of dealing, thereby to catch vs at vn-
awares, who being plain and simple men our selues, could not suspect such frauds and impostures in o-
thers. And in case these things should come a-
broad, as in part themselves had discovered them a-
gainst their wils: yet so confident and resolute did I finde them, to maintaine all for good and honest dealing, as that Father^a Persons maketh a won-
der of it, and thinketh that God should deale worse
with men then hee had done with beasts, if hee
should not grant them equiuocating trickes, and
reserued wiles, as he hath granted to the Hare
and the Foxe, their leapes and turnings, and
windings, and going backe againe in the same
trace they come, to deceiue the Dogges that
pursue them. And yet all this confidence I take to
be but a copie of their countenance. For euen in
their printed Apologies of this Arte, they seeke to
cast

a Mitigat.
cap. 9. m.
81. p. 403.

The Epistle DEDICATORY.

cast mist before the Readers eyes, that hee may not be able to see the depth of their meaning. These things when I had found, as I thought, (though I know I am much short of finding all) I was willing, according to my abilitie, to impart them unto well-meaning Christians, that they seeing the deepe frauds of these men, may learne to shun their company and acquaintance.

In which indouour of mine, what service I may haue done for the publique good, I cannot tell: but sure I am, if there be any good in it, I should in reason returne it whither, where I first found it. The consideration whereof, hath made mee to presume so far upon your Graces clemency, as to lay downe at your feet this poore Treatise, the grounds whereof I first learned from your owne pen: desiring (if therein I be not over-bold) that it may, under your name and protection, be sent forth into the world. Which being all, that at this time I haue to say, I humbly take my leave, desiring the God of peace and truth, to preserve you from euery euill word and worke, that you may maintaine his truth in this world, and enjoy his peace both in this world, and the World to come.

Your Graces deuoted in all seruice,

HENRIE MASON



TO MY LOVING AND
Dearely beloued Parishioners, the
Inhabitants of S. Andrews vnder-shaft in
London, GRACE and TRUTH in
IESVS CHRIST.

IN the ordinary exercise of my
ministry among you, when I
came to speak of the ninth Co-
mandement, the first thing that
I met with to bee considered,
was the matter of *Truth* and *Lying*. And con-
sidering hereof, I found two sorts of Lyes
frequent among men: the one, an open and
professed Lye; and the other, a cunning and
artificiall Lye. The former was defended by
the *Priscillianists*, an old kinde of Heretikes: &
the latter is now defended by the *Romanists*,
a latter sort of false Prophets. Both of them are
odious to God, who is honoured by *Truth*;
and pernicious to the societie of men, which
is vpheld by *Truth*: but the latter is the more
(b) dangerous,

dangerous, because vnder a colour of *Truth* it beguileth simple soules, who are otherwise enemies to Lying. The consideration heereof, made me to enquire a little further into this Arte; which the fauourers thereof haue sought to conceile, by calling it by a new name. For beeing ashamed of the name of Lying, they haue christened it by the name of Equiuocating: a name as vnknowne in this meaning, as the Arte it selfe was vnheard of before these latter dayes. The mystery and iuggling tricks of which deuice, I did then and vpon that occasion, in part discouer vnto you: but briefly and plainely, the time, and place, and occasion not admitting of any long or Schoole-like discourse. But since considering, that together with the increase of false Prophets in this Kingdome, this Arte of falsehood hath abounded also: I thought it a part of my duty, (God hauing pleased to place mee as a Watch-man ouer your Soules) to giue you a fresh warning of this danger, and that in a more ample and large discourse, then formerly I had done, and in such a maner and sort, that you might haue something lying by you, that might aduertise you of this dangerous deceit; when I could

not haue opportunity to speak vnto you out of the Pulpit. And this I was moued to vnat this time the rather; because I haue of late obserued, that these artificiall Lyers (among their other deuices and forgeries, which vpon confidence of this Arte, they take liberty to vse without remorse) doe instill into the minds of their credulous followers, an opinion; and doe labour to spread abroad among others a suspition, that among our Learned men, many in heart are of their Church, howsoeuer for the worlds sake they dissemble their opinion: and that there are a good number among vs of the Clergie, who are better perswaded of their Religion, then of our own. Doctor Sheldon, a man well acquainted with their dealings, as hauing liued in their bosome, and taken the Orders of Priesthood in their Church, doth write, that * *whilest hee fed on Romes buskes, hee* * Sheldon
often heard of many grieuous imputations laied of the mira-
upon some of the greatest Clerkes in the Church cles of Anti-
of England, as though in heart they were theirs, christ, ca. 4.
which he then beleeeued to be true, as others did; pag. 52.
but since hath found to be much otherwise. And
my selfe haue met with some, (which perswa-
deth me, that they abuse others in this kind,
(b) 2 beside

beside our *greatest Clerkes*) who haue more then intimated to my selfe, that I knew that which might iustifie their cause, if I would speake it. Which might well put mee into a muse, what had euer slipped frō me, why they should be perswaded that I had such an opinion of their Church : sauing that I considered, that this might well be one of the Iesuites equiuocating deuices, to instill that opinion concerning vs, into their Disciples minds, that so they might gaine more credit to their cause. Vpon which occasion, entring a more serious cōsideration of the point; I perceiued, that besides this *Arte*, they vse other deuices also, for this purpose, which I thought good, for your better caution and safety, briefly to relate in this place.

First then, if they meete with any of our *Clergie*, which are of weake braine, and vnsettled resolution, (as it is possible, wee may haue some such as well as they) they set vpon such weaklings, with plausible tales in commendation of their Church; whose open abominations practised at home among themselves, are not so well known to vs, who haue neuer trauelled into Popish Countreys. And if by
this

this meanes they chance to peruert a *weake* and *unsettled* man, then the cry goeth, that such a *Learned* man, is become a Catholike, because euidence of truth forced him to forkake his old Profession.

Secondly, if they meete with men, who being either opinatiue of their own worth, think their good parts not sufficiently rewarded; or being indeed of good parts, haue but slender meanes: they tempt such, as the Deuill did our Sauour, with offers of gifts and preferments. And if by these allurements they can bribe any man to become their *Proselyte*, for *filthy lucre sake*, then they blaze abroad the conuersion of such a great and learned Scholar, who could not withstand the light of truth shining in the *Roman Church*.

Thirdly, if by these, and such like policies, they preuaile not: (for these deuices fit them best, because then they bring men ouer to their side, with their own mouthes to publish their owne shame; but if thus they preuaile not) yet one shift they haue behind, which is, to deuise lyes, of such and such mens conuersion to their Church, who euer hated it from their very soules. In which kind of forgerie, they

(b) 3.

haue

haue so farre proceeded, that they haue spared neither liuing nor dead. For, as if they had cast off all feare of shame, which was sure in the end to be their reward, they haue in writing belyed in this maner, the chiefeſt Doctors in our Church, who haue suruiued to refute, and to detest their forgeries in Print. But when men are dead, then they become more bold: and of the most constant and zealous Professors of our Religion, they giue it out to the world, that such and such men of chiefeſteeme in the *Protestant* Church, did recant vpon their death beds, it being then no time to dissemble any longer. And when themselves haue first deuised these tales on their fingers ends; then they produce them in their serious bookes of Controuersie, as graue arguments to confirme the *Roman* faith by. The discouery of which falsehood, I wish it may worke the like effect in your hearts, that it hath done in mine: which is, that whereas I vtterly disliked Poperie before, I do now detest it more then euer. And for this purpose I was the rather moued to penne this small Treatise, that you, of whose soules I knowe my selfe to haue vndertaken the charge, seeing these forgeries, may

may learne to beware of *Equiuocating Spirits* :
who, though otherwise they professe strictnes
of conscience, & according to the rules of the
Romane Faith, are very deuout and religious;
yet can cozen you with an hundred lying de-
uices, and neuer feeble the least grudge of con-
science for it. For so Father *Persons* telleth vs,
that * *Equiuocations are allowed principally to men*
of scrupulous conscience, for avoiding of lying. By
which he giueth vs a faire warning, (and I de-
fire you take notice of it) that if there be any
scrupulous and tender consciences amongst
them (as some no doubt there are) though
they would not tell a lye, if they knew it, for
all the world, yet euen such men may with-
out any scruple or feare, deceiue vs with *equi-
uocating reseruations*, and mentall deuices. And
hauing thus giuen you this faire warning, now
me thinketh I may speake vnto you, to the
same purpose as our Lord did to his Disciples; *Matt. 24. 5.*
If they shall say vnto you, *Loe beere is Christ,* *23. 24.*
or loe there, beleene it not; for there are many
false Prophets arisen, and doe deceiue many. *Be-*
hold I haue told you before. And if after all this
warning, any of you shall suffer himselfe to be
deluded by lying Equiuocators, *his blood will*
bee

Gal. 5. 10.

Gal. 6. 11.

bee vpon his owne head, but I haue deliuered mine
owne soule. But I feare not this in you, of whose
constancie and zeale I haue had good experi-
ence: so that I may rather take vp that saying
of the Apostle, *I haue confidence in you through
the Lord, that ye will be no otherwise minded; but
that, if any man shall trouble you, (or seek to
withdrawe you from your faith) he shall beare
his iudgement, whoeuer he be.* And in assurance
hereof, I leaue you to Gods grace, in the words
of the same Apostle; *Brethren, the Grace of our
Lord Iesus Christ be with your Spirit. Amen.*

Yours, the vnworthy Minister
of Iesus Christ, and your ser-
uant for Iesus sake,

HENRIE MASON.

TO



TO the READER.



When the Impression of this Treatise was almost finished, I obtained the sight of two severall papers of Latine Verses, composed long since, in the yeere 1606. by two then Students in the Vniuersities, now Doctors in Diuinitie, and my worthy friends. Which Verses being (according to the Academicall custome) made vpon Questions then disputed in both the Vniuersities, in Publicis Comitijis, and happily concurring with the subiect of this Treatise, as I was glad that my selfe had gotten, so I was willing to impart them to the Reader, presuming that my two friends, and much-respected brethren, will not be offended, that I send them their Verses backe againe in Print.

A

Aequivo-



*Questio philo-
sophica in Comicijs
Cantabr.*

*Aequivocationis tenebrae pugnant
cum rationis lumine.*

*Ecloga. Cui nomen Pseudolus,
siue Aequivocator.*

Persona.

Simia. Pseudolus.

*Vide passim Ho-
ratij Satyrarum
quintam, &
Plauti Pseudo-
lum, cui iste sup-
per.*

*a Sic Black-
wellus Archi-
presbyter in sua
ad Catholicos
Epistola dat. 7.
Novemb. 1605.*

*b Vinculo caeca
obediencia ob-
stringi o mnes
Iesuitas & no-
uitas Seminariorum pullos abunde notum est: Quo tenentur, quidquid Superior imperaverit,
seorsum ad id agere exequi.*

Sim. **H**oc quoque docte Pater, præter narrata, petenti,
Pseudole, responde, quibus artibus in via rerum
Effugiam, nostræ propria pericula Sectæ.
Nonne vides quàm non satis est maria omnia circum
Romuleæ quæsisse diu responsa Cathedræ,
Vinctos, adraños, Iesu cognomen adeptos,
Iam revehi in patriam, Romæ duce, & auspice Romæ!
Hinc crucis, hinc vrget malus horror carceris; aut nos.
Explorat densus, capita heu damnata, Sattelles.
Pseud. ^a Nos nil interea miseri, nil tendere contra,
Nos tantum lachrymas, & nulli audita Deorum
Vota damus: vel, si nostra hoc Ecclesia poscat,
Idque ^b Patri (qui nos in Sancta incepta remittit)

Præ-

Pseudolus.

Præcipisse lubet, bello, sicavè, venenovè
Extinxisse nefas, & gentem abolere nefandam
Conamur; vel, si zelus flagrantior adsit,
Forſan ſulphureo diſperdimus obvia flatu.

(veſter

Sim. Cuncta piè ac rectè. *Pſeud.* Quid rides? *Sim.* Simia

Ille ego. Nos inter quaſi e nos non norimus. *Pſeud.* Euge *c* Lupus lupum
Simia quandoquidem tam ſanctè, tamq; ſeuere
Iſta rogas, noſtram miſſis ambagibus Artem,

nouit, &c.

Artem, quam magnus docuit *Pater* ^d *Arius*, Artem, ^d *Ary* hereticus.
Cortinam quæ Phœbe tuam, quæ te quoq; Proteu,
Vinciat, & vincat (paucis adverte) ^e docebo.

cba ſophiſticum

& Acquiraculo-

rium coram Impe-

ratore Conſtan-

tino inſurandum

recole apud Sa-

cratem Hiſt Ec-

cleſ. lib. 1. c. 25.

e Plautus in

Pſeudolo Aſt. 2.

Scen. 4.

Pſeud. Onerabu-

meis præcep-

tis Simiam

Quid agat, ne

quid titubet, do-

ctè ut hanc ſeriat

fallaciam.

f Apocal. 9. 11.

g Quid olim

Templarij, quid

vi tandem Je-

ſuiti occiderat?

Putide Tireſia. *Quicquid loquere aut eris, aut non:*

O quàm divinare tibi donavit Apollo.

Lentū eſt. Quicquid ego edixi *ſimul ipſum eris, & non.*

Equiuocare mihi Stygius dedit ^f *Απολλων*

Sim. Eſt, & Non ſemper ſibi contradicere dixi,

Et didici à puero. Si iam hæc mutaverit ætas,

Auſa ratam violare fidem, & convellere prima

Fundamenta, quibus verorum innititur ordo,

Submetuo ne nos (quorum venerabile nomen

Auſanctum populis, & formidabile Sceptris

Nunc ſedet ad primas) & olim, volventibus annis,

Mutati in peius ſaſtidia publica ſumus.

Sed tu perge loqui quorſum hæc adeo ardua tendant.

Pſeud. Rectâ ad te, fili. Si te, ſub iudice (qualis

Hæreticæ nimium eſt vigil indagatio turbæ)

Contigerit reſponſa peti, vel dicere cauſam,

Accipe quâ ratione queas nec prodere verum,

Nec male mentiri, nec te obiectare periculo,

Nec reticere tamen. Captes aſtutus oportet

Lucifugam ſermonem, & verſicoloria diſta.

Sim. Ut ne vir eludam pueri de more Sophiſtæ?

Præterea, ſiquid perplexi ſubloquar, omnes,

Evolve, ingeminant. *Pſeud.* Vah nil ſapis: utere verbis *Ariſt.* *ſel*

Ex ſe perſpicuis, ſed mente interprete tortis, *'Egylwv iſt.*

Mente *cap. 1.*

Pseudolus.

b *Act. 1. Sc. 2.*

Pseud. Tu inventus verò me-
am qui foras illes
fidem?

i *Act. 1. Sc. 3.*

Pseud. Dy im-
mortales auri-
chalco contra non
charum fuit
Menum menda-
cium.

k *Act. 4. Sc. 8.*

Nimis illic mor-
talis doctus, nimis
versutus, nimis
malus
Superavit dolum
Troianum atque
Vyssem Pseu-
dolum.

l *Act. 2. Sc. 2.*

Pseud. Hic mihi
incens est, procu-
dam ego hodie
hinc multos
dolos.

Formula reserua-
tionum mentalis
Iesuaitis vtilitate,
Non novi i. e.
apodistice.
Non vidi, i. e.
visuane b'ati-
ficat.
Vel non ut di-
cam tibi.

Mente tua, non mente illa, quæ consona voci.

Sim. Me verò meminì primo didicisse Lyczo

Sensa animi rerum, sensorum Symbola voces.

Scilicet vtibilem linguæ articulantis honorem

Naturam tribuisse patet mortalibus, vt sit

In quo conueniant, & possint mutua fungi.

Quinetiam ratio. — Pseud. ^b Nam tu rationibus audes

Iniussu certare meo? meminisse decebat,

Me Patre cum primum nostrarū elementa Scholarum

Imbiberes, in verba manus te nostra dedisse.

Imperio iam disce meo: ac, dum prosequor, audi.

Forsitā hoc de te quærat, *Tunc Sacerdos?*

Non ego Responde. Sim. Quid? mentiar? Haud ita Romæ.

Pseud. Ipse fui Romæ; mentiri nescio. Num tu

Esse Sacerdotem te credis *Apollinis, Orci,*

Isidos, aut Cereris? Tu sic intellige. ⁱ Fraus hæc

Argento contra non chara est, aut orichalco.

Sic itidem. *Tun? Romam adiisti?* Non ego Romam

Vnquam adii (*capite incedens, aut compede victus,*

Aut furcam ore gerens, humerovè molatili saxum)

Simia, ne risu te ruperis. Hæc ego trado

Sobrius, ac prudens. Sim. ^k O te, Pater alme, cerebri

Fœlicem! quàm Dîa doces! Haud talia dicant

Pythagoras, Anytivè reus, vel dogma Platonis.

Pseud. Te præstas nobis ^l incudem Simia: tecum,

Dum loquor, ipse novas videor producere technas.

Si, cui consilii socium te adiunxeris, idem

Cum fuerit Patriæ suffossor, perq; duellis,

Is coram sistatur, & hunc norisne rogeris?

Haud te nosse hominem, prius aut vidisse, repone.

Non nosse (*ex animi cantu, Boreave susurro,*

Non ex Æthiopum. historijs, Troiaeve ruinis,

Non ex notitiâ, qua Demonstratio dicta est.)

Non vidisse (*oculis palpebra tegmine clausis,*

Non oculis Argus, non alta noctis in umbris,

Pseudolus.

*Non disjunctarum trans saxea septa domorum,
Non hoc, quem Coelum dabit olim Patria, visu:
Denique non, ut rem tibi, Iudex improbe, narrem.)*

Sic non lingua tibi mendax, sed dictio fallax.
Interea^m duplices condens in pectore sensus,
Viceris, & rabidos prædâ spoliaveris hostes.
Sim. O Pater: ô nulli quidquam mentite, quid autem,
Quid si iuratos recta ad responsa laceſſiant,
Si tangendæ aræ, sic cœlum in vota vocandum,
Fallemusne fidem? *Pseud.* Fidei est sine corpore nomen
Hæreticis concessa fides. Periuria non sunt,
Quæ varium sumunt ex vocum ambage colorem,
Aut iniuratae sunt dissona nuncia mentis.

Sim. Hæc super Hæretici iurabunt protinus omnes,
Papicolis non esse Deum: " ludibria Cœlo
Conceptis fieri, consultisq; impia verbis:

°Non posse (ut reliquæ cessant hoc nomine lites)
His pietate malis obſisti. *Pseud.* Simia, quicquid
Hic nobis inimica cohors obganniat (ut se
Ruperit invidiâ) tu sic, licet vndiq; crescat
Suspicio, corvum hûdes & elapsus hiantem
Tortilis in morem anguillæ, & nova flumina inibis.
Deprendi miserum est, vel Apolline iudice vincam.

Me memini quondam bis ter vè his artibus vsum:
°Periurum aiebant. Quid tum? Non hoc mihi bilem
Moverat. Irascor, quod non irasceris hosti

Arciùs. *Sim.* Ipse quidem (sic me rationis egentem
Dementisse modo fateor) vix ista putaram
Digna fide. Iam me Magnæ reuerentia Romæ,
Iam tuâ me virtus, cœnuraq; nescia falli
Imperii egere suis, ut singula credam,
Et cupiam ut capiam tam sanctæ imitamina fraudis:
Iam liqueo in laqueos, totusq; inter fluo rimis:
Iam me vtinam celebres Romani nominis hostes

manifesto tenetur? Ch. Anguilla est, elabitur. ° AEl. 4. Sc. 6. Bal. Malum & scelestum, periurum
aiebant esse me. Si. Pol haud mentitus es. Bal. Ego haud iratus fui.

^m AEl. 2. Sc. 1.
Pseud. Ego in
meo pectore ita
paravi copias du-
plicis triplicis do-
los

Perfidias, ut & bi-
eumq; cum hos-
ibus congregiar
malorum meorum
Fretus virtute
dicam, mea in-
dustria & maliti-
tia fraudulentiâ
Facile ut vinâ,
facile ut spelitem
meos perducas
meis perfidijs.

° AEl. 1. Sc. 3.
Quid ais quantis
terra regis homi-
num perurissime
Iuravisti? te,
&c. Bal. fateor.
Cal. nempe con-
ceptis verbis. Bal.
etiâ consultis quo-
que. Cal. Periur-
avisti scelestè.

° Ibidem.
Pseud. Non po-
tèſt pietate obſisti
huic, ut res sunt
cetera.
Deos quid è, quos
maximè aquum
est metuerè, eos
minimi facit.

° AEl. 5. Sc. 4.
Pseud. Quid cū

Pseudolus.

Exagitent. Sic est. An mecum Pseudolus unquam
Verba habuit, quærun. Nunquam, respondeo, quicquā
Verborum (*virides urentum flatribus ornos,*
Aut animas Erebo, Scopulis, glacieve cientum.
Non per canalem sonnit, Taurumve Perilli.
Non Arabum lingua Chaldaeorumve loquutus,
Non lingua veridior, τῆς ἀληθῆς, βαρβαρῆς γλῶσσης,
ἡ δὲ κοινὴ ἐστὶν ἡ προσηγορία, ἢ ἡ ἑλληνική,
Μυσιγάρτων γλῶσση. Pseud. Quo tendis nūbila supra?
Sim. Κορυθαοὐρανόθεν. Pseud. Satis ὁ satis. Vnde sed ista?
Sim. Nomina sunt longè populorum utroq; sub Indo,
Quos è barbarie nuper sub fœdera Christi,
Pontificiq; iugum nostri misère Sodales.

* *Al. 4. Sc. 1.*
Pseud. O homi-
nem lepidum! te
quoque etiam do-
lis
Atque etiā men-
dacys. Iupiter te
mihi servet.

Pseud. O lepidū, charumq; caput, quā Pseudoliciffas!
Simia non magis est imitatrix, Simia, quā tu.
Te mihi, te servet Romæ, ac sibi Iupiter. Sim. Atqui
Pluris adhuc ego sum. Si quando (scilicet haud sunt
Semper in occulto nostræ mysteria Sectæ)
Suspicio est cæcos verbis me affingere sensus,
Iurabo me non hoc fingere: dumq; ita iurem,
Interea me non quicquam finxisse, negantem
Fingere, iurabo. Tum tertia, quarta secundis
Iuramenta superiiciam catus. Omnia falsa,
Et falsura omnes. Hæc *Æquinoctio* nomen
Me tribuente, potest *Reflexa* aut * *Orbica* dici. (te
Pseud. (Dapsile ob inventū hoc, nequeo, mi Simia, quin
Osculer, argutumq; caput demulceam, Abundè
Iam scio te nostris aurem adiecisse lubentem
Consiliis; &, quæ superaddis, facta daturum.
Sim. Quī verò nosti num non, dum, Pseudole, tecum
Hæc loquor, æquivocè me iam tibi credere fingam,
Æquivocè tibi pollicear me strenuè in hostes
Vocibus æquivocis vsurum? Pseud. O improba virtus!
Sim. Dum pullum doceas oculos transfigere, corve

* *Æquinoctio*
circularis.
* *Al. 4. Sc. 1.*
Vt ego ob tuam,
Simia, perfidiam
te amo, et metuo,
& magnifacio.

* *ἡ δὲ κοινὴ ἐστὶν ἡ*
προσηγορία, ἢ ἡ
ἑλληνική.

Pseudolus.

Ipse tuis caveas. *Pseud.* Metuo malè, ne malus iste,
Et nimum præcox Patris anticipator, ab hoste
Protinus in nostros obuertat cornua. *Sim.* Nam quid
Impedit, in Caium qui sit periurus cundum
In Titiū quoq; — *Pseud.* Sed nostris sermonibus ecum
Nescio quis captator adest. Discede. *Sim.* Valto.

Quid ni igitur

Pseudolus æquivocare docens, & *Simia* discens,
Verborum laqueos ambo luan laqueos

THO. GOAD
Magister Artium.

• *Al.* 4. Sc. 3.
Pseud. Peiorem
ego hominem,
magisq; versutè
malum,
Numquā a diol.
quenquam vidi
quam hic est Si-
mia,
Nimisq; ego illum
hominem metuo,
& formido male,
Ne malus item
erga me sit, ut er-
ga illum fuit;
Ne in re secunda
mibi obuertat
cornua.

An

Questio philoso-
phica proposita in
Comitijs Oxon.

An Societati humanae infestiores sinte vasi Amphibologi, } *Affirmo.*
quam aperte periuri.

* Guido Faux.

* Garnet Ies.

* Parenthesis in-
cludit mentalem
Iesuita reservati-
onem.

FAUX erebi, patriæ fax, fax mundi, *vnū at habebis
Patrem flagitii, flagitio parem.

Herculeas ambo sceleri posuere columnas,

Nū ultra, hic calamo pessimus, hic manu.

Nomine qui varius, qui vestibus, ore, colore es

Vectus trans mare tu? Non (*mare mortuum.)

Curia Papalis tibi visa est? Non (*sine scortis*)

Sacris Papa caput? Non (*caput anemum*)

Num tu mendicans abraço crine Sacerdos?

Non (*ritu antipodum*; Non (*apud inferos*)

Nonne a te binis grauidata est Fulvia natis?

Non, verum fateor (*bimula cum foret.*)

Heus laqueo nodos claudas hos ocyus vno,

Et nodo laqueos, in cruce carnifex.

Ignare æquiucæ fraudis constringito fauces,

Garnetto vniucè guttura frangito.

Pendeat infelix, membris truncetur, aperte

Periuro æquiucos crimine dirior.

Pectore diffisso videas, quæ mente *reservat*;

Evulsi latebras cordis et explices.

Ancipiti gladio Iesuitica texta secentur:

Solvi nam nequeunt ancipites doli.

DAN. FEATLY,
Magister Artium.



THE
NEW ARTE OF
Lying, couered by Iesuites
under the Vaile of
Equiuocation.



He * Apostle describing the state a 1.Theſ.2.7.
of Antichriſt, doth ſignifie, that
a *mysterie of iniquitie* ſhould ap-
peare in the managing of it:
and this doth implie, that in the
kingdome of Antichriſt *iniquity*
ſhould reigne vnder a couert of
holineſſe. And the ſame Apoſtle
doth foretell, b that in the latter
times (which are the times of Antichriſts reigne) men
ſhould *ſpeake lies in hypocriſie*. And this, though it may
bee extended farther, yet cannot bee more literally vn-
derſtood, then of ſuch as teach a practice of *lying*, vn-
der a pretence of preſeruing *truth*. Now of theſe
Prophecies of the Apoſtle I may ſpeake in a like man-
ner, and almoſt in the ſame words, as our * Lord ſpake c Luke 44.
of the Prophecie of *Iſai*; *This day are theſe Scriptures*
fulfilled in our eyes; for now wee ſee thoſe who ex-
erciſe a *mysterie of iniquity*, and *ſpeake lies*, pretending
thereby to maintaine and preſerue the *truth*: as (to

omit all further instance) may evidently be scene in a new-found Arte of *Equiuocation*. For the Masters and maintainers thereof doe tell vs, ^d That by speaking according to this Arte of dissembling, sinnes are avoided, which, without it, are commonly committed. And that ^e Equiuocation altogether serueth, or is of good vse for auoiding of lyes and perinuries. And ^f that for what end or reason soeuer a man sweare, that hee did not doe a thing, which indeed hee did doe, yet hauing his reservation within himselfe, he in very deede telleth no lie. And ^g that by this singular doctrine wee may auoid innumerable sinnes, which through heedlesnesse diners of vs doe euery foote commit, by denying or affirming things vsually, without a reservation understood, with which if they were ioyned, they would bee true. And to this purpose it is, that Father ^h Garnet, a Master of this Arte, when a booke was to be licenced by him, the title whereof was, *A Treatise of Equiuocation*, hee scored out that title, and put this in the place of it, *A Treatise against lying and fraudulent dissimulation*. By all which it may appeare, that these men, while they teach the Arte of *Equiuocation*, do professe notwithstanding, that all which they doe, is with a religious obseruance and preservation of the trueneth. But now in the second place I offer to prooue in this short Treatise, that whatsoeuer shewes they make to the contrary, yet this deuice of *Equiuocation* is in truth, an Arte of falshood and deceit, and such as the Scriptures doe condemne vnder the name of *lying*. Which point if it bee once cleared, then there can be no doubt, but that the Church of *Rome*, and her Doctors, are they which exercise a mystery of iniquity, and speake lies in hypocrisie.

^d Loquendo cum Arte dissimulationis vitatur peccata, quae communiter committuntur, &c. Rodriquez sumâ, v. mendac. nu. 4.

^e Acquiuocatio, in his singulari doctrinae uicem, omnino ad mendacia perinuriasque vitanda confert. Heissius Refut. Aphor. cap. 4. Aphor. h nu. 130.

^f Sine recreationis gratia, siue quocunque alio fine, iuret se non fecisse aliquid quod reuera fecit, intelligendo intra se aliquid aliud &c. reuera non mentitur. Sanchez oper. moral. to. 1. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 15. pag. 25.

^g Per hanc doctrinam singularem, possumus evitare innumera peccata, quae passim aliquot negligentiores admittimus negando vel affirmando passim sine aliqua subintellectione, cum qua coniuncta essent vera. Nauar. Comment. in C. Humanæ aur. q. 3. nu. 13.

^h Proceeding against Traitors. lib. 1.

Now

Now for the clearing hereof, and that the world may see more fully what to thinke of this *mystery*, there are five things, which I haue thought necessary to be considered of.


1 *The name, or what is meant by the word Equinocation in this Question.*

2 *The Originall of it, or who be the Authors and vpholders of it.*

3 *The obiect and matter, or in what cases they allow it to be lawfull.*

4 *The vse, or rather abuse of it, or for what turnes it may serue the Patrons of it.*

5 *The Grounds, or what the proofes or reasons are either for or against it.*



CHAP. I.

Of the name, and what is meant by the word Equinocation in this Question.



Hat wee may the better vnderstand what is meant by this word, wee must note that there are two famous acceptions and vses of the word *Equinocation* among men. The first is a proper and ancient vse of it, frequent among all sorts of writers, but handled and spoken of, especially in Logicke. The second is an improper and abusive acception of it, which was of late yeeres deuised by some writers and Doctors of the Romane Church. Father Parsons calleth the former, *verball*, and the later, *mentall Equinocation*. And of these hee saith, ^a that the *verball* is a *Mitigat. cap. 8* proper *Equinocation*; the *mentall* is so called, rather by a *nu. 10. p. 314.*

a *ibid.* nu. 15.

b *ibid.* nu. 10.

c *Refut. Apbor.*
cap. 4. *Aphor.* 3.
nu. 129.

certaine similitude, then propriety of speech, and that the verball is onely true and proper Equivocation, for that mentall invigor is none. And againe, that ^b Equivocation hath of later yeeres onely been accustomed to bee used in this sense, that is, for mentall Equivocation. And Heissius another Iesuite, & Patron of this Art, saith, that their mixt speech (which they call mentall Equivocation) is not properly Equivocation. By which speeches of these Iesuites (especially seeing the one of them is a man so well seene in this Arts, and so much exercised in this argument of Equivocation) I presume I have sufficient warrant to say as I did, without the controll of any of our punie Iesuites, that the one use and acception is proper and ancient, the other improper, and of a later growth, that is, since the mystery of iniquity did open it selfe more fully to the world, and men did more apparantly speake lies in hypocrisie. But yet for the distinguishing of these two kinds, I will rather call the first *Logicall Equivocation*, as being that which Logicke doth onely acknowledge: and the later I will call *Iesuiticall Equivocation*, as hauing, if not its first deuising, yet at least, its polishing from men of that Order. The Question in this place is onely concerning the later, which I call *Iesuiticall Equivocation*. Notwithstanding, for the better clearing of the point in controuersie, somewhat is first to bee said concerning the former, which I call *Logicall*.

First then for the *Logicall Equivocation*; it is an ambiguous or doubtfull saying, when one word or speech hath more senses then one, and it hapeneth three ways.

1. When a word by it selfe hath diuers significations and meanings; as this word [*to know*] hath. For sometimes it signifieth to apprehend and vnderstand the certaintie of some truth: as when S. Iohn saith; God is greater then our hearts, and knoweth all things. 2. [*To know*] is as much as to approue and allow of: as when

David

a *1oh.* 3. 20.

David saith; The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous. Psal. 1. 6.
And when Christ saith to the foolish Virgins; Verily Math. 25. 12.
I say unto you, I know you not. The meaning is; I doe not
acknowledge you for any of mine. In this, and such like
words as this, there is an Equivocation; because the
word hath diuers acceptions and vses.

2. When words, which haue but one signification of themselves, yet are so ioyned together in some sentence, as that they may, by reason of the composition, make and yeeld diuers meanings: or when by reason of their contexture, they may haue moe meanings than one: as when *S. Luke saith; When they heard this, they were baptized in the Name of the Lord Iesus:* these words are diuersly construed by the Learned. For some thinke them to bee the words of *S. Paul*, and to haue reference to the speech of *John Baptist*, immediately going before: and then the meaning must bee this; that when those brethren, there spoken of, heard *John* so teaching concerning Christ, *they were baptized of John, in the Name of the Lord Iesus.* But others thinke them to be the words of *S. Luke*, and to haue reference to the former speech of *S. Paul*: and then the meaning must be; that when those brethren had heard *Paul* discoursing in this manner of *John* and his Baptisme, then *They were baptiz'd of Paul, in the Name of Christ.* In this Clause then, there are two senses given by the Learned; and that sheweth that there is an ambiguity; but that ambiguitie riseth not from the diuersitie of significations in any of the words, but from the different consideration of the contexture or composition of the sentence.

3. When the circumstances of time, place, persons, &c. are such, as that in reason, and in the iudgement of sober men, being well and duely considered, they may limit or restraine the speech to some speciall matter or subiect; or otherwise alter the meaning of it from that

Acts 20. 27.

which it should haue, if it were in some other place, and vpon some other occasion. As for example: when S. Paul saith; *I haue not shunned to declare vnto you all the Counsell of God.* These words considered by themselves, doe comprize all the Secrets of God, and all the mysteries of His Wisedome: but if we consider the circumstances of the persons, time, place, and occasion; as that the speaker was *Paul*, an Apostle, whose office and employment was to teach the mysteries of Religion; that the hearers were the Church of *Ephesus*, who expected information in matters of saluation; and that the occasion of their meeting at this time, and in this place, was onely for teaching and learning the Word of God, and the Gospell of Iesus Christ: these circumstances, in reason, may teach vs, that in this place, those words [*all the Counsell of God*] are not to bee extended to all the secrets and depth of Gods Wisedome; a great part whereof, is neither reuealed, nor necessarie to bee knowne of any man; and some part whereof, though it be reuealed, yet was not pertinent to this occasion; but rather, that those words are to bee limited and restrained, according to the present occasion, to signifie and note, all necessary things for them to know for their soules health and saluation. Or, to giue a more familiar example, and such as a Iesuite hath giuen instance in; wee may suppose, that two men going together in a iourney; the one of them (his money fayling him) desireth to borrow ten pound of his fellow; who maketh answer, that he hath not so much: heere his meaning must be supposed to be, that he hath not so much in his purse, or so much in a readinesse about him, though he had foure times the like value in his Chest at home. But if the same thing should be desired of him, when he were at home in his owne house, then the meaning would be, that he had not such a summe at home. And the same answer, which was true, beeing giuen to his fellow-

fellow. Traueller by the way; would be a lye, if it were vttered to him in his house. Thus there may arise an ambiguity in a speech, by reason of the circumstances of person, place, time, and occasion; where otherwise there is no ambiguity either in the signification of any word, or in the composition of the sentence, considered in and by themselves.

And in what kind focuer, of these now specified, there happeneth an ambiguity; that I call a *Logicall Equiuocation*; concerning which our present question is not. For as the Doctors of the Romane Church, so the learned of our side doe acknowledge, that there may bee a lawfull vse of equiuocall speeches in euery of these kinds, if they be not extended too farre, or mis-applied to a wrong cause. For, to speake more particularly, it is granted,

1. That we may lawfully vse words, which may indifferently be taken in diuers acceptions and meanings, as they are then vsed. And this is plaine, partly because the Scriptures are full of such speeches; and partly, because our common conuersation and life cannot bee without them.

2. It is not vnlawfull, when some case of further good doth require it, to vse these ambiguous speeches in the lesse knowne and common signification, and in another meaning then it is likely the hearers wil vnderstand them for the present. For so, when our Lord said, *Lazarus our friend sleepest*; He meant that he was dead; Ioh. II. II. which was the lesse common and knowne signification; and therefore the Disciples, according to the more vsuall meaning, vnderstood him of naturall sleepe. And he did this for good purpose, and for the profit of the hearers; that they might heereby learne, either that death in generall is to Gods children but as a *sleepe*, by which they are refreshed, and made the more lively: or that this death of *Lazarus*, was rather to bee called

a sleepe, then a death, because hee was so speedily raised from it againe.

3 It is not vnlawfull, if there be iust cause for concealing of a trueth, to vse an ambiguous speech in any of these kindes, that thereby we may hide some thing from the hearers, which they should not know. This assertion hath not so direct prooffe from *Scripture*, as the others haue; & yet it is not without all prooffe from the *Scriptures* neither. For there wee finde, that a man may lawfully vtter one trueth, thereby to hide another trueth from the hearer. As for example, a God appointed *Samuel* to goe to *Bethleem* and anoint one of *Iesses* sonnes to bee King; and when *Samuel* objected, *How can I goe? If Saul heare it, hee will kill mee. The Lord said, Take an heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord.* And so *Samuel* did, as it followeth in the same Chapter; and by this he concealed his purpose of anointing a new King; which was the speciall intent of his going to that place. And if it be lawfull and warranted by Gods own appointment to vtter one trueth, for the concealing of another: then in reason I thinke it cannot iustly be condemned for vnlawfull, if a man, vpon iust occasion, doe vse an ambiguous speech in a true sense, thereby to hide from the hearer, something which hee should not knowe. For if in so doing, any thing bee faulty, it must be, as I take it, the one of the two; either because an ambiguous speech is vsed in another meaning then it is likely the hearer will take it; and that to be lawfull, is prooued in the former assertion: or because this true sense in the ambiguous speech, is vttered to conceal another thing from the hearer; and that to be lawfull, is cleare by this example of *Samuel*. And therefore I thinke the conclusion may hence be inferred, that it is not vnlawfull, if there be iust cause for concealing of a trueth, to vse an ambiguous speech, that thereby we may conceal some other thing, which is not sin

to

a 1. Sam. 16.
1, 2.

to be vttered. And hereto agree our learned diuines also. For one, speaking of *Equiuocatio*, as it consisteth in the ambiguity of words vttered, addeth, *T*his is the kind of *Equiuocation*, especially in ordinary speech, no man doubts but that it may lawfully be used. And, *this Equiuocation* may haue his due place for concealing of Counsels, and binding of secrets. And againe, speaking to his aduersary, *Knowe* (saith he) *that those concealments*, whether of Confessions or Counsels, whereof you speake, where they doe consist of ambiguities in the words, Wee dislike not: onely if they be couered with a lie, that Wee doe wholly condemne. And another learned writer in our Church, speaking of one, that magnified the vse of *Equiuocation*, adioineth, *I*f by the name of *Equiuocation* be vnderstand a plain and sober concealing and couering of secret counsels, which in this miserable life is oft times necessary, I am of his opinion too. This is the opinion and iudgement of our learned men, concerning the vse of *Logicall Equiuocation*; and herein we agree with them of the Church of *Rome*: or if there bee any difference among the learned of both sides in these cases already mentioned, as perhaps about some circumstances in the vse of those ambiguous speeches there may be, it is nothing to the present Question in hand, which is not concerning any of the kindes of these *Logicall Equiuocations*, which consist in the ambiguous acception and meaning of the words vttered. And therefore when the *Equiuocators* of our time doe labor to confirme their *Arte*, by the authorized vse of such speeches, as are ambiguous by reason of the diuers meanings which the words may receiue, they misse the marke, beate the ayre, and spend their labour to no purpose.

And this being briefly noted, concerning the true and *Logicall Equiuocation*, I come now to the *improper and Iesuiticall*. And that what it is, I will set downe in their owne words, who profess to bee Patrons of it.

a Mitigat. cap. Father *Persons* : then, a man very laborious in the poli-
 9. m. 13. p. 382. string of this *Arte*, defineth it thus; *Equiuocation* or *Am-*
 philologes in this our *Controuerſie*, is nothing else, but when
 a speech is partly vttered in words, and partly reserved in
 mind, by which reservation the sense of the proposition may
 be diuers. And again, went all *Equiuocation* (saith he)
 b Mitigat. ca. is, when any speech hath or may haue a double sense, not by
 12. m. 3. p. 484. any double signification or composition of the words them-
 selves, but only by some reservation of minds in the speaker,
 whereby his meaning is made different from the sense which
 the words that are vttered; doe beare or yeeld without that
 reservation. And Sanchez giving a Rule concerning the
 words vsed in this their *Equiuocation*, saith, *A man*
 c Possum adq; may without telling of a lye, use those words, yea though they
 mendacio ea ver- be not ambiguous by their signification, and doe not make a
 ba uis pari, et- true sense, either by themselves, or by reason of the circum-
 amf ex sua sig- stances then occurring; but doe only make a true sense by
 nificatioue non some addition, kept in the speakers minde, what former that
 sine ambigua, nec addition bee. Thus they: By which descriptions it ap-
 cum sensum ve- peareth, that *Iesuiticall Equiuocation*, is a mixt proposi-
 rum admittant tion, (as *Persons* also diners times calleth it) part where-
 ex se, nec ex cir- of it is vttered in words, and so taken it hath one sense;
 cumlatius oc- and another part of it is reserved and understood in the
 currendibus, sed speakers minde, which being added to the words spo-
 tantum verum sen- ken, maketh another sense; as for example, A *Seminarie*,
 sum reddam of a *Iesuite Priest* being asked by a *Magistrate* yea
 ex aliquo addito you a Priest? He answereth, *Ego no Priest*, understand-
 mente profertur ing and reseruing in his minde this clause, *So as I am*
 resento, quodam- bound to tell you, or any other which himselfe pleaseth
 illud st. Sanch. to like purpose: here (say they) is but one mixt pro-
 oper. morall. 3. position, part whereof is vttered in words, namely, *I am*
 c. h. u. 15. no Priest; and that taken alone as it is vttered, breedeth
 a false smyle, and in this sense they would haue the
 Magistrate to conceiue it, & another part of that proposi-
 tion is reserved and kept secret and close in the Priests
 mind, & that is this, *So as I am bound to tell you*. And this
 secret,

secret & mental reservation, being added to the words, maketh this one entire Proposition; *I am no Priest; for as I am bound to tell you:* and that being taken all together, maketh a true sence, and so the Priest vnderstandeth it. And therefore, if he doe but keepe, or reserve, or vnderstand that or any such clause in his minde, though the words which he speaketh bee neuer so false, yet this man telleth no lye, nor speaketh no vntruth. Such is the vertue of this new-found Arte; and thus they describe it.

But that it may yet appeare more fully and more distinctly, it will not be amisse to set downe the mysterie of this Art in certaine distinct Propositions, all gathered from their owne writings, and approued dealings.

1. That this mixt Proposition of theirs, or this Equivocation, as they call it, whether we consider that part of it which is vttered in words, or the whole Proposition, as it hath the reservation added to it, which is kept in the speakers mind, hath in neither respect or consideration,

as F. P. saith, *any doubtfull sense of speech or words,* (a) Mitig. cap. 8. nu. 10. *by their doubtfull or double signification; but only that it stretcheth not all the whole sense of the speaker; & therefore can* pag. 313.

not be properly called equivocal, according to Aristotles meaning & Definition. And againe, The best mixt Propositions (b) saith he) *are not properly equivocal in the sense that*

Aristotle did define, &c. *for that they do not of themselves* (b) Mitig. cap. 11. nu. 14. pag. 447.

nor their own natures, signifie equally diuers things; but being vnderstood wholly, haue a simple and single signification in the mind and vnderstanding of the speaker: yet, for that the bearer of the signification, that is the part thereof, apprehendeth a different sense from the speaker; & they must, as effects, be called ambiguous; for that they haue a different sense in the bearer or speaker, altho of themselves they be plaine, cleere, and true, &c. Out of which words, considered & compared with that which was formerly cited out of Sanchez and Parsons, we may note three things. 1. That there

is no ambiguity or doubtfull sense, either in the words vttered, if they be taken alone; nor in the whole Proposition, as they compound it of the words vttered, & the reservation vnderstood, taken together. 2. That therefore they call it *Equivocation*, or an *Equivocal Proposition* or speech; because they signifie or expresse one meaning to the hearer, which is false; and retaine or vnderstand another sense within themselves, which is true. 3. That the taking of this word *Equivocation* in this meaning, is not proper, and such as *Aristotle* did vnderstand and conceiue by it. Hee might haue said, that it is not proper, nor such as either *Aristotle*, or any man either learned or vnllearned, hauing but common sense in his head, and common honesty in his heart, did euer acknowledge before this last Age. And the truth is, they therefore call it an *Equivocation*, though the word was neuer known to haue any such meaning or signification; because they are ashamed to call it by its right name, which is, *A Lye*. But as the couetous man, though he practiseth the thing, yet abhorres the name; and therefore will be called *a good husband*, or *a thrifty man*: And as a thiefe is ashamed of his right name, and when he meeteth with a Traveller to whom he would signifie his errand, he saith, that *he is a Good-fellow which wanteth money*: So the *Romanists* teach an Arte of lying; and because they are ashamed of the infamous name of *Lyers*, they call themselves *Equiuocators*; and that which other men call *Lying*, they call *Equiuocating*.

2. That if a man will vse this benefit of *Equiuocating*, he must be warie and carefull, that he reserve some secret clause in his mind, which being added to the words vttered, doe make a true speech; or else all is marred, and he, for want of that clause, become a plaine Lier.

To this purpose, Father *Persons* saith, that the *Equiuocator* speaketh a truth in his owne meaning, and in the

the sight of God; which alwaies he must doe, when hee useth this Evasion; for that otherwise he should lye, and commit sinne, if he had not some true sense reserved in his mind, &c.

To declare this yet further: Say that two Priests were questioned by a Magistrate, whether they were Priests or no; and the one should say, *I am no Priest*: and should withall reserve in his mind this clause, *So as I am bound to tell you*: and the other should answer in the very same words, *I am no Priest*: but should forget or neglect to frame or imagine in his mind that reservation, or some such like: the former, who imagined that reservation in his mind, should be an *Equivocator*, and speake the truth; but the latter, who had omitted it, should be a *Lyer*, and utter a falshood and vntruth, though hee speake none but the very same words; and they haue none but one signification and meaning.

Risum teneatis, amici?

This they say, to shew vs, how an *Equivocator* doth differ very much from a *Lyer*. The truth is; this *Equivocator* and this *Lyer* doe differ as much as two false knaues, the one of which is called a Thiefe, and the other, a *Good-fellow that taketh a Purse*.

3. That whatsoever a man doe say or sweare, be it otherwise neuer so false and absurd; yet if a man doe imagine a clause in his mind, which being added to the words spoken, would make a true meaning; then the former speech or saying, how false soeuer otherwise, becommeth true, and without all compasse of lying: because (saith Father *Person*) it is freed from the nature of a Lye, by the due & iust reservation in the speakers mind. By the due and iust reservation, saith hee. But suppose the reservation be not iust and due, but that a man vse this arte, when he ought not to equivocate? Why, yet euen then, he is by this reservation freed from telling of a Lye, though not freed from all sinne. For though he

a Mitigat. cap. 10. nu. 14. pag. 418.

should not be properly the sinne of Lying, nor against the negative Precept of Truth: yet should it be another sinne, against the publike good of ciuill society, and consequently against the affirmative Precept of Truth, &c. Thus speaketh Father *a* Persons.: And to the like purpose Valentin^b. But Sanchez more plainly and roundly: If a man (*c*saith he) either alone or before company, either being asked or of his owne accord, either for recreation sake, or for any other end, doe sweare that he did not doe something, which indeed he did do; vnderstanding within himselfe some other thing then that he did doe; or some other day then that in which he did doe it, or any other addition that is true; this man, in very deed, doth neither lye nor forswear.

Thus they speake, and so must all they that will maintaine this Arte. For whereas Father Persons speake of the Wife of Ananias saith; that *shee* being lawfully demanded by S. Peter in a lawfull cause, touching her owne vow and promise, no clause of reservation could *saue* her speech from lying: he doth here in not only contradict himselfe, as Liers usually doe, but doth also thereby ouerthrow the very grounds of this fond Arte. For if a reservation in the mind doe free the Equiuocator from lying; because that being added to his words, both together do make a true Proposition; why should not a reservation in this womans mind, saue her speech from lying, if it were such, as being added to her words, both together might yeeld a true meaning; which, according to the rules of this Arte, it had beene easie for this woman to frame.

4 That in any case, in which Equiuocation may be vsed, a man may frame any reservation; whatsoeuer himselfe pleaseth, so it be such, as being added to the words, doth make the whole compound to be true.

e Persons sometimes seemeth to require, that the reservation be conformable to the matter, time, and place; & not framed at random, as some fondly do imagine. But he doth but mocke

a Mitigat. cap. 10. num. 23. pag. 424.

b Tom. 3. disp. 5. q. 13. punct. 2. pag. 1136.

c Si quis vel solus vel coram alio; sine interrogatus, sine propria sponte; sine recreationis gratia, sine quocumque alio sine, iuxta se non fecisse aliquid quod reuera fecit, intelligendo intra se aliquid aliud, quod non fecit, vel aliam diem ab ea in qua fecit, vel quoduis aliud additum verum, reuera non mentitur, &c. Sanchez op. moral. l. 3. cap. 6. num. 15. p. 25. *d* Mitigat. cap. 11. num. 29. pag. 439.

e Mitig. c. 10. nu. 22. p. 424.

mocke his Reader; making shew of following the former Schoole-Doctors, whose words these are; when he hath no such meaning as they had in them. For, when he speaketh plainly, and so as you may understand his distinct meaning, then his words are; *I doe truly and really meane, that I am no Priest, in the sense that I speake it, which may be any that pleaseth me, or that I list to frame to my selfe: so as it may meane, that I am no Priest, such as I should be, such as I desire to be, such as is worthy of so great an office, and sacred a function; such as he ought to be, that occupieth the place of God in governing of soules; I am no Priest subiect to the demand, or obliged to answer his demands; or the like.* Thus, and such like, whatsoever he pleaseth, he professeth may be his reservations, when he denyeth himselfe to be a Priest: and what conformity these haue, at least the most of them, with the *Circumstances*, I leaue to bee declared by the Patrons and Masters of this Art. Sure I am, if such a large scope may be granted, and yet the reservation bee conformable to the matter, &c. and not fainter than *domo*; then it will be an easie matter to keepe within compass, and to obserue the wise rule of this grave Father. But, let Persons goe with his doubling, and let vs heare what others say. Sanchez alloweth any words, if they yeeld a true sense; *By any addition, reserved in the mind of the speaker, whatsoeuer that addition be.* And each of *Grossus*, proposing a Case of one, who being taken by the throat, doth for feare promise them somewhat with an oath; *if* (saith he) he doe imagine some other thing in his mind; for example; *I promise to give this, or do that, if I be not so shal compell me to it, or if I be thus shal fall, or as he like.* then he shal be cleare from sinne. And Sanchez, that a man may lawfully answer, that he killed not Peter, meaning another man of the same name, or that he killed him not, and acquitt himselfe, before he was borne. And Strange the Jesuite, so shew what strange and unlimited liberty they

Mitig. cap. 8.
nu. 65. p. 344.

fito, mente pro-
ferentia retento
quodcumque illud
Sanch. op.
morall. 3. c. 6.

nu. 15. pa. 25.

Sic se aliud
mente cogitauit,
verbi gratia,
promitto dare aut
facere, si a iustice

si calumnia ruit,
aut quid simile,
tunc a peccato
erit immunis.

Dei. An. pr. b.
1. 1. c. 17. nu. 2.

1. 1. c. 17. nu. 2.
d Oper. mod. 3. c. 6. nu. 16.

pag. 18.

Proceeding a-
gainst Trai-
tors. lib. I. 1.

they doe take in the framing of this fancie, affirme that he was in the company, reseruing and intending secretly as added, this word, *Not*; when hee was questioned before the Lord Chiefes Iustice of England, and the Kings Attourney. These reseruatiōs, and others not much better, doe they allow and practise in the Arte of Equiuocating, whereof there is frequent mention in their Bookes and Treatises of this argument. By all which it appeareth, that they approoue of any reseruatiōn, which a man can fancie, if the case be such as they allow of, and the clause such, as may signifie a trueth.

a Mitigar. ca.
11. nu. 17. pag.
449.
b Mitig. c. 11.
nu. 43. pa. 463.

5. That this Equiuocation of theirs, is lawfull, not onely in ordinary speech, but in oathes also. This is plainly anounced by Father Persons, and vpon this reason, ^a *Because it is a most certaine principle, as well in reason, as in Diuinitie, that what a man may truly say, hee may truly also sweare.* And againe, ^b *As all Diuines hold (saith hee) that which may lawfully be said, may also lawfully be sworne.* And to this doe agree others of this Crue, who commonly handle this question of Equiuocation in their Treatises of Oathes, and allow it as a thing very lawfull, and of good vse.

c Mitig. c. 7.
nu. 14. pag. 284.

6. That this Arte was deuised, and so by them is vsed, that by it they may deceiue the vnderstanding of the hearer, and make him beleue an vntrueth, when it may serue for their turne. To this purpose those words of Father Persons sound; ^a *Equiuocation must sometime be practised, when no other euasion can be found for defence of innocencie, iustice, secrecy, and other like vrgent occasions.* And speaking of some cases of inconuenience, which hee would haue to bee avoided by Equiuocation, he demandeth, ^b *Hath God and Nature, and Law of Iustice left no lawfull euasion in such cases?* And againe, ^c *Wee delight not (saith hee) in this Arte or manner of euasion by Equiuocation.* By this it appeareth, that Equiuocation (to vse the Iesuites owne words) is an *Art of euasion,*

d Cap. 7. nu.
12. pa. 189.
e Cap. 7. nu. 1.
pag. 174.

equivocation, which cannot be understood without a meaning and purpose to deceive the hearers understanding, and to make him believe an untruth. The same Doctor of this Arte goeth on, and teacheth vs, that this their Equivocation is, ^a when any speech hath, or may have a double sense, not by any double signification or composition of the words themselves; but onely by some reservation of minde in the speaker, whereby his meaning is made different from that sense which the words that are uttered, do beare, or yeeld without that reservation. And by this is implied, that the purpose of this is, to imprint one sense in the speaker, which they acknowledge to be false, and to keepe within themselves another, which they imagine to be true. *Beatus* also, another Jesuite, having first proposed the question, *An liceat vti Equivocatione: Whether it may be lawful to use Equivocation:* he explaineth the point thus; ^b Whether it be lawfull to deceive and beguile others by Equivocations. In the prosecution of which question, though he wrangle, & would gladly shift off from themselves the imputation of this equivocating fraud; yea, and flatly denieth it: yet by explaining the question in such sort, he acknowledgeth, that their meaning who defend it, is to beguile and deceive men. And in like sort *Tolet* saith. ^c It is sometimes lawfull to use Equivocation, and to deceive the hearer. And therefore when *Father Persons* ^d saith, that his intention is not to deceive in this mentall proposition, but to defend himselfe, &c. and that the Priest (who denieth himselfe to be a Priest) that his principall intent is not intentio fallendi, an intention of deceiving; but rather, *evadendi desiderium*, a desire to escape and defend himselfe: he doth either too boldly presume vpon his Readers simplicitie, or too grossely bewray his owne. For first, when hee saith, that his principall intent is not to deceive, but rather to escape, hee implieth, that an intention he hath to deceive, though that be not his principall

D

intention;

^a Mitig. c. 11.
nu. 3. pag. 484.

^b Sensus est, an liceat alios fallere, decipere aut eludere per Equivocationes. Manual Controu. l. 5. c. 31. pag. 530.

^c Aliquando licet vti equivocatione, & fallere audientem.

Tolet. Instruct. Sacerd. l. 4. c.

31. nu. 9.

^d Mitig. cap. 8 nu. 58. pag. 346 & 347.

See also, *Sober Reckon*. c. 4. nu. 89. pag. 287

intention; and that is enough to prooue (which hee denieth) that his *Equiuocation* doth herein agree with the nature of a lye, that as a lye is said to bee, *cum intentione fallendi*, so his *Equiuocation* cannot be denied to haue the same purpose and intention in it. And secondly, where he saith plainly that his *intention* is not to deceive, but to defend, hee speaketh as wisely, and to as good purpose, as if a thiefe by the high way side should say, that hee intended not to take away the true mans purse, but to supplie himselfe with money for his owne spending. For as the thiefe intendeth to robbe, that thereby he may supply himselfe; so the Iesuite intendeth to deceive, that thereby he may defend himselfe.

7 That to forbear the vse of this *Equiuocation* (vnlesse where by duety a man is bound to vse it) is better and more Meritorious then to vse it. To this purpose speaketh the great Master of this Arte; *Wee delight not* (saith hee) *in this Arte or maner of euasion by Equiuocation, though it be no lye at all; but rather do allow and like far better of simple, plaine, and resolute speech in all Catholikes, concerning aswel matters of ordinary conuersation, as of their conscience, &c. And presently he addeth; Yet for that perfection is one thing, and obligation is another, wee may not binde men to more then Gods precept bindeth. By which speech hee plainly teacheth, that though it bee not vnlawfull to vse Equiuocation, because it is not forbidden by any precept; yet it is a worke of perfection, (such as they vse to call a worke of supererogation) not to vse a mans lawfull libertie in this case. And yet further, It is euident, that albeit good men desirous of perfection, and prepared to suffer iniuries, may liue without going to Law, without swearing, without dinorcing their Wives, without Equiuocation, &c. yet for all that, men are not bound to this exactnesse, &c. And yet againe, My wish is* (saith hee) *that Catholike people, but especially Priests, whose example must instruct the rest, should yeeld also of*

Miig.c.7.nu.3
pag.174.

Cap.7.nu.5.
pag.176.

Cap.13.nu.3.
pag.148.

their

their right, for increase of their merit and Crowne in heaven, and vse all plainnesse and synceritie in speech, and free discovering, not onely of their religion, but also of their state, where it is hurtfull to none but themselves. And in a word, plainnesse and syncerity of speech, he compareth with virginity, (which in their esteeme, is a glorious worke of perfection or supererogation:) and the practice of Equiuocating to Wedlocke, which is lawful, but not of such merit.

See Persons also
in his Sober
Reck. ca. 7. nu.
22, & 23. pag.
484, 485.

Now hence I inferre two Conclusions.

1 That the practice of Protestants in vsing plainnesse and syncerity in speech, according to their doctrine, is by the confession of the Iesuite, better and more holily, then the practice of Papists in vsing Evasions and Equiuocations, according to the doctrine of the Equiuocators.

2 That according to the doctrine of Popish Equiuocators, Iesus our Sauour was not so perfect, nor vsed not so much exactnesse in his speech, nor merited not so much, as the Iesuites doe, many of them at least. For Father Persons saith, that albeit good men desirous of perfection, may liue without Equiuocating, yet &c. hee meaneth that though it may bee seene in such men, yet others are not bound to that exactnesse: and he implieth, that men desirous of perfection, doe vse to doe so. And such, I trow, the holy Order of Iesuites is, who for desire of this perfection, haue by solemne vow abandoned the world, and all the glory, and profit belonging to it. Besides, Father Persons graue aduice is, that not onely Priests, but other Catholikes too, should yeeld of their right, by forbearing to equiuocate, for the increase of their merit and Crowne in heaven: and, I trowe, the followers of IESVS will not bee slacke to performe, what one of their owne Fathers doth aduise to bee so behoofefull, not onely for seculars of the Clergie, but for lay-

a Sober Reck.
Append. nu. 16
pag. 681.
b Sober Reck.
in append. nu.
24. pag. 687.

Catholikes also. But now I E S V S our Lord, see how farre off the Iesuite maketh him to bee from this degree of perfection. For hee was so frequent in equiuocating, that Father Persons^a findeth him to haue vsed the same in one onely Chapter of S. Iohns Gospell, about seuen or eight times at the least. Nay, and that^b more then one Equiuocation was vsed by our Sauour in one sentence: and that eight or nine Equiuocall speaches at the least, are contained within a piece of one onely Chapter of our Sauours talke with the Jewes, Scribes and Pharisees. And indeede hee hath recited and alleadged nine seuerall examples out of our Sauours words, recorded in the latter part of the eighth Chapter of S. Iohn. And sure, hee that did equiuocate so often in so little compasse, cannot be imagined to haue forborne his right in this practice, for the increase of his merit and Crowne in heauen. Or if they will say, that notwithstanding this frequent vse of Equiuocation in so short space, that yet hee did forbear his right still, and so increased his merit thereby; then they will giue vs occasion to thinke, that Iesuites and Priests, and other Roman Catholikes may attaine this height of perfection, vnto which Father Persons aduiseeth them, and coozen and deceiue vs silly fellowes with their Equiuocations seuen, or eight, or nine times in one houre.

I leaue it then to bee considered by the wise Reader, whether Father Persons doe cog with vs all this while, and make no small vse of this deceitfull Arte, while hee labourerth to defend it: or, whether in good earnest hee thinketh that our Lord and Sauour did not follow so exact a rule of perfection, as hee aduiseeth all his Catholikes vnto.

These bee the most speciall properties belonging to Iesuiticall Equiuocation, as neere as I could gather and obserue them out of their bookes, which bee the abettors of this Arte, among whom the principall, Father Persons,

Persons, must needs bee acknowledged to bee. For hee hath laboured herein more then they all. Out of all which obseruations layd together, I leaue it to the consideration of any vnderstanding man, to iudge, whether these two things doe not follow.

1 That the Roman Doctors haue such rare wits, as that they can by their deuised sleights, transforme the nature both of words and things, euen as well as Alchymists can turne lead into gold. For as in matter of State, they haue found out a mystery; that a Clergie-man of their Church may moue *Rebellion* against his Prince, and yet be no *Traytor*: so in Conferences with men, they haue found a like mysterie; that any man of the Romane Church, may speake, and say, and sweare whatsoeuer himselfe pleaseth, though it bee neuer so false, and yet be no Lier. The one they fetch from their doctrine of *Exemption*; and the other from their doctrine of *Equiuocation*: both dangerous practices to all humane society. The one whereof should teach Kings to be aware of their Swords, and the other should teach all men to beware of their words.

a Clerici Rebellio in Regem non est crimen lesa maiestatis, quia non est subditus Regi: S^a. Aphor. v. [Clericus] printed at Antwerp, 1599. and allowed and commended by Silu. Pardo, the Inquisitor.

2 That by their doctrine, a man is at liberty to lye, without anie grudge in his conscience; and that the Abettors of this Arte, by a secret iuggling deuce, doe set open a schoole for deceit and periurie; in which they teach an Arte of Lying; by the helpe whereof, he that can lye & forswear by the Rule, shall bee free either from lying or periurie: as a reuerend and learned Diuine hath noted. But hereof there will be fitter occasion giuen to say more hereafter. In the meane while, thus much shall serue to be said of the first Point.

Cuius beneficio, qui ad normam mentitur aut peieret, baud ille perurio aut mendacio reus censendus sit.

b Abbor. Anti-logadu. Eudemon- Ioann. c. 2. in princ. fol. 11. fac. 1.

CHAP. II.

*Of the Originall of Equiuocation; and who they bee
that uphold it, and giue life vnto it.*

*Hospinian.
Hiflor. Iefuit.
l. 4. c. 2. p. 228.



3 Quos Autores
habuerit, non
facile dixerim.
Cafaub. epist.
ad Front. Du-
ccum. pag. 108.

Concerning the Originall of this Arte,
* some learned men referre it to the
Priscillianists, or *Arim* the Arch-heretike,
who are read to haue vsed fraudulent and deceitful speech. And such
Heretikes had not beene vnmeet Fath-
thers for such a deformed child. But this Brat was not
then borne, nor for many Ages after those dayes. For
mine owne part, vnlesse I shall hereafter meete vvith
some thing more cleere then yet I haue scene, I must say
with a iudicious and learned Writer, ^{b7} cannot readily
say who were the first founders of this Arte. Nor is it
maruell, that a thing of this nature, though found out
but yesterday, should appeare to the world without
the name or notice of his Author. For, as the head or
spring of *Nilus* hath beene long enquired after, and for
ought I know, is yet scarce heard of; and the reason
may bee, because it is supposed that that Riuer doth
rise somewhere in *montibus Lune*, in some place of those
great Mountaines, whose greatnes doth hide the place
of the Well-head or Spring: So deuices of State, which
neuer prosper after they are discovered, are commonly
smothered for a time, and doe vsually appeare with-
out name; themselues being vnwilling to owne them,
and others being vnable to descrie them. And such is
this Arte of *Equiuocation*, hatched by some rare wit,
who yet had rather lose the glory of the inuention,
then

then to lay open the myſterie of it : and ſmothered by the *Romane State* as long as was poſſible, till miſfortune brought it to light againſt their wils. And yet now, that the Riuer appeareth with a full ſtreame, notwithstanding, the Spring will hardly bee found. And if any *Romanist* ſhall hence inferre, that this Doctrin is therefore an *Apoſtolicall Tradition*, and came from Chriſt himſelfe; becauſe I cannot tell who was the firſt Author, and at what time ſince it was firſt hatched; as they uſe to diſpute in other caſes againſt vs: I will ſend him to find me the head of *Nilus*, and when he hath found that, I will goe about to enquire for the Originall of this Arte. And yet in the meane while, though I cannot preciſely ſay who was the firſt Father of this blacke Arte, yet ſome things may bee ſaid, not impertinent to this purpoſe. And thoſe (as I conceiue them for the preſent) I will lay downe in certaine Propoſitions or Assertions. And they be theſe.

I It is certaine that it is a late deuice, and found out the other day. *Persons* claimeſt *Vniuerſality*, *Antiquity*, and *Conſent*, for the prooſe of this Arte. * His words are, that euery man may heare him ſpeak in his own dialect; Let vs conſider (ſaith he) how this abſurd and impious opinion (if ſuch it be) could come ſo bee receiued ſo generally, both in approbation & practice, doctrine & action, throughout the *Chriſtian world*; that is to ſay; The Doctrin in all *Schools*, *Pulpits*, *Chaires*, *Vniuerſities*, where teaching hath bene uſed, extant alſo in the *Bookes* and *Workes* of all learned men of what ſort ſoener, before *Ieſuites* were borne or heard of: but eſpecially thoſe haue moſt treated thereof, who haue written moſt tenderly of matters belonging vnto conſcience, whom we call *Cauiſts*. *Lawiers* in like manner, both *Canon* and *Ciuill*; *Diuines*, both *Scholaſticall* and *poſitiue*, haue approued the ſame. And as for practice, it hath in due caſes bene receiued in all *Courts*, in all *Countries*, in all *Tribunals*, and *Seates of iudgement*, both eccleſiaſticall

* Mitigat. c. 7.
nu. 12. & 13.
p. 281. & 282.

astlicall and temporall; and neuer refused, condemned, or controlled by any, so it were used with the due circumstances, &c. And a little after; Was there no man to stand for truth and reason in any Countrey, in any Prouince or State? in any place or time for this 400. yeeres, &c? Where it must be noted, that when he mentioneth 400 yeeres, his meaning is not to limit the approbation of this *Arte* to the compasse of those yeeres; but because he supposeth, but falsely, that his Aduersarie had granted so much; and so here he disputeth *ex Concessis* vpon the Confession of his Aduersarie: but he intendeth and meaneth the consent of former times also; as himselfe signifieth in the same Chap. ^a whereof he there promisseth to speak afterward; & so he doth, ^b For he bringeth the testimonies & practice of the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles, and Iesus Christ himselfe, and that frequently declared. Where it may bee noted, that this Father is as bold to alledge *Vniuersality, Antiquity, and Consent* for the prooffe of this *Arte*, as the rest are for the prooffe of their *Church*. And sure the prooffe is as good and sound in the one, as the other. Onely, Father *Persons* affirmeth more boldly, and confirmeth what hee saith, more weakely. But the reason is alike good in both cases. But heere I haue onely to deale with *Persons*, about his *Equiuocation*. And against these great cryes, I oppose the confident and iust challenge of a Reuerend man; Name me one man (saith he) out of all antiquity, Heathens, Iewish, Christian: name but one man, who euer approued these your Reservations, vlesse perhaps some who were noted with infamy for their paises. I may adde; Nay, name me one, who defended this *Equiuocation*, which Iesuites call a *mixt or mentall Proposition*, or by a secret reservation, in all the time from Adam to the *Trent Councell*. I will not say none such can bee named; for who can say or presume, that hee knoweth the sayings and opinions of all former Ages? but this I will

^a Nu. 16. p. 285.
^b cap 9. nu. 17,
 &c. and repeateth it againe in his Sober Reckon. cap. 7. nu. 26, &c.

Da mihi unum
 ex omni hominu
 antiquitate, Eth-
 nica, Iudaica,
 Christiana; davel
 unum, cui Reser-
 uationes istae tue
 probatae sunt, nisi
 siquis forte in in-
 famiam notati,
 &c.
 Abbot Anri.
 cap. 2. fol. 25.

will say, that whereas the Abettors of *Equinocation* haue bin challenged by two learned Doctors in our Church, to shewe any who in former times haue allowed this diuclish *Arte*; hitherto I haue seene no one man produced, who doth giue any plaine or direct allowance heereof. For as for the many authorities, which *Persons* doth alledge, they be Conclusions of his own, spun out of other mens sayings, by such consequences as himselfe fancieth or pleaseth to frame. For where holy or learned men haue vsed speeches, that may admit diuers interpretations, either by reason of the words vsed, or some circumstance occurring, according to which only former Ages were wont to expound them; he presently runneth away with an out. cry of *mentall reservation*, or *mixt Proposition*: as euery man that considereth the Allegations, may easily perceiue. In a word, *Persons* claimeth very boldly, and to speake truth, impudently, *Uniuersality*, *Antiquity*, and *Consent*, for this nouell, new-deuised, and vpstart fancie of their owne. Where I wish the Reader to consider, how farre he may credit such men, when they lay the like claime to all *Antiquity* and *Consent* of Nations, either for the prouing of their Church, or for maintaining of any other subordinate point of Controuersie. For mine owne part, till they shew me one who approoued a *mentall Equinocation* or *reservation*, I will thinke and say there is none. And this is my first assertion; whereof see further prooofe in the next assertion.

2 My second is, that the latter sort of Schoole-men and *Casuits* gaue occasion, and laied grounds for this ensuing *Arte*; which at that time themselves, it seemeth, did not so much as thinke or dreame of. For, whereas some Cases were then debated, how farre a *Priest* might deny the things which hee had heard in Confession; and in what sort any man that was questioned by an vnlawfull Iudge, or proceeded against in

an vnlawfull manner, &c. might deny the things which he knew to be true: they, considering the *circumstances of the persons, place, and businesse*, did allow some hard *Equiuocations*, which the words would hardly beare in any true sense, yet such as they thought might be allowed and gathered out of those circumstances, and might well be vnderstood in those words, as there and then they were vttered; As for exāple, If a Priest were questioned, whether he knew or had heard any thing of such or such a matter; he might say, *No*: if he did not know or heare it any other way, but onely by *Confession*. And the reason of this answer is, because, *a Words* (saith Dominicus a Soto) doe so signifie, as they are vnderstood or taken by the people. Now Christian people, when they heare a Priest swear, that he knoweth nothing of such or such a matter; they vnderstand him not to speake or mean any thing that he heard in *Confession*. And therefore those words (of the Priest) doe onely signifie or import, that he knoweth nothing out of *Confession*. And the like defence of this answer is giuen by Sepulveda, de *Rat. dicendi test.* cap. 3. Again, it is a further Case, If the Priest be asked concerning the same thing, whether he know or haue heard it in *Confession*; whether may he then say, *No*, *I heard it not*? And the common opinion of the Doctors was, that in this case, *how may swear he did not heare it*; But Soto, vpon better aduice, disliketh this answer, because in this Sentence, *Nihil audiui in Confessione*; *I heard nothing of it in Confession*; the Restriction allowed in the former case, cannot fitly bee vnderstood, to say, *I heard nothing in Confession*, to wit, out of *Confession*. And therefore he concludeth, that that answer in this case cannot be excused from being a lye; because the words cannot haue that construction. Another case is proposed; Suppose a Tyrant should aske of a Priest, whether Peter (for example) did kill Iohn. (which the Priest knew in *Confession* only) may the Priest say and swear, that Peter

did.

a Voces eo modo significant, quo recipiuntur à populo: populus autem Christianus, dum audit Sacerdotem iurantem se nihil scire, nihil intelligit de his quæ nouit in Confessione: Quare verba illa solum significant nihil se scire extra Confessionem.

Soto Relect. de Secreto, mem. 3. q. 3. Concl. 1. His vero. Relect. de Secreto memb. 3. q. 3. Concl. 4. 5. Hactenus opinionem. pa. 312.

did not kill John? Adrian, who afterward was Pope, and was called Adrian the sixth: he resolved the question, that he might answer negatively, that he killed him not: but Soto againe replyeth, that this which Adrian said, had no shew of reason; because the words admit of interpretation, that may excuse them from a Lye. For, saith he; ¹ It were a most fond interpretation to say, He killed him not that I may tell you, or (as our Equivocators use now a dayes to speake) He killed him not, so as I may tell you. And he giueth a further reason hereof, because these words have no immediate relation to this word, [that I may tell you] in the word [I know] and other such words of sense haue. And in his Booke de Iustit. & Iure, disputing the like question, whether a man being questioned concerning his owne Act, may by Ambiguity elude the question; hee resolueth, It cannot any way be defended, that he may lawfully say, that, he did not doe it: and hereof he giueth this reason; ² Because this speech [I did not doe it] cannot receive this sense: I did not doe it, so tell him, or that I may tell him, &c. His meaning in more plaine words, is this; that the Priest might truly say in the case proposed, I know not that Peter did kill John; because hee might reasonably vnderstand it thus, or with this restriction, I know it not out of Confession. And of such a knowledg. the Iudge is supposed to aske, and men do usually vnderstand the Priest to speake. But the Priest might not say without telling a lye, Peter did not kill John; because, this restriction cannot without absurdity, bee applied to those words. And consequently, these words could not bee so vnderstood by the hearers. A fourth case may be added, and with that I will end. Suppose a guilty person be against order of Law examined by a Iudge, whether he haue committed such a crime, which indeede he hath done, but is not in this case bound to answer him: suppose (I say) he be inforced to answer, may he truly say, I did not doe it? And Adrian's resolution

a Insuperfina interpretatione est, non occidit, ut dicam.

b Quia facta non habent ordinem immediatum ad hoc quod est, dicere scire & alia verba significationum. Soto ibid. pag. 314.

c Quod bene ei dicere se non fecisse, nullatenus est sustentabile. Soto de Iustit. & Iure, lib. 1. q. 8. art. 2. prope finem.

d Quoniam, Non feci, nullo modo amplecti potest sensum.

e Non feci, ut dicitur [face] & Iam non habet eandem connexionem cum eo, quod est, ut dicam, quam habet [scire].

* Potest secundū omnes Doctores respondere quod nihil de facto ille nouit, vel certū, quod non fecit. Adrian, in 4. de Sac. Conf. resp. ad 2. prin. pag. 143. col. 4. Deficientia, ex qua liceat respondere. Nescio qui sint illi omnes Doctores: fateor me nullum legisse. De Secre. 19. mem. 3. q. 3. Concl. 4. p. 316. v. etiam de iustit et iure, l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. Sensus ille uisibilissimus est. * Nemo veterum & nobilium Theologorum, quid equidem sciam, affirmavit. Sepulch. de rat. dicend. testim. cap. 17. Quorundam antiquarum Theologorum decretis consentaneam. & illam veterum ac summorum Theologorum consensu damnatam opinionem. Nostri & pa-

of the doubt, was; that in such a case, ^a he may truly answer, according to the opinion of all Schoole-Doctores, that he knoweth nothing of that fact, or at least, that hee did not doe it. And his reason is, because in this answer, he is supposed to speake ^b of such a knowledge of the fact, as he may lawfully discover. But Soro replyeth againe, ^c I know not who all those Doctores are, that Adrian speaketh of: I confesse, I haue read none of that opinion. And he addeth; ^d That meaning, in which Adrian interpreteth these words, is a most forced and violent sense. Thus Soro declareth his owne opinion, and the opinion of other Schoole-Doctores and Casuists of that time, in these and other cases of like nature. And the like doth Io. Genesius Sepulveda, another learned man of the same nation, and about the same time. For hauing heard some defend some such like Equivocations and ambiguities, he vndertaketh to proue, and that by the testimony of ancient *Diuines*, that in witness-bearing (for thereof hee doth in particular intreat) a Witnesse may not, *ante verborum*, by cunning words, deceiue the Judge, but that he is bound to speake plainly, and according to the meaning of the Judge, who asketh the question. And of the contrary opinion, hee saith, ^e None ancient and renowned *Diuine* that I knowe, did affirme it to bee lawfull. And in the Preface to that Booke, hee saith, that while hee was in Rome, hee met with one, who maintained this opinion, which he calleth ^f agreeable to the Determinations of some yong or late *Diuines*: and when he came backe againe into Spaine, that *prater spem*, contrary to his expectation, he found some of their learnedest *Diuines*, maintaining, and instilling into their Students hearts and eares, ^g that opinion which was condemned by the ancient and chiefe *Diuines*. And, Chap. 15. hee sheweth who they bee, whom he calleth ancient *Diuines*; and that is in his owne words, ^h those which liued before our and our Pre-

thers.

thers dayes, such for example sake, as Thomas Aquinas is, *trū memoria su-*

Out of which testimonies and sayings of these two learned men (the one of which was Confessor to Charles the fifth, and the other his Historiographer, and the one flourished about the yeere 1360: as Possenin saith, and the other died in the yeere 1372: saith the same Possenin, out of these their sayings) I gather and obserue these things.

That in the dayes of these two learned men, which was about some 60 yeeres agoe, there was little or no speach of any Equiocation by mentall reservation, or of any such mixt propositions, as the Romanists now fancie. This I gather, first, because Soto, in oppugning these ambiguous Answeres and speaches allowed by some Schoole-Doctors of that time, doth no where (to my knowledge) charge them with any such opinion, or euer labour to refute it. Which (considering the argument that hee had in hand, and the diligence that he vsed in handling of it, and clearing of all doubts that belonged vnto it) no man may with reason imagine that hee would haue forborne to doe, if those times had giuen occasion of disputing such a question. Secondly, the same learned man, in oppugning that liberty, which others did grant, doth still ouerthrowe or confute their opinion, because the interpretation and the meaning which they doe allow those answeres to be taken in by the speaker, are such as doe not agree to the vse and signification of the words spoken, nor cannot bee applied to them, without incongruity and absurditie. By which reason of his, hee implieth, that these *Diuines* meant no other ambiguity, or interpretation, or meaning, in those answeres; then such as they thought, the words in that case in which they were vttered might beare. Or els his reason had bene insufficient and foolish; which yet he supposeth to be such, as that his aduersaries could not dislike as impertinent, if the

*Quamvis status
sermo citra men-
daciū ferre
possit. Soto de
Iustit. & Iure
l. 5. q. 6. art. 2.*

*Ut si ex in-
dustria aliud
præter ea mente
loquatur.*

thing which he urged were true. Thirdly, the same Author doth still so set down his opinion, that in the cases proposed, and others of the like nature; he alloweth any ambiguity or Amphibologie, *which the use of the speech can beare without a lye*, as in expresse words hee explaineth himselfe, but refuseth and condemneth all such, as is not noted and implied in the words. Fourthly, *Sepulveda*, he also disputeth against those, who think themselves not bound in the cases propounded to answer according to the common meaning, and acceptation of the words: and confuteth them, who hold it lawfull simply to denie the crime truely layed to their charge, although they *purposely speake some other thing in their minds, which the Iudge, taking their words in the common meaning, understandeth not*: Cap. 17. & throughout the whole Booke. But yet I haue not obserued in all that Booke any speech, in which hee mentioneth a *mixt proposition*, a *mentall Equiuocation*, or an ambiguity made by a *reservation*. Against which opinion, (if there had then appeared any such to the world) hee might haue disputed with more probabilite and shewe of substantiall reason. But he no where (as farre as I can obserue) either refelleth or mentioneth any such opinion among these late and punie Diuines. For whereas in the place last cited, he hath these words, *though purposely he speaketh some other thing in his minde, that maketh nothing*, as I thinke, for the *mentall reservation*, which our *Equiuocators* haue deuised. For he meaneth nothing else, as I take it, but that the speaker doth frame in his minde, another sense and meaning of his words, then they in the common vnderstanding of men doe make, or then the *Iudge* according to the common vnderstanding doth take them in. And therefore those very Schoole-Diuines, whom hee and *Soto* doe refute for going too farre, and allowing too much liberty, yet goe not so farre as our now Iesuites doe, who

who build all vpon a fancied reservation of their owne framing, no way included in the words spoken. Fifthly, say that those Divines; whom these learned men doe refute, did maintaine such a *myst. proposition*, & mentall reservation as our *Romanists* doe strive for: yet *Soto* saith, that he had read no Schoole-Doctor, who allowed such a fancie as *Adrian* imagined, which yet by a reservation of a Iesuite, might easily bee solued. And *Sepulveda*, when hee came out of *Italy* into *Spaine*, thought it strange, that hee found *Dilomas*, who contrary to the meaning of all the *Ancients*, did allow that opinion, which he there refuteth. And therefore if we shall say, that the *Divines* against whom these men wrote, did hold this Equivocall reservation, yet it was then a nouell opinion, lately sprung vp, such as *Soto* had read in no Schoole-Doctor of former time, and such as *Sepulveda* did marvell to finde set on foote in his owne Countrey, where he liued. But, as I said, these learned men did not know of any such opinion risen vp at that time. And therefore in those dayes, either this *Arte* was not yet found, or if it were, it was rather whispered in corners, or taught obscurely, then published in Schooles.

Secondly, I gather out of these learned mens writings alleadged before, that *Schoole-Doctors* about that time, allowed and gaue liberty for such ambiguities as in opinion of these men, and in truerth the words could not beare; and therefore their interpretations were forced & violent, and such as could not free their speeches from being *yes*. This without further deduction, is euident by the words before cited.

Thirdly, I obserue, that these hard and harsh Equivocations, by some *Divines* then allowed; and the violent constructions that they made of the words, were then newly taken vp, and were vnknowne to the elder and more iudicious *Schoole-men*.

And out of all this, I leaue it to the iudgement of the

the learned Reader, whether I may not vpon good reason inferre; that therefore in all probabilitie, the later sort of *Schoole-Doctors*, by the hard *Equivocations*, which they allowed, did giue occasion & layd grounds for this *Iesuiticall Art of Equivocation*, though at that time themselves did not thinke of it. For, may it not hence be reasonably conceiued, that the progresse and proceeding to the framing of this *Art*, was on this manner? that first of all, and in elder times, there was nothing, but *simplicitie* in their Oathes and answers, or if any *ambiguities* was allowed to be vsed, it was but in some such sense, as the *circumstances* of the persons, time, place, and occasion, did put vpon them, and that according to the intention of publique Lawes, and the reasonable construction that the Hearers might make of them: and that afterward they allowed violent constructions, and such as the words, together with the *circumstances*, could not beare, in any reasonable mans vnderstanding, but such as the speaker, in his minde did fancie to be agreeable to that businesse and occasion. And lastly, that this ouer-bold liberty in them, in framing such a sense, as the words in reason & congruities could not beare, made way to fine wits following after, to adde something to the former inuention, and to frame a sense of words spoken, which they acknowledge not to be signified by them, but made vp by a *Reseruation* in their owne breast, such as themselves would please to fancie, what euer it were, either pertinent to the businesse, or as farre different from it, as the *falling of the skie* is different from the *paying of money*. But this will appeare yet more plainly, if it be considered, that *Nauarre*, who liued at the same time with *Soto*, & *Sepulveda*, but wrote after them, and when they were dead, doth from the opinion of those Diuines, and in speciall from the opinion of *Soto* also, and from his sayings, labour to inferre and proue the lawfulnessse

(*) Nauar.
Com. in c.
Humane
iures, q. 1.
nu. 4. & nu.
8. & 9.

lawfulness of the Jesuiticall Equivocation; because (as hee saith) there is the like reason of them both. How truly he inferreth his Conclusion, from the sayings of *Soto* and the rest, I dispute not; I onely note in his course of disputation, that hee taketh their assertions for a ground to proue his owne by. And that sheweth that those former Writers gaue occasion, &c. And thus I haue declared my second Assertion concerning the originall of this new Art.

3. The third is, that whosoever wit deuised it, yet it seemeth to mee most probable, that it receiued the first life and credit from the See of Rome, and the Romane State. My reason is from these grounds.

1. Doctor *Nauarre*, who (as *Persons* saith, *Mitig. cap. 7. nu. 41. pag. 361.*) is held to be one of the most libellous and largest in admitting Equivocations both in words and oaths, was thought a fit man to be the Popes Reader of Cases in Rome. And if I mistake not, hee was the first that broached this new arte. For hee read at Rome not long after the time of *Soto* and *Sepulveda*, who (as before was noted) had not yet heard any thing of this arte. And there he read & framed that Commentary, in which he teacheth this *mysterie*, for the instruction of the Iesuits Colledge, and dedicated the same vnto *Gregorie 13.* the present Pope: which may breede suspition, that the Pope was well pleased with this new deuice of *Nauarre*, of whom he made choise to be his publique Reader of Cases; and who, while he was imployed in this seruice, did perfect that arte, and from whose Readings, the very Iesuits themselues may seeme to haue borrowed the grounds of that Doctrine, which afterward they polished with great dexteritie and care.

a Praefat. ante
initium Com-
mentar. in c.
Human. aures,

Secondly, In *Queens Elizabeths* time, there was a Treatise found out, which before was in the secret keeping of Iesuits or Priests: in which, beside the Resolu-

tions of *Nanarrs*, were contain'd sundry instructions and directions, given by *Sixtus Quintus*, for the practising of this mysterie of *Equivocation*. Which, if the Reader be desirous to know more fully, hee may reade a Relation thereof set downe by a molt reuerend and learned *Prelate*.

Thirdly, I finde that *Emm. Sà* in his *Aphorismes V. Mendac.* had given his opinion concerning this *Equivocall reservation*, in this manner: that in a case, ^b where a man is not bound to reueale the truth according to the intention of the Demander, some say, that a man may answer by understanding or reserving something in his minde, as that is not so, to wit so, as that hee is bound to tell him; or that hee hath not such a thing, meaning, that hee hath it not to giue it vnto him. But others admit not of this kinde of answer, and perhaps, upon better ground and reason. Thus hee gaue his iudgement of this poynt, and so the Booke passed in the Low Countries, and with approbation and commendation of *Silv. Pardo*, the Inquisitor and Censor there, and was printed at *Antwerpe* 1599. But when it came to be perused, and renewed at *Rome*, the Censor there, *Io. Maria*, Master of the sacred Palace, he purged the Booke, and put out the last words, which were, ^c And perhaps upon better reason. In which words *Sà* had signified, that hee inclined to their opinion, who disliked this *Equivocating* by reservation. And hence it appeareth, how acceptable and welcome this Doctrine of *Equivocation* is in the Popes Palace. For whereas *F. Persons* saith, that in the last Edition of *Sà's* Booke at *Rome* 1607. this whole last sentence was left out, as though hee had changed his opinion. And ^e that it seemeth that *Emm. Sà* did afterwards change his opinion; it is but a trick of iugling, such as this Father often useth to delude his Reader with. For *Sà* died, as ^f *Ribadeneira* reporteth, in the year 1596. eleven years before this edition

a G. Abbot in the Preface to his Sixe questions. cap. 1. pag. 7. &c.

b *Quidam dicunt,--posse respondere aliquid subintelligendo, ut non esse, scilicet ut ei dicere teneatur; velse non habere, scilicet ut ei det. At alij id non admittunt, & fortè potiori ratione.*

c *Et fortè potiori ratione.*

d Sober Reccon. cap. 4. nu. 76. pa. 176.

e *Ibid.* nu. 80. pag. 179.

f *Ribaden. Catalogo Scriptorum Soc. Iesu. in Eman. Sà.*

of *Rome*, and three yeares before the impression of *Antwerpe*, being then about threescore and ten yeares olde. And if *Sa*, after so many yeares deliberation, had changed his opinion, how came it about that that change was not scene in the *Antwerpe* Copy, which was printed 3. yeares after he was dead? Besides, the Edition of *Rome*, re-printed also at *Colage*, An. 1612. doth professe, that that Book was purged by *Joan. Maria*, the Master of the Palace, and not that it was corrected or amended by *Sa*, the first Author of it. Further, *Persons* giueth no one piece of a reason, by which the Reader may imagine, that *Sa* did euer change that point. And therefore, this is but one of *Persons* vsuall trickes of fittening, with which his Brethren of the secular Clergy doe so often charge him.

Now these considerations layed together, make mee thinke it very probable, that this *Arte* receiued its life from the *State and See of Rome*. But if any man can shew mee, whence it might rather haue its first ground, I will willingly yeeld to him; and be thankful to him, that can and will discouer the Spring, or Well-head, whence first flushed forth this muddy *Nylus*, so fertile of *Crocodiles*, I meane of this sophistike *Crocodilites*, whereby vnware men are ouer-reached and caught.

4. My fourth Assertion is; It is obserued by learned men, that whosoeuer was the Author, yet the Iesuites, especially those of our *English Nation*, haue bene the chiefe Abettors, Defenders and Polishers of this *Arte*. For prooffe of this, I will set downe the words of some learned men. The learned Gentleman, who wrote the *Relation of Religion*, speaking of false newes, frequent at *Rome*, for aduantage of their Sect, addeth, that he found by observation, and iudgement of some wise men, that the Iesuites were the Masters of that *Mint*, and that all those coynes were of their stamp;

a *Relation* nu. 33. fol. 36.

^a Histor. Iesuit. l. 4. cap. 2. pag. 228.

^b *Vt non immerito Autores & Inuentores eius esse vulgo dicantur.*

^c *Constat multis vestri ordinis Theologos eam artem magnam, & explicuisse & asseruisse. Sed qui precipue Acquinocationem excouerint, eos video fuisse Anglos. Casaub. Epist. ad Front. Duceum, pag. 108.*

^d Reply to Father Persons Libell, fol. 22. & 23.

^e Quodl. 2. art. 6. pag. 39.

^f Quodl. 3.

art. 4. pag. 66.

^g Quodl. 2.

art. 4. pag. 31.

and, that the Iesuits were noted by some of their owne friends, to be too hardie Equiuocators, and their Equiuocations too hard. And Hospinian² hauing cited many testimonies of Iesuites for this Arte, concludeth that thereby it is euident, that many Iesuits with great care haue explained and defended it, ^b that not without cause they are commonly thought to be the Authors and Inuentors of it. Adde hereto that which the learned Casaubon obserued, who was well acquainted not onely with the writings of all sorts of Iesuits, but with the proceedings and dealings of our English Iesuits also. Hee telleth Fronto Ducau, a learned Iesuit, ^c It is a cleare case, that many Diuines of your Order haue explained and maintained that Arte: but they which haue especially polished it, I finde to be English-men. Yea and their owne Brethren, the Secular Priests, lay the ouer-bold vse of Equiuocation in their dish. ^e For so famous (say they) and so notorious are their Equiuocations, and so scandalous, that the very Protestants take notice thereof, &c. and, such iugglings, and shiftings of late haue bene used by them, that not onely Protestants, but also Catholickes, yea Priests can scarce tell when they speake sincerely, when otherwise. And a little after, Howsoeuer this kinde of dealing may seeme excusable vnto them, vnder the name of honest Equiuocation; sure I am that few honest men will excuse it from dishonest lying. And Master Watson ^f calleth it the Iesuit rule of swearing and forswearing in a contrary sense and meaning; and ^g a shift, which they call a lawfull Equiuocation. And againe, hee ^h calleth these Equiuocations, their absurd paradoxes of Equiuocation. And the like speeches may be found in diuers other places of the Priests bookes. By all which it may appeare, that learned men on both sides, not onely among the Protestants, but also among Popish Priests, haue noted this deuice especially in the Iesuits: which may be reason enough, (beside that which is to be found in.

in their owne writings) to make any sober man resolute, that the *Iesuites* haue had their fingers chiefly in this new deuised *Arte*. And reason may perswade the same to be most likely; because the *Iesuites* are an Order consecrated and deuoted from their very first birth to the *Popes* will, to doe what may serue his turne. For so the *Iesuites* themselves, who published *Sanchez* Morall worke, doe professe in the Epistle Dedicatorie to Pope *Gregorie 15.* ^a that their first founder ^b did make himselfe and his Order or Societie vassals to the *Popes* command, in a new and vheard of manner. And therefore if the *See* and *State* of *Rome*, did (as before I shewed) giue life, and credit and authoritie to this *Arte*; then, in reason it must be conceiued that the *Iesuites*, who by their first institution are created the *Popes* vassals, to serue at his pleasure, and to doe his will, would be the most forward in the ranke, to vphold and maintaine with all their wit, this deare Childe of the *Popes* owne breeding. And yet when I conclude that the *Iesuits* are the most forward, and the men that haue polished this *Arte*, my meaning is not, either to include all of that Order within this compasse, or to exclude all others not of that Order from it. For first among the *Iesuites*, *Becanus* doth disclaime it, as ^c being not taught by the *Iesuites*, and vlawfull to be practised by any. Wherein hee saith well, that it is vlawfull; but ill, that it is not taught by the *Iesuites*. For their Doctrine this way is so cleare, and so open to the view of all men, that *Becanus* in denying it, must needes either vse the *Arte* of *Equiuocation*, which himselfe condemneth, or else tell a flat and downe-right lye, which is not much better. And the like may be noted in the writings of some other *Iesuites*, who deny and renounce this deuice. But they had best keepe themselves from *Rome*; for if they come in the *Censors* hands, it is to be feared hee will deale with them, as

^a Prefixed before the second tome.
^b *Se suamque Societatem Pontificis imperijs more prius non mancipauit.*

^c *Manual. Controu. l. 5. cap. 21. & Opusc. Theolog. tom. 1. Opusc. 17. in Respons. ad Aphorism. 13, 14, 15, 16. & tom. 2. Opusc. 1. in Append. de fide Her. seruand. & in exam. 4. propositionis.*

he hath done with their fellow *Sa* already; that i. circumsise their lips, and teach their pens to speake the *Roman Language* more purely. Secondly, among those that be no Iesuites, wee haue experience and examples good store, of them who haue learned this *Arte*, and maintained it as stiffely, as the best Iesuite can. In which number, I may place Doctor *Norrice*, who beeing apprehended in *Oxford*, denyed himselfe to bee a *Priest*, and afterward in prison did defend it by this sleight of *Equiuocation*, and that he maintained to be lawfull, by the example of our blessed Sauour; *Mar. 13. 32. But of that day & houre knoweth no man, neither the Son, &c.* and *Ioh. 7. 8. Ego non ascendam, &c.* For so he then alledged the place, as Father *Persons* also doth, against both the *Greeke*, and their owne approoued *Latine*. In expounding, and applying of which Texts to his purpose, how weakely he behaued himselfe, he may now bee pleased to call to his remembrance: that as he braggeth of his victories ouer other men, so for his humiliation, hee may sometimes call to mind his owne infirmities. And that perhaps may stand his soule in as good stead, as the meritorious forbearing of *Equiuocation*, when he might lawfully vse it: which (as Father *Persons* saith) may increase his Crowne and merit in heauen.

But in earnest, he shall doe well, if in the next edition of his Antidote, he place this question of *Equiuocation* among the rest of his Controuerfies, and tell vs in good sadnes, what, after so many yeeres more, he thinketh of this Point. But in the meane while, the Reader may vnderstand, that Dr. *Norrice* is not the only man that ioyneth with the Iesuites in the practice and maintenance of this *Arte*. For in this small Treatise may be scene diuers testimonies for it, out of other Writers. And the secular Priests, though they charge & vpbraid the Iesuites with a *nimium*, too often and too bold a practice of it, yet themselves doe allow it, euen when they

they shew greatest opposition aginst the Iesuites. So Master Watson speaking of Equiuocation, as a shift which the Iesuites vse; saith, that though there bee no question to be made of it, but that in some sense it may bee lawfull, &c. In which place, the sum of that, wherein he sheweth his dissent & dislike of the Iesuites, (for his owne words are too many to be set down in this place) is in these two things: First, That the Iesuites doe allow Equiuocation in a case, wherein he thinketh a man is bound to speake the plaine truth. And secondly, that they doe hold, that they may not onely to their Adversaries (to Protestants) but euen also to any Catholike Magistrate, yea to the Pope himselfe, answers one way, and meane another. And to like purpose, the Author of the Replie to Persons Apologie, beeing to answer for D. Bagshaw, whom Persons had reprooued, as denying the doctrine of Equiuocation; saith, that the Doctor, no doubt, knoweth in what cases doubtfull answers and Equiuocations are to be made to curious questions: neither is it to be thought (saith he) that he disallowed thereof by words of liberty, which is in the Iesuites and their Adherents, in all their dealings with other men. By which it may appeare, that the difference betwene the Secular Priests and the Iesuites in this point, is not about the equitie & lawfulness of this Arte, but about the liberty and large scope that the Iesuites take, to practise it among their owne Brethren, and before their owne Magistrates and Superiours, and in all their dealings. And surely, for our owne experience, I cannot learne any thing to the contrarie, but that our Tribunals and places of Iudicature, our Bishops, Iustices, and other Officers, who haue to deale in their Examinations, yea and that our common sort of Christians who conuerse with them, doe find in their experience, that Secular Priests, and late Popes of all sorts, doe iumpe with the Iesuites in the practice of this Arte. Notwithstanding, if any among them, which

which call themselves Catholikes, doe renounce and disclaime it, as well in deedes as in words; I am so far from fastening any imputation of disgrace vpon them for this inquirie of their brethren, as that I wish and pray they may goe on, to forsake and abandon all other the abominations and errors of the Roman Church. But (to draw toward an end in this Point) all things considered, my Conclusion commeth to this head; That this *mystery of iniquity* spreadeth farre and neere in the Papall Kingdome, hauing receiued authority and countenance from the very *Roman See*, and finding entertainment and acceptance among all inferiour sorts; but yet the Iesuites are they that haue chiefly polished it, and most boldly practised it; and among the Iesuites, our *English-men* (be it spoken to the credite of our Nation) doe beare the bell away. And from hence the Reader may see why our Diuines doe vsually ascribe this Doctrine to the Iesuites: and consequently what wee haue to answer to *Becanus* his question. For *⁊ desire to know* (saith he) *why you call this Arte of deceiuing, Iesuiticall Equiuocation*: and our answer is ready; We call it *Iesuiticall*, because men of that order, haue beene the chiefe Abettors and polishers of that Arte.

*Quero cur
hanc fallendi ar-
tem appelles Ae-
quiuocationem
Iesuiticam. tom.
2. Opusc. 1. in
Append. in ex-
aguatione
⁊ prope.*

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the matter or object of Equiuocation, or in what cases it is allowed by the Patrons of it.

EOr the matter or object, about which this Arte may be exercised, *F. Persons* seemeth to except two cases, in which they hold it vnlawfull to equiuocate. First, *In matters of faith*: and secondly, *in buying and selling, in common conuersation and humane traffique, to the hurt or preiudice of any.* But this is but another trick of his iuggling, by which hee would bleare the eyes of his Reader; and make the world belecue that they vse no fraud, either in matters of Religion, or in businesses with their neighbours, so that any body should be hurt or beguiled by them. For first, where he saith, that they may not vse Equiuocation in matters of faith, perhaps in this saying he doth equiuocate with vs; and meaneth, that we may not so vse Equiuocation, as to deny any point of faith. But that in handling & dealing about matters of faith, it may bee lawfull with them to vse this Arte; there are good proofes from their own Writings, beside all the experience of their practice. For *F. Persons* saith, that ^b in matters of Religion, it belongeth to the faith of the hearer to seeke out the speakers reservation for his better assurance. Which is but a slender comfort to a poore Christian, who had as good seeke a Needle in a bottle of hay, as a reservation locked vp in an Equiuocators mind: but hence it followeth, that he alloweth Equiuocation in matters of Religion. A

G

gaine

a Mitig. cap. 7. nu. 7. p. 277. & cap. 10. nu. 23. p. 424. & cap. 15. nu. 31. p. 460. & cap. 13. nu. 2. p. 547.

b Mitig. ca. 11. nu. 23. p. 454.

^a Mitig. cap.
13. nu. 3. p. 548.

Againe, the same Father Persons telleth vs, that ^a no man can deny, but many falls and cases may fall out concerning matters of Religion, not tending to Confession (especially in time of persecution) wherein a man may, or perhaps also must by obligation vsd equiuocall speeches. Here he granteth, that by their principles, it is an vn-doubted conclusion, that in cases concerning Religion, a man may equiuocate, so the case be not such, as tendeth to Confession; 1. as I vnderstand it, if by equiuocating he doe not seeme to deny the Roman faith, which at such times, they hold it necessarie for their Children, without any tergiversation to confesse. But elsewhere hee vnfoldeth himselfe a little more plaine-ly, when he saith of Equiuocation, ^b that it may not be used in matters of Religion, where Confession of our Faith is required. For this implyeth, that where Confession of faith is not required, there it may be lawfull enough to equiuocate. But euident and cleare it is, that the

^b Sober Rec-
kon in Ap-
pend. nu. 27.
pag. 687.

^c Mitigat. cap.
9. num. 25. &
scqq.

^d Mar. 13. 32.

^e Ioh. 8. 15.

^f Mar. 16. 16.

^g Ioh. 6. 51.

^h Ioh. 16. 23.

^c Iesuite maketh our blessed Saniour to equiuocate in sundry matters of Religion, and thence would perswade vs, that by his example, they may doe the like. As for example, hee did equiuocate, when he said of the day of Iudgement, ^d Of that day and houre knoweth no man, nor the Sonne, &c. And when hee said of himselfe, ^e I iudge no man: the Iesuite saith, that this speech without a mentall reservation is false, and cannot stand, for that it should be contrary to many other places of Scripture: and should imply a deniall of Christs office to be our Iudge. He proceedeth to other examples, and telleth vs, that Christ did equiuocate about the Sacrament of Baptisme, when he said, ^f Hee that shall beleue, and be baptized, shall be saued: and about eating of the flesh of Christ, ^g If any man shall eat of this bread, hee shall live for ever: and about Prayer, when hee said, ^h If ye shall aske any thing of my Father in my name, he will giue it you. Now the points here spoken of, and others of like na-
ture,

ture, in which the Iesuite findeth Equivocation to haue beene vsed in Scriptures, are, I trow, *matters of faith and Religion*. And hence it followeth, that Equivocators must either confesse that they abuse the world in alledging these and such like Texts, to proue and vphold Iesuiticall Equivocation, which is not there meant; or that they hold their Equivocations to be lawfull, and sufficiently warranted, euen in principall *matters of Religion*, such as are Christs office of iudging, the doctrine of the Sacraments, and prayer in Christs name. In the first place then, when *Persons* excepteth *matters of faith* from the practice of Equivocation, hee mocketh his Reader with generall speeches, when hee meaneth no such thing; but onely that men may not equivocate, by denying in words their beliefe of *the Roman faith*, or some such like. Secondly, where *Persons* saith that they allow not equivocation in common *conuersation*, in *buying*, &c. it may be observed that *Nauarre*, the famous Reader in Rome, doth highly commend this Equivocation as a *singular point of Doctrine*, by which wee may auoid innumerable sinnes which wee commit by denying and affirming without this *mentall reservation*, with which if the words spoken were ioyned, they would become true. This he explaineth and confirmeth thus: *We are asked & demanded every foore, whether we goe, what we haue eaten, how much money we haue, or haue borrowed, or haue giuen, what letters and newes we haue receiued, what wee haue written and related, what such or such a man said to vs, what wee know of such or such a one: and many hundred like. To all which (saith hee) wee might answere without sinne, & by vnderstanding somewhat in our mindes, which may make that true, which we affirme, and that false, which wee deny: As for example, When a man asketh of vs, money, or a Booke, or newes, &c. if wee answere him, I haue the money, or I knowe him not; vnderstanding, so as I am*

a Comm. in
c. Human au-
res. q. 3. an-
b. Per hoc ab-
Ebram singula-
rem possumus
evitare innumera
peccata, &c.
c. Passim enim
interrogamur,
Quid vadimus,
quid comedimus,
&c.
d. Subintelli-
gendo aliquid,
quibus sunt vera
que amittimus,
vel falsa que
negamus.
e. Ita ut remor
vel conueniat illi
præfate, tradere,
dicere, &c.

a Summa v.
mendac. nu. 4.
pag. 381.

b *Que doctrina
debet notari.*

c De precept.
2. 5. 1. nu. 8.

p. 49.

d *Causam habet
non illam dandi.*

e *In communi
loquutione inter-*

rogato de re,

quam secretis

seruare expedit,

licitum est dicere,

se nescire intel-

ligendo, ita ut

expedit dicere.

Sanchez O.

per moral. l. 3.

c. 6. nu. 27.

f Mitigat. c. 9.

nu. 81. & 83.

pag. 403, 404.

g Inc. Human.

uirt. q. 2.

nu. 11.

h *Verum & in-*

ipsum damnum.

bound, or, as it is convenient to doe it, or give it, or to speake and make it knowne. The like is affirmed by ^a *Ennis*. *Rodriguez*, who alledging this determination of *Nanarre*, and transcribing also some of his words, addeth in the end, to shew how hee esteemed this denice, ^b *Which Doctrine ought to be marked and obserued.* And *Fernandes* in his *Examen* saith, that if a man being requested to lend a thing to his neighbour, ^a *haue a cause or reason, why hee will not grant or giue it, &c.* hee may sweare by Equivocation, that he hath not such a thing. And *Sanchez*, ^c *In common talke (saith hee) if a man be asked of a thing which is becometh him to keepe secret, it is lawfull for him to say, that hee knoweth not, understanding so as that it is expedient to tell it.* And Father *Perforis* ^f also thinketh it most iust and necessary, if a man come to borrow money whom we may not deny without inconuenience, that we may then answere equivocally that wee haue it not, understanding, with any minde to lend it: or that wee haue it not in our purse, &c. Which instances and examples, if they be not matters of common life and conuersation, I know not where to finde any. But it may be said, that *Persons*, when he excepteth matters of common conuersation in buying, &c. hee addeth, *to the hurt or preiudice of any;* as if hee meant by that restriction, to leaue a libertie of equivocating, euen in buying and selling, and humane traffique; so it be without the hurt of any man: but then vtterly to forbid it. And I graunt, hee addeth those words: but I cannot tell, whether he meant the vulgar Reader to conceiue that meaning in them. Howsoeuer, there is a mysterie in those words, which *Nanarre*, (who useth to deale aboue-board, and to speake more plainly) hath vnfolded, when he calleth it, ^h *a reall and vniust hurt or preiudice;* by which hee vnderstandeth such an hurt, as wee may not doe to another, without sinne and iniustice. And then, the meaning of this

this goodly Exception of *Persons*, will be this; that in buying, and selling, and humane traffique, and common conversation, wee may not equivocate, if thereby wee doe hurt any man unlawfully and unlawfully: but else, if any of their Catholiques should thinke that the hurt which redoundeth to one of vs, is lawfull and just; that then they may freely delude vs with their amphibologies and reservations, in what matter soeuer, and for what end they please, though it were for massacring of an assembly, or for murdering of a Prince, or for blowing up of a Parliament, or for the invasion of this Kingdome by hostile and forraigne forces: And so by this exception we are well freed from the feare of these deluding and equivocating spirits. Let vs then dismiss *Persons*, with his shifting Exceptions, and enquire more particularly and directly what the case be, wherein they doe in sober sadnesse allow their Schollers to vnder the benefit of this *Art*. And for this purpose I finde two things said by them. First, (that whensoever a man may lawfully keepe silence, and say nothing, or whensoever hee is not bound to reveale and lay open the truth, then hee may lawfully equivocate; and vnder this sleight of amphibologie; be in a matter of faith, or a businesse of commerce and traffique, or a poynt of State, or what else you will; it mattereth not to this purpose. For proofe of this, first take the resolution of Father *Garnet*. He being prisoner in the Tower, and required to declare his opinion concerning this point, set downe his minde in writing, which is yet kept vpon Record: and it was this; *Concerning Equivocation this is my opinion. In all matters and businesses of life, whosoever friends it is required of a man to speak truth, then hee may not use Equivocation.* Or. But what if there is occasion for necessary defence, or for murthering of some injury or dishonour, or for obtaining some good for others, or whatsoeuer, without the perill of any sinne? When Equivocation is better

[illegible]

^a Proceeding
against Tray-
tors, liti. 4.

^b Et etiam ut
licet, quam in
quis interrogatur,
si datur rationa-
bilis causa non re-
spondendi ad me-
tem Interrogan-
ti. Fernand.
Exam. de prec.
2. cap. 5. §. 1. nu.
3. p. 49.

^c Non solum quod
inimosa est in-
terrogatio, sed et-
iam absque cau-
sa interrogatio,
sape non tenetur
ad mentem eius
respondere, quan-
do cumque scilicet
Interrogans non
habet in mente
causam respon-
dendi, & Inter-
rogatio iudicis non
est, sed illius
denegandi causa
supplet. Nam
cui licet dicere, si
preter questionem,
aliquid quid cum
Deo, confidit,
aut secus loqui
possit, & non
scit, non tenetur
respondere,
i. pariter vocat,
pariter miratur.
Hic Refut.
Appl. c. 4. Appl.
na. 117. p. 913.

full: I saw which speech, Master Caspoken doth truly note
by the way, that those words, without the perill of any
man, are onely added for a colour, and to blind the sim-
ple with: as I noted the like before, in a like sentence
of Father Berisius. For the thing that I now note for
this purpose, is, that he saith: In common use of life, when
it is required of a man to speake truth; then it is not lawfull
to equivocate. By which words he implyeth, that where
a man is not of duty bound to speake or reveile the
truth, that he may obscure & hide it by this Arte. The
same Father Garnet, while hee stood at the Barre, in
fewer words, and plainer manner, explaineth his
meaning thus: A No man may equivocate when he ought
to speake the truth, otherwise he may.

To like purpose, Fernand. ^d A man may lawfully
speak also, when he is iustly or lawfully demanded, if hee
have a reasonable cause not to answer, according to the
meaning of the Demander. And Heisius the Iesuite, &
Not onely (saith hee) when the question is unjust, but also
when it is without fault, when many times are bound to
answer him that asketh the question, according to his inter-
tion and meaning: and this is, whensoever the Demander
hath not right to command an answer, and the Demanded
hath a sufficient and not idle reason to deny it. For he that
may lawfully bid him pray, may, passing by things, that
are asked him, speake some other thing with Gods, the hea-
venly Spirits, or with himselfe, either by vot all or mentall
speech, or by a voice speech, which is partly vassell and part-
ly inward. In these two last testimonies, the instance is
in a particular case, when a man is examined, or que-
stioned: but the ground on which they build their de-
termination, is a general Rule, that whensoever a man
may lawfully say nothing, then he may lawfully equiva-
cate, and speake by a voice Prophecy, as appeareth
plainly in the reason of Heisius, now set downe in his
owne words. And in a word, Equivocate say, that

if a man use Equivocation with marvellous reservation, he doth not offend against the negative Precept, which forbiddeth a man to lye; because, whatsoever he speaketh in that manner, is a truth: onely hee may offend against the affirmative Precept, if he doe then equivocate, when he is bound to utter and reveale the truth: And hence I inferre, that whensoever a man may lawfully say nothing, as not being bound to reveale the truth; then in these mens opinion, he may lawfully speake by Equivocation. And this is the first thing that they say for this purpose. The second thing is, that there is just cause for using of Equivocation, whensoever it is necessary or expedient for preserving of bodily safety, honor, household goods, or for any other act of vertue; so that the hiding of the truth may when it is thought to be expedient, and honest. So speaketh Sanchez, meaning this rule of such an Equivocation as is ioyned with an oath. For else, if there be no oath taken, then honest sport, used for lawfull recreation, may make the use of Equivocation lawfull. But if there were an oath added, then it is an evident fault, because of the Oath and indiscreet using of Gods Name. So speaketh the same Author not long after. From which words of the Jew suite we may gather two things. 1. That an easie cause may suffice for iustifying of Equivocall speeches, in a simple assertion without an oath. If there bee no other cause but onely for merriment and recreation; yet that is reason enough to make the use of Equivocation lawfull and honest. 2. That when other Equivocators doe require some kind of necessity or utility which may draw men to use it, they are to be understood of Equivocation ioyned with an oath, and not when it is used in a bare and simple affirmation or negation: unless wee may conceine, that sport and merriment goeth with them for a matter of necessity or great moment. And

^a Persons mit. c. 10. nu. 23. pa. 424. Greg. de Valent. tom. 3. Disp. 5. q. 13. punct. 2. 5. Ad. 3. Arg. Sanchez moral. 1. 3. c. 6. nu. 16. p. 26.

^b *Causa iusta v. tendi his amphibologiis est, quoties id necessarium aut utile est ad salutem corporis, honoris, vel familiaris tuenda, vel ad quolibet alium virtutis altum: ita ut veritatis occultatio censetur, tunc expediens ac studiosa.* Sanchez op. moral. 1. 3. c. 6. num. 19.

^c *Dum Sotus ait non esse culpam Amphibologiis uti joco, & in ridiculis, intelligo quando absque iuramento id fiet. Tunc enim honestus ille ludus, recreationis in causa exercitus, honestum redderet amphibologiae usum. At si iuramentum adesset, est manifesta culpa.*

propter unum indiscreetum Divini Nominis usum. Sanchez moral. 1. 3. c. 6. nu. 22.

indeed,

indeed, this difference given by Father Sanchez, betwene *Equivocation* with an oath, and without it, hath reason in it, if we consider their grounds and principles. For in affirmations and negations, there are two things required. 1. That no lye be told: for this is required by the negative precept of truth, as they vse to speake. And this fault, as they thinke, they auoide by their *arte of Reservation*. And secondly, that men conceale not a truth, when they are bound to disclose it: for this is required by the affirmative precept of truth. But in an Oath, besides truth in the speech, there is a third thing required, and that is, that it be vndertaken with iudgement, that is to say, aduisedly and with due discretion. Else, by swearing a truth *unaduisedly*, Gods Name may be prophaned. There is reason then for this difference which Sanchez maketh. And now by all this, the Reader may see, that an easie cause is thought sufficient for the vsing of this *Arte*. If it be for ease of the body, safety of a mans goods, preferuing of his credite, &c. then by their doctrine, a man may *equivocate* with an Oath: but if it be for sport and merriment only, yet then it may bee lawfull in affirmations and negations without an Oath: provided that it be such a case, in which a man may lawfully hold his peace, and bee not bound then to disclose the truth.

By this it appeareth in generall, in what cases they allow the vse of this *Arte*. But for fuller satisfaction of the Reader, and for more distinct conceining of their meaning in this point; it will not bee amisse to point out some speciall and particular Cases, in which they giue expresse leaue for the practising of this sleight, And they be these, and such like.

1 If a Priest, that hath heard another mans Confession, should be demanded, whether such a one had confessed such a sinne vnto him, or not; — he may answer directly, that hee hath not confessed any such thing vnto him, albeit hee had done

done so: yea, he may swear also to his answer of his, understanding and reserving in his minde, that the Penitent hath not confessed the same unto him, so as he may viter it. These be Father Persons words. And hee saith, they be agreeable to the mind of all Schoole-Doctors.

2^b If a Penitent be asked without a iust cause, whether he haue confessed such or such a sinne (which he had confessed to the Priest) he may swear he confessed it not, understanding, so as that he is bound to tell him. So speaketh Sanchez, and citeth others of the same opinion.

3^c If a Iudge do against iustice question a Defendant, and doe not question according to order of Law; the Defendant may vse Equiuocation, and swear according to his owne meaning: that is, by a secret reseruatiō kept in his mind. So saith Tolet. And Sanchez saith the like, When the Iudge that questioneth, is not the lawfull Iudge of him that is questioned, or is not his Iudge in that peculiar case; the Defendant may vse Equiuocation. And the like he saith, if the Iudge bee an Excommunicate person. And the like Father Persons doth largely confirme, When the Iudge is not lawfull, or not competent at least in that cause, or proceedeth not lawfully. In these cases, they thinke that a man questioned before a Magistrate, may vpon his oath, by an equiuocall reseruatiō, deny that which he knoweth to be true.

4^e If one doe ignorantly kill a man, thinking him to be a wild Beast, (a Deere for example) or if he kill a man in his owne defence; he may being questioned of the fact, denie it vpon his oath.

5^f When an vniust tax is set vpon a commoditie, if a man sell it for more, or maketh light waight, and scant measure, so that he make himselfe satisfaction for the wrong of the Taxe, and yet sell his commodities worth the moeny; he being examined by a Iudge, whether he sold the commodi-

ignorāter, putans esse feram, occidat, aut in propriam defensionem. potest de eo facto rogatus in iudicio, id negare. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 29. 8 Quando taxa alicuius rei est iniusta, si plura vendens, aut defraudans in pondere & mensura, ita ut sibi satisfaciatur pro pretij iniustitia, & reddat correspondentes merces pretio dato; potest hic interrogatus a Iudice, an plura vendiderit

^a Mitig. cap. 10. nu. 2. pag. 407, 408.

^b Vltimū, Deducitur Penitentem temerè rogatum, an hoc vel illud peccatū confessus sit, posse iurare se non confessum, intelligendo ita ut teneatur illi explicare. Sanchez mor. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 44.

^c Si contra iustitiam petit, et iuridice cum non interrogat, potest vi equiuocationis, et iurare secundum propriam mentem. Tolet. de Instru. Sa. l. 4. c. 31. num. 10.

^d Eisdem amphibologiis potest vi reus, quando Iudex interrogans non est legitimus Interrogatus Iudex, aut in hoc casu peculiariter. Sanchez l. 3. c. 6. nu. 27.

^e Mitig. cap. 10. nu. 11. and in the rest following.

^f Si quis hominē

vol defecerit in
pōdere aut mēsu-
ra, id negare, of-
ferre, se pretio
taxato vendidisse,
se, & integre
pondus & mensu-
ram tradidisse, in-
telligenda hec,
ita ut plura ven-
dens aut defici-
ens in pondere aut
mensura deli-
querit. Sanchez
moral. l. 3. c. 6.
nu. 29.

Si reperto cada-
uere, quis interro-
getur, an gladius
ibi repertus suu-
us, vel tali bond
illac transferit,
quod vera sunt,
& petuntur ab
eo, tanquam illi-
us homicidii indi-
cia quod vere nō
commisit, potest
negare. Sanch.
l. c. nu. 30.

6. If a man be found slaine, with a Sword lying by him;
and a guiltlesse person should be asked, whether that sword
were his, or whether hee passed that way at such an houre,
(which things are true, and are inquired after as signes of
that murder, which he committed not) he may denie it.

7. If a man haue borrowed money, and paid it againe,
and be examined of the Iudge, concerning the money that he
borrowed; he may sweare that he borrowed not that money;
understanding so as that he is now bound to pay it. And so
a man may sweare, that he had not such money, which hee
did receive; if through poverty he be excused from making
payment, or if he should be urged to pay it, before the day
that it is due.

8. If a Creditor haue money owing him upon Bond,
part whereof is payed unto him, but as much is due unto
him some other way, for which hee hath no Instrument to
shew: if he be required before a Iudge, to sweare whether
part of that debt were payd him; he may sweare that it was
not paid, understanding, so but that as much is now due to
him, some other way.

9. If a man be forced to promise marriage to a wo-
man, whom otherwise he is not bound to marrie [the mea-
ning is, if he be urged and pressed by a Iudge against
reason, to make that promise] he may sweare, that hee
will marry her, though hee meane it not, understanding

ut hinc

Within himselfe, if he be bound to doe so, or, if after ward I shall like of it.

10 ^a If a Woman, that hath played the where, bee asked by her husband, whether she haue committed adultery, shee may sweare that she hath not done it, understanding within her selfe, so as I may or mean to tell you of it.

11 ^b If a man haue contracted himselfe to a woman, and after ward make another contract with another, by words de presenti: and being called before the Bishop, and there asked, whether he made such a contract de presenti with this later woman, he may sweare hee did not, understanding, so as that it is a marriage.

12 ^c If a man bee requested to lend money, when hee is not bound to lend it, though he haue the money by him, yet he may sweare that he hath it not, understanding within himselfe, so as that he will lend it him.

13 ^d If a man come from London in a time of infection, to Conetrie, where he cannot be admitted to lodge, vntles he will sweare, that he came not lately from London, hee may sweare that he came not from London, reseruing in his mind, so as that if am infected with the plague, if vpon good reason he thinke that he is not infected,

14 ^e If a man in common talke bee asked of any matter which is behooueth him to keepe secret, he may lawfully say, that he knoweth not, understanding, so as it is behoouefull

^a Si vir ab uxore petat an sit adultera, ista potest dicere, Non sum, (quoniam verum suum cum adulterium commississe) intelligendo, ut tibi venellem Tolet. Instru. l. 4. c. 21. nu. 11.

Sanch. moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 41. Persons, mitig. c. 10. nu. 37. pa. 436.

^b Contraxit quis matrimonium per verba de presenti, qua de re postulatus coram Episcopo, potest adducere iuramento respondere, non se contraxisse per verba de presenti, seruata sibi clausula, sed ut matrimonium fuerit.

Treatise of Equivocation, allowed by Blackwell and Garnet, cited by D. Abbot Anulog. cap. 2. fol. 13. and Casaub. Epist. ad Front. pag. 115. ^e Decimo quinto deductur, eum, a quo mutuo pecunia petitur, quam reuera habet, posse iuristrando affirmare, se eam non habere, intelligendo intra se, ut mutuo det. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 43. & Nauar. Com. in c. Human. aures, q. 3. num. 13. Persons mitigat. cap. 9. num. 21. pa. 403. 404. ^d Londino quini, sciuerunt ibi posse, proficiantur. Contritioni, quem magistratus de his suis inculpate solliciti, diuersari ibi non patuerunt, nisi prius littere se Londini nuper non fuisse, non inde venisse, iurare poterit non se venisse Londino, cum hac reservatione mentis, ita ut infectus peste venerim. Treatise of Equivocation, apud D. Abbot Anulog. c. 3. fol. 13. The like is said by Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 35. by Tolet. de Instru. l. 4. c. 21. num. 12. by Nauar. Enchirid. cap. 12. nu. 19. ^e In communi loquutione interrogato de re quam secrete seruare expedit, scitum est, si scire se nescire, intelligenda, ita ut, expedit dicere, -- potest etiam -- uti quavis alia amphibologia, &c. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 15.

^a *Observandum*
quoties licitum
est, ad se tuendum
ut aliquam equi-
uocatione, id quo-
que erit licitum,
et si interrogans
urget excludens
illam equiuocati-
onem, and, Quā-
tumcumq; redu-
plices inquis In-
terrogator, ut in-
vet se nulla equi-
uocatione uti, &
absque omni
prorsus equiuoca-
tione id intelli-
ge: adhuc id in-
uare potest, intelli-
gendo, ita ut pla-
ne debeat loqui et
explicare, vel ali-
quid aliud mente
concupiendo, quo
verum id redda-
tur. Sanchez
moral. l. 3. c. 6.
num. 45. and
the same is
said in the
Treatise of
Equiuocation
apud D. Abbot
Antilog. fol. 13.
fac. 2.

to tell it: or With any other reservation that he will imagine.

Lastly, ^a If he that asketh the question, doe exclude the use of Equiuocation, and require a man upon his oath not to use any Equiuocation, and that he meaneth what he speaketh without any Equiuocation at all (as it is in the Oath of Allegiance) yet he may sweare it still, understanding, so as he ought to speake plainly; or framing some other reservation in his mind, by which it may be made true.

These and such like be the cases, in which they allow their Equiuocating fraudes. I could adde more, but I feare I haue wearied the Reader by too many already.

Surely, by this that hath beene said, we may learne two things, which it is requisite all plaine-meaning Christians should take notice of.

1 That *Equiuocators*; and such as are instructed in this *Arte*, doe take vnto themselves a large liberty of vsing this fraudulent deuice. For out of the premises it may appeare, that whatsoeuer busines or occasiō be offered, be the matter sacred or ciuill, publike or priuate, in open Courts of Iustice, or in common practice of life; yet if they can perswade themselves that they haue any *serious cause* to conceale the truth, whether it be for some good to their soules, or for safety of their bodies, or keeping of their goods, &c. they may freely sweare the contrary to that truth, by an *Equiuocall* or mentall reservation. And if they haue any light cause or reason, if it be but for *sport* or *merriment* to recreate themselves, then they may deceiue vs by an *Equiuocation*, in a simple affirmation or negation, hauing no Oath in it.

And this being so, I desire euery Christian, that would not be deceiued, to consider with himselfe, whether he can thinke of any busines that passeth between man and man, in which hee may promise to himselfe plaine dealing, or may presume that he shall not bee deceiued by some *mentall deuice* or other, if hee haue to doe with them, who doe professe this Equiuocating *Arte*.

Secondly,

Secondly, we may learne, that there is no limitation, or exception, or explication, be it neuer so wise or wary, nor any thing which mans wit can deuise, that may restrain or keepe backe these Equiuocators, from deluding vs by their equiuocall speeches; but that say of doe what a man will or can, they will take libertie to equiuocate still: so that no Oathes, how warily and carefully soeuer they be framed, can hold these men, further then themselves will. *Pacemius* discoursing of the Oath of Allegiance, laugheth at the simplicitie (as hee calleth it) of our King and State, who thought by that Oath to provide for their safetie: as hunning hee'dged it about with so many circumstances, as that, to their thinking, no man could winde himselfe out of it with a safe conscience. But they consider not (saith hee) that if the Pope shal dissolve this Oath, all the bands of it, either for performance of fidelitie to the King, or for not admitting a dispensation from Rome, are shattered in pieces. Nay, I will say one other thing (saith hee) that is more admirable. An vnjust Oath, when it is declared to be such, bindeth no man: but that, this Oath is vnjust, hath bene sufficiently declared by the Pastor of the Church. Hee meaneth the Pope: And hereupon hee inferreth in an insulting manner; *Thou seest now (saith hee) how the band of that Oath is vanished into smoke?* (saith hee) which so many wise men thought to be as strong as Iron, proueth weaker then straw. Thus this man boasteth, that by the Popes dispensation, or declaration of the vnlawfulness of it, no Oath in the world is any thing worth. A great priuiledge sure for them, that can so easily winde themselves out of bands, euen the strongest that can be thought of, among men. And yet me thinketh, aliud admirabilius, the Equiuocators haue found a more admirable deuice then this of *Pacemius* is. For hee sent Epistol. Monit. Iacob. Regis lit. 8. 2. & 3. b. *Pacemius* tam in seipsum abisse, nulla ratione; ut vinculum, quod a tot sapientibus ferreum putabatur, nullum se quoniam stramine.

deeth a man to Rome, to fetch a *dispensation* thence, or to get the Popes *declaration* of the vnlawfulnessse of the Oath, and then they may breake all. But our *Equiuocators* haue that at home, and within their own breasts, that may free them from all. For if themselues doe but thinke that the thing is vnlawfull, or that they haue some reasonable cause, to dissemble, they may take this or any other Oath whatsoever, and by an *equiuocall* reservation, breake the band of that Oath, before they take it. And if such be the priuiledges of these men, how great is their danger, that liue and conuerse with them? God preserue all well-meaning men from such deceitfull tongues.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the vse, or rather abuse of Equiuocation, and for what turnes it may serue.



Equiuocation, such as hath beene described before, may be beneficiall to them that vse it, many wayes, and for diuers purposes. For in the generall it may serue them for all turnes, in which by misleading the Hearer, they may make any advantage to themselues, and more particularly it may serue them for these speciall ends and purposes. First, in State-businesse, and matters of politic, it may serue great men, to hide their plots, and to worke their ends by; and yet to make faire weather towards all men, and keepe them in hand that they meane nothing but friendship and loue. In this kinde a *Nauarre* telleth vs of a great *Monarch*, who hee thought

a In c. Human.
sur. q. 3. nu. 14.
p. 353.
Monarchum cum
p. 100. m. 100.

thought had viced, and did then vser his good art (as he calleth it) by the benefit whereof, every man was contented and pleased, that came to him, or had to deale with him about great affaires. ^b For (saith he) hee is thought so to entertaine and to heare those that come vnto him, and in answering, so to expresse and declare himselfe vnto them with whom hee hath to deale, as well by gestures, as by words and deedes, that the things being understood according to their meaning, doe please and content them, though in themselves they be false, but are true according to the restrictions understood by the Answerers. The same *Nauarre* addeth further, ^c that hee thinketh any other great Monarch meane to teach his soine this doctrine and good art of Equiuocating, when for some secret defect, hee drew him backe from the studie of learning, saying, I would not haue my sonne to haue any more Latine, then onely this one. *A people beguile.* * *Qui plures dissimulare, nescit regnare.* Doe they thus instruct their Catholique Princes, to dissemble and equiuocate? and call they it a good *Arte*, by which they may possesse men with a good opinion of them, when they meane quite otherwise? that so they may worke their ends, and bring about their plots and plots? Why, then I neede not feare to say, that one turne, for which the Doctrine of Equiuocation doth serve them, is in State-businesse to hide their plots, and to worke their ends by it. Which as it is dangerous to themselves, so it is dangerous for those that haue to deale with them.

Secondly, It may serve them, for a meanes to hide their mischievous plots against the State and Religion, and yet to escape the hand of iustice after all. For when they have plotted and acted Treasons, or are about any unlawfull businesse, forbidden by the wholesome Lawes of the Kingdome, *Equivocation* serveth to hide both themselves and their Associates, from the en-

b Creditur enim
ita excipere &
audire ad se
venientes, & sic
respondendo, significare
tam gestu, quam
verbo, & scilicet,
ut placeant eis,
cum quibus ven-
geris, intellecta
secundum inten-
tionem illorum,
licet sint in se
falsa, &c.

c Ibid. nu. 15.
d Hanc doctrin-
am & articu-
lum.

* He that know-
eth not to differ-
ble, ² knoweth not
to argue. . . 2

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quiry.

quyry of the Magistrate; be hee neuer so vigilant and carefull. For if one of them be examined or asked; whether hee haue reconciled such a man to the Pope, or absolved such a subiect from his bond of Allegiance, or haue conspired against the life of the King, or haue beene acquainted with a plot of blowing vp the Parliament; though all these things be most true, yet hee may without scruple deny them all vpon his Oath. Or in case one be detected otherwise, and examined, who were his Associats, whether such a Priest, or such a Iesuite, or such a Gentleman were priuy to the thing; though these men were all of them as deepe in the villany, as himselfe; yet he may sweare that none of them all did know the least iote of the matter. And by these trickes they can worke all mischief to Kings, and Nobles, and People, and Parliaments; and yet wind themselves and their complices out of the hands of iustice; vnlesse God doe disclose them, as many times he doth beyond the prouidence or expectation of man. For rather then Treasons should goe vnespied, God maketh
a the Bird of the ayre to carry the voyce; and that which hath wings to tell the matter; saith Salomon. This vse Southwell the Iesuite made of this Arte. For, fearing to be detected, b hee instructed a Woman-Disciple of his, that if shee should be examined, whether himselfe were or had beene in that house, shee should vpon her oath vtterly deny it; and so shee might safely doe, vsing but the help of this Arte, though shee had often seene him there, and knew him to be in the house. And to like purpose c Tresham, one of the Gun-powder Traitors, vpon examination did confesse that Father Garnet was priuy to the Treason, and had talked with him about it: but afterward, hauing been better instructed or confirmed in this rare mystery, when he lay sicke on his death-bed, and not aboue three or foure houres before his death, hee protested, andooke it vpon his Salvation,

a Ecclesiast
20.

b G. Abbot
prelect. de
mendacio.
pa. 50. nu. 13. &
R. Abbot An-
tilog. cap. 2.
fol. 13. fac. 2.

c Proceeding
against Trai-
tors, Cc. 2.

nation, and set it downe vnder his hand, that his former Confession was false, and that hee had not scene *Garnet* of sixteene yeeres space before, at the least. And thus hee died. Which protestation of his, vpon his oath, was proued not long after, to be most vntue. Yea, and *Garnet* himselfe confessed, that within that space hee had scene him many times. Whereupon this graue Father, and grand Equiuocator being demanded what he then thought of *Treshams* Testamentall protestation, hee answered, *It may be hee means to equiuocate.* And this reuerend Father himselfe, who was Prouinciall of the Iesuits, when after secret conference betweene him and *Hall*, another Iesuite in the Tower, hee was asked before all the Lords Commissioners, whether *Hall* and hee had any conference together, and was desired not to equiuocate; hee stiffely denied it vpon his Soule, reiterating it with so many detestable execrations, as wounded their hearts to heare him. And afterward, when he knew that the thing was knowne, and that *Hall* his fellow-Iesuite had confessed it; hee cryed the Lords mercie, and said hee had offended, if Equiuocation did not helpe him. And though the Priests accuse the Iesuites for it, yet when they are examined before a Magistrate, or Officer, they also say and sweare and protest all maner of falshoods and vntuths, that so they may winde either their fellowes or themselues out of the danger of the Law. And indeede this is the chiefe and principall turne, for which Equiuocation is intended to serue them.

a Proceeding
against Trai-
tors .Y. 3.

Thirdly, In matters of Religion this good Art may serue them to auoide arguments and euident reasons brought against them, which their owne consciences doe acknowledge to be true. For hereby they can glosse the Fathers sayings against their meaning, and deny all sorts of authorities that are alledged against them. For so themselues professe to their friends in

a Quum in Catholicis veteribus alijs, plurimos feramus errores, & extenuemus, excusamus, excogitato commento per sepe negamus, & commodum ipsi sensum affingamus, dum opponuntur in disputationibus aut in constitutionibus cum Aduersarijs: non videmus cur non eandem equitatem & diligentem recognitionem mereatur Bertramus. Index Belgic. lit. B. in Bertramo. pag. 12. in 8°. b Mitigar. ca. 7. num. 34. & seqq.

secret, ^a Seeing (say the Belgicke Censurers) in other ancient Catholics, wee beare with very many errors, and doe lessen and excuse them, and very often by some deuised shift doe deny them, and feine vnto them some commodious meaning, when they be objected against vs in disputations and conflicts with the aduersaries: wee see no reason why Bertram may not deserue the like equitie or fauourable dealing, and diligent reuising. This they profess among their friends (for their meaning was not that euer it should come to our sight:) and being that they hold all lying to be so sinfull, that they may not tell a lye for the sauing of a soule, it were too hard a censure to thinke, that against the light of their owne consciences, they would so wilfully thrust themselves on that danger, and so boldly profess it in the eares of their friends. But by this fine Arte they can quiet the murmuring of their consciences, because by it, they can say any thing, neuer so false, and yet by a reservation, make it as true as the Gospell.

This consideration maketh mee not to maruell, when in men, that profess such religious strictnesse, (as Father Persons ^b saith they doe.) I finde such broad and vnreasonable expositions and glosses of Fathers and other Writers, as that no man of vnderstanding who readeth the places, but will see, that the glosse doth corrupt the Text, and the expositions doe clearely depraue the Authors meaning. For I know that an Equiuocator hath an Arte, by which hee can make all speeches to become true, if once they doe but come forth of his mouth.

Fourthly, It may serue them for deuising and counterfeiting of strange apparitions, and heauenly visions, and diuine miracles. This, how frequent it hath beene heretofore, the wisest and most learned among their owne Writers doe confesse and bewaile. And of late yeeres their owne ^c Brethren doe say, that the miracles

^c The Author and the Publishers of the Iesuites Catechisme.

racles and visions reported of ^d Ignatius, and ^e Iustinian d L.I.c. 18.
 and ^f Xauier, and others of the Iesuiticall straine and fol. 64.
 order, are not much better. And what should let vs to c L.I.c. 17.
 thinke, but they which presume so much in other fol. 63.
 things, in ordine ad Deum, and pro bono societatis, in f Ibid.
 reference to God, and for the good of their Order; would not
 sticke to fittes and faine and tell of glorious facts, and
 admirable wonders which were neuer done, and make
 faire shewes without substance, if these may helpe to
 aduance the papall dignitie, or the Iesuiticall order, e-
 specially seeing they know how to say and write and
 sweare any thing for so great a good, without the least
 grudge of conscience?

Fifthly, It may serue them for forging and diuulging
 of false, especially slanderous reports. against their ad-
 uersaries and enemies of their profession. A thing so
 generally and so boldly practised by the men of this fa-
 ction, especially by the Fathers of Ignatius his Order,
 that wise men haue much wondred, when in such po-
 litique persons as Iesuites are, they haue seene and ob-
 serued such a strange liberty in coyning of forged tales,
 as that the vntruthes which they haue broached, might
 well be called *splendida mendacia*, transparent lyes, such
 as by their owne light bewray themselues, or such as
 within a few dayes might and haue appeared to the
 world to be loude and lewd lyes, that might shame
 their Master. And wee might well wonder, if we knew
 not the Iesuites *new Arts*, that men of any either con-
 science or honest minde, could let passe out of their
 mouthes, or from their pens, such shamefull and yet
 shamelesse fictions. For example (to giue the Reader a
 taste of their forgeries and lying slanders) Luther was
 a great *manle*, that battered their *Babel*; and of him
 they reported, and printed it too, that hee was dead
 and buried, which was no great wonder: but (that
 which was worth the straining of their wits) when hee

g Relation of
 Religion, num.
 33. Beza Re-
 diu. Epist. ad
 Gul. Stuck.

lay a dying, hee tooke order, that his bodie should be layed on the Altar, and adored as a God. And when hee was dead, and buried, that there was such a terrible noyse and tumult about his graue, as if heauen and earth had gone together. And the night after his buriall, that there was a much greater and more hideous noyse and shrieking then before. And when, vpon the occasion of this fearefull noyse, which frighted all the Citizens out of their sleepe, his graue was opened the next day, there was neither bodie, nor bones, nor graue-clothes to be seene; but so hellish a stinke came out of his graue, as with the poyson of it, it had almost killed the standers by. And all this while Luther was aliue, and did helpe to demolish their Babel still; and not long after the same time, published a book in print, & gaue it this title, *Contra Papam à diabolo institutum*, Against the Papacie founded by the Deuill.

a In vita Lutheri pag. 152.

This story if any man be desirous to see, he may read *Melch. Adamus*, in the booke which he wrote of the liues of German Diuines. ^a Where he may also reade the words of the lying Relation, printed by them in Italian, and afterward translated into Latine. After this practice against Luther, they fell vpon Calvin, the wounds of whose pen were deepe in their sides; and of him they scattered this newes in the Courts of the German Princes, and in a generall Assembly in Germany, that Calvin now was weary of his Religion, had revolted, and was turned Papist. And at this very time, was hee printing his booke of Institutions: and in a ^b Preface prefixed before this booke, doth make answer to this slander, and telleth these lying Spirits, ^c The Deuill and all his rowe of lying spirits are deceived, if they thinke by lading me with base lyes, to discourage or hinder mee in my course. In like manner, but with more shamelesse impudency, they afterward traduced Beza. Of whom there were not onely false reports scattered through

b Directed to the Reader.

c Fallitur cum
dota sua caterna
diabolus, &c.

through Italic, Germany, & other Countreies, but letters also were written & diuulged to this purpose; That Beza ^a a little before his death had recanted his Religion in a full Assembly of the Senators of Geneva, beseeching them that if euer they would be saved, they should renounce Caluins errors, and betake themselves to the profession of the Romish faith; that for more full testification of his vnfeigned Conuersion, after his death hee desired them to send for and to be aduised and directed by the Iesuites; that hereupon the Pope had appointed the Bishop of Geneva to absolute Beza, and other learned men, such as could be had neere at hand, to goe to Geneva, and consider of the businesse, and deale with the Inhabitants, if any were more backward, about points and Articles of Religion in question. After which Relation, the Reporter addeth, that this newes is most certaine and true; as may appeare by the numberlesse company of letters written to this purpose, and will (as hee saith) appeare at the next Frankford Mart, by the store of Bookes which would then flye abroad in the World, for the witnessing of this thing. Hee yet goeth on further, and for more abundant prooffe, telleth vs, that Puteanus, the Generall of the Iesuites, who liued within twelue miles of Geneva, had by writing related this newes, adding moreover, that himselfe was one of those Fathers, whom the Pope had appointed to goe and instruct the Citizons of Geneva. Yea, and moreover, saith the Relator, the Landgrane of Hesse, being scared with this newes, sent messengers to Geneva, who after their returns confirmed all this to be true. This they reported of Beza; without either fear of God or reuerence of men. For all this while Beza was aliue; and continued preaching and writing against the superstitions and idolatries of the Romane Church, for diuers yeeres after. And for the cleare detection of this shamelesse lye, he wrote a Booke, the title whereof is *Beza redinuum*, Beza returned to life againe: Wherein

See the Iesuits Catechisme, l. 1. cap. 17. § 62. a *Vise mortis vicinum sensu, coram pleno Senatu Geneuensi palinodiam fecit.* Beza Rediuu. Epist. Colonia missa, pag. 9.

he hath laid open the Iesuites forgeries, to the shame of their Order. I could bring more instances of their abominable forgeries of this kinde, but I am afraide to cloy the Reader with such vnflauoury fictions. Yet two examples there are, (both within mine owne knowledge and experience) which I cannot omit, without some short rehearfall. The one is, of the famous Diuine, Doctor *Rainolds*, President of *Corpus Christi* Colledge in *Oxford*: and the other, of the worthy Prelate Doctor *King*, Bishop of *London*, my euer-honoured Lord. Of the former, some well-willers to the Roman-Church, were discovered to haue diuulged reports, in the time of his long sicknesse, (for hee died of a lingring consumption) that hee voyded his owne Ordure vpward by the mouth: (of which lye what construction ill mindes would frame, any man may easily conceiue.) This report was brought to him while he was yet aliue, which made him to send for the partie, who was said to be the *author*, or at least a *reporter* of this forgerie, and shewed him what the matter was, that hee vsed to spit out of his mouth, euen the very same that other such sicke men vse to doe. But these lyers might haue proceeded perhaps to fowler fictions, had they not beene preuented by the timely prouidence of some learned, and his louing and religious friends. For they remembring and considering the shamelesse practices of Papists, in scattering false newes to disgrace the Worthies of our Church, came to him the day before his death, put him in minde of their false dealing, and desired him, that for the preuenting of such slanders after his death, hee would now make an open confession of his faith, and constant beliefe. Which he being not able to doe with his owne mouth, his speech hauing fayled him some dayes before, left the composing of a forme of Confession to them, to which hee would subscribe. And they considering his
weaknesse,

weakenesse, framed it in generall and few words, in this manner :

These are to witnesse vnto all the world, that now in this my Weakenesse, wherein I looke for my dissolution, and hope shortly to be with my Christ, I die in a constant belife, perswasion, and profession of that holy truth of God, in defence whereof I haue stood both by writing and speaking, against the Church of Rome, and whatsoever other Enemies of Gods truth. And for mine owne resolution touching mine owne state of Saluation after this life, I assure my selfe thereof, by the merits of Christ Iesus onely, into whose hands I commend my spirit, as vnto my faithfull Redeemer.

To this he readily subscribed with his owne hand ;

John Rainolds.

And his friends then present, who had beene eye-witnesses and eare-witnesses of the whole passage of this businesse, did by their hands witnesse the truth of the act to the world, in these words :

That hee made this Subscription with his owne hand, with such willingnesse and chearefulnesse, as ministred great comfort vnto vs, who were then present ; wee testifie by this subscription of our names also hereunto. May 20. 1607.

Henrie Airay Vice-Chancelor.

Henrie Wilkinson.

Edward Rylston.

Richard Taylor.

Henrie Hindle.

Daniel Faireclough.

Henrie Mason.

Alexander How.

John Dewhurst.

The Originall hereof signed with Doctor Rainolds owne hand, and subscribed by the afore-named parties, I haue in my custodie : out of which this is a true and faithfull Transcript here published. Now blessed be his counsell, and blessed be hee of the Lord, that gaue this aduise for the stopping of these slanderous mouthes.

For

For had not this preuention beene vsed afore-hand, we may feare that such as belied him in his sicknesse, would not haue spared him after his death. And for want of some such prouidence and preuention it is, that that Reuerend and learned *Prelate*, (whose memory is precious with all good men that knew him) our late Bishop of *London* I meane, mine euer-honoured Lord and Patrone: for want, I say, of some such prouidence afore-hand, this glorious Soule hath beene traduced by worthlesse pennes, and foule-mouthed fiends (the indignitie of the thing maketh mee, against my nature and custome, to giue them that name whereof they are most worthy) as if hee had made defection to the Roman Church; to whose errorrs notwithstanding he shewed himselfe an Enemy to his dying-day: as those that knew him inwardly, doe know very well, how in the very time of his sicknesse, hee spared not vpon occasion to expresse his zeale that way. But of all foule-mouthes, that haue slandered that blessed Soule, hee that wrote the *Bishop of Londons Legacie*, is the most shamelesse and impudent lier. The Author of the *Protestants plea* is but a milke-sop to this noble Champion: and Father *Persons* himselfe must now be forced to resigne vp to him the *Whetstone*, which his secular Brethren bestowed vpon him for his excellency in the *sittening Trade*. For they and other of their fellows, haue played their prizes well: but this *L yer* *excellerh them all*. He hath made two publications of one indiuiduall Booke, qualifying, or rather destroying in the latter, some transparent lyes, which with an Whores forehead, and without regard of the Worlds censure, hee had auerred in the former. For, in the yeere 1612. when hee first diuulged this Libell, he made the worthy *Bishop* to speake those silly Motiues, which his worthlesse selfe had deuised. And so hee went masked vnder the *Bishops* name: but with such difformitie and

*Egregie illi
quidem, sed nihil
ad Parmenonis
Suum.*

and disproportion euery way, as made mee remember the Asse in the Fable, which presuming to weare the Lyons skinne, did by his long eares bewray himselfe to be an Asse notwithstanding. He saith, that the *Bishop* himselfe did penne those Motiues, and deliuered them to this *Publisher*, this publique *Lyer*, to be committed to the Presse. I would the world were worthy to vnderstand what rare man this is, that had such inward acquaintance with that learned and wise *Bishop*, as to heare from him the secrets of his heart, and to receiue from him the studied Reasons of his Conuersion, which were neuer made knowne to any bodie else. And sure, it were a great honour to see that face, that could come and goe, and conuerse with the *Bishop* about these weightie affaires, and in this serious manner, without being once seene of any other man, as if by the vertue of some *Gygis* his Ring, he had bin transformed into an inuisible Spirit. But he goeth on, and saith that the man is knowne that reconciled the *Bishop* to the Romane Church. But it is to be feared, he will neuer make knowne the mans name to the world, lest if the *Reconciler* should proue more shamefast, then this *Publisher* is, hee might returne the lye vpon the Author that deuised it, and spit his shame in his owne face. And yet say, hee both can and will name the man, what great mastery is in this? or what great credit might such a circumstance, comming from an Equiuocator, gaine to his cause? For did not *Puteanus* the Prouinciall of the *Iesuites*, name the man that reconciled *Berato* to their Church? Yes. He said expressely (not with *If* and *And*, as this *Publisher* doth) that the man was the Bishop of *Genena*. And did hee not name beside, both the man that was sent to catechize the Citizens of *Genena* in the Romane Faith; and the man that sent messengers to enquire of this news in *Genena*, & found it to be true? Yes, For, for the

one, he nameth himselfe, who among others, was going to *Geneua* to instruct them. And for the other, hee nameth the *Lantgraue of Hessen*, who was a Prince not farre off, and knew the vndoubted truth of this newes. Iesuites and Equiuocators are ashamed of nothing. And yet, I would we might be so much beholding to this *Publisher*, as to publish the *Reasoners* name, that performed so great a worke for this great man. To this purpose this publike *Lyer* spake in the first publication of his Booke; which not long after was suppressed and kept from the view of the world. I suppose, some of his Superiours more wary then himselfe, being ashamed of such *shining Eyes*, did call in the Booke, till some kinde of qualification might temper those shamelesse and hideous vnraths. And then in the yeere following 1623. hee made a new publicatillon of the same worthy Worke, changing onely the Title-leaf, and the Preface to the Reader. And in this second publication, hee is contented to owne his owne abortive Brat, which in the former hee had without shame fathered vpon the worthy Bishop: and wisheth that himselfe may be taken to haue writtten those motiues, as a precedent or patterne warranting any Protestant in the change of his Religion, though by a Poeticall freedom particularly applyed to the Bishop. And whereas throughout the whole Booke, hee maketh the Bishop speake what himselfe had forged, hee now giueth his Reader leaue with his full consent and allowance, to suppose all these passages to be *fictions personarum*, and warranted by the figure *Prosopopeia*, that is, a fiction of the Person. It were some signe of grace, if he had acknowledged the whole *fiction*, as hee doth this part of it. But he goeth on still: and euen in the new altered Preface, or Aduertisement to the Reader, hee accuseth the Bishop of defection from his Religion; and by a figurall kinde of *Peritition*, hee *pareth peremptorily* to
affirme,

affirme, that the Bishop did write and deliver to others any Reasons or Motives of his change in Religion. In which speech, this Slanderer would haue his Reader to vnderstand that, which himselfe daereth not speake; that when it shall appeare to be a shamelesse forgery, hee may wipe his mouth with the Whore in the *Proverbes*; and say, that hee said it not. But, *faule-mouth*, if thou hast any thing to say, spit out: and labour to giue some satisfaction to the World, to auoid the euidence of *condemning the liuing*, and *slandering the dead*. For know, that the World already is possessed with this opinion, that thou must needs be some ignorant Iesuite: (for none else can be imagined to be so Bayardly bold.) And if now thou forbear to produce some prooffe, or some probabilitie, or some possibility, how these things might be; wee shall resolve vpon it, that *Persons* his *ghost* is risen from the dead, and hath brought with him *seuerall other spirits worse* and more lying then himselfe: and that that is the reason, why such vast and shamelesse Forgeries doe shew themselves in this man. But I leaue this Lye for this time; and humbly pray the *Members* of our Church, that they would take these things into their consideration: and as men that deale with Thornes, doe fence their hands with thicke Gloues; so seeing they doe liue, and must die in the midst of such slanderous Tongues; they would arme themselves against such malice, by an open profession of their Faith, at such times especially as they are ready to leaue the World; lest they may be slandered after their deaths, when they will want libertie to defend themselves. But heere I stay my course. For I perceiue I haue in part digressed already; and yet not so, as that I am gone from the matter in hand. For I was saying, that Equivocation did serue the Masters of it for this turne among others; that by it they might without scruple of conscience,

defame and belye the *Worthies* of our Church; that so they might gaine the more credit to their owne. Now how they vse to defame our learned men, I haue declared fully by this digression, if the Reader will so esteeme it: and what vse Equiuocation may stand them in this practice, will not be hard for any man to conceiue. For a wonder it might seeme, that men of any religion or conscience; should endure themselves; while they broach such broad-faced lyes. But the Arte of Equiuocation will presently remoue all such scruple or grudge. For, it teacheth how to speake all vntruths; without telling of the least lye: and so the Equiuocator needeth not to haue any scruple in that respect. And this doubt being once remoued, there can be no further let to hinder their proceeding. For, what though the Heteriques complaine of wrong and iniustice done to them in their good name? that skilleth not. For, *in ordine ad Deum*, and *pro bono Societatis*, that is lawfull enough, or rather very meritorious. For the *Seculars* tell vs, that when a Priest complained to the Iesuities, or some *not among them*; of wrong done to *Master Bennet* by their defamation; reply was made; that it was necessary or conuenient hee should be disgraced, because hee was against their Societie. Where the Author or Authors of that Booke adde further, that the Iesuities hold such *deuillish Principles*; whereby they may at pleasure defame whom they please. And if they take such libertie of Conscience against their own Catholique Brethren; they will out of question make no boties to slander and disgrace an Heterique. This then is one turne among the rest, and it is a speciall one and of great vse for their purpose, that by this Arte of Equiuocating, they can defame and disgrace, and (as we plaine-dealers doe call it) belye whom they will, without any offence or grudge of conscience.

Sixtly, In ordinary dealings and course of life, Equiuocation

a Reply to
Persons Libel.
pag. 18.

uocation may serue them, for concealing of any truth, or perswading of any vnttruth, if either of them may make for their aduantage. So *Nauarre* telleth vs, that if wee be asked *What wee haue eaten, how much money wee haue, what wee haue heard, &c.* In these and all such cases as these, if there be aduantage to be gotten by it, we may by this fine *Arte*, conceale the truth, or speake an vnttruth, so as by *subtillties*, or a mentall reseruatiō, wee make vp the matter. And the *Scollars* tell vs, that the *Iesuites* make *Equiuocation* to serue their turnes so frequently in this kinde, as, that their owne *Catholique Brethren*; nay, their fellow-*Priests* can scarce tell when they speake sincerely, when otherwise. They might haue added, no nor their holy Father the *Pope* neither. For, Father *Standish* coozened and deluded him also, by *Equiuocation*, thereby to oppresse the *Secular Priests*; as they complaine in diuers places of their *Bookes*. And if this *Arte* can serue for this turne, when they decide with his vntnecessie himselfe; no maruell if they make the same use of it, whensoever they haue to deale with their enemies of their *Religion*, his Father, who'd giuing his *Faith*, in *verbo Sacramenti*, is prisoner to the *Knights-Marshal*; yet, who would not thinke that this *Word* and that *Qualitie*. But the good Father (say his *Secular Brethren*) had perhaps, some inward enuision, which to rescue his Soule, at least from a *damnable* (though not from the *Devill*). As for example; as the *Magistrate* has minde hee would be true prisoner, or for anys his on the *Kidnap* should know to the contrary, till hee were escaped; or that hee might not so willingly in his head; but in his feete; or that hee would not break away so long as the *Knights-Marshal* or his *Deputies* stood by and looked on; or that hee should not break away as a *Priest*; but as a *Secular*; or that hee would not scape with a *small* value come againe with his will, or that nulla fides signanda

a Comment
in c. Human.
aur. q. 3. nu. 13.

b Reply to
Persons Libel.
pag. 33.

c Reply to
Persons Libel.
cap. 3. pag. 57.
True Relation
pag. 55, 56.
Quodl. 3. art. 4.
pag. 66. in the
Margin.

d Answer to
a Letter of a
Iesuited Gen-
tleman, p. 104.

Hereticis; or, how many Ors might I make upon this point & faith the Author of that Booke. But the point is plaine, and as well proued to be true, of all sorts, as heere it is affirmed of the Iesuites; though I will not denie these Fathers the precedencie in this practice: *Equivocation* then serueth for many singular turnes, and for uses of great consequence and moment: and therefore it is no marvell that they doe so hugge and embrace it, as a dearling of great worth.

CHAP. V.

Of the Grounds and Arguments, either for or against Equivocation.

IN setting down the Reasons on either side, I shall not neede to be long; because I have beene large already in unfolding the nature and conditions of this Art, in the points hitherto spoken of: and the discouery of such a monstrous device is argumēt enough to disprove it. It may then be sufficient for this place, first, to answer the chiefe Arguments; which are brought in defence of it; and then in the second place, to set downe some fewe Reasons, that may refute it.

And first, for their Arguments, they are many in particular; for Father Persons findeth 8 or 9 at least, in one piece of a Chapter: & how many then might he have found, if he had sought all the Chapters of the Bible, in the like maner? But the Wren hath more birds then the Eagle: and errors doe more vscally abound with their

their rotten proofes, then Truths doe with sound and substantiall Reasons. And it is no marvell, if such a false Conclusion hath no direct or good proofe at all: and Canils and Impertinent flourishes for every thing, may bee infinite and without number. And so it is in this case. For such proofes, as the 8 or 9 are, which Father Perkins findeth in one Chapter, he might have found 8 or 900 in the compasse of the Bible. But howsoever the particular allegations be so many, yett all of them may easily be reduced to some few heads: and so many of them together may be cut off at one blowe. bib. 20

The Heads then, to which the substance of all that they say, may be reduced, are these three. 1. Examples of holy men. 2. Examples of God himselfe. And 3. Examples of Iesus Christ our blessed Saviour.

And first, for Examples of holy men, they bring in the Patriarches and Prophets, and other Saints of God. For Abraham, say they, did equivocate, when he said of Sarah, that she was his Sister: and Jacob, when he said, I am thy first-borne Esau. and Moses, when he said to Pharaoh, that they would goe to worship in the wilderness, but meant to goe to Canaan: and Samuel, when he said, he went to offer sacrifices, but principally intended to anointe David to be King of Israel: and David, when he told Achish, that he had killed the Philistines, &c. and so on, when he sought out of the Nobles, who demanded of him, What saidst thou to the King, &c. He answered, I presented my supplications to the King, that he would not cause me to be a burden to mine own house, &c. And so on: whereas he talked with him, concerning his yeelding up to the King of Babylon.

Gen. 20.

Gen. 27. 19.

Exod. 5. 1.
& 8. 27.

1. Sam. 16. 1, 2.

1. Sam. 21. 2.

Ier. 38. 25, &c.

For answer to these and the like, I note 5. things by way of preamble. 1. That the old Hereticks, who were Gillianists, who defended the lawfulness of Equivocation, as now the Papists doe of Equivocation, did alledge such like places and examples, at least many of them, for proofe

prooffe of their heresie; which our Iesuites doe for confirmation of their opinion. And they had better shew of reason then these men haue; for diuers of those Instances were either direct and culpable vntruthes, or seemed at least to border too neere vpon such obliquity: but as for this newfound *Equiuocation* by mentall reservation, it hath no shew nor semblance of probability, to be gathered from them. 2. That neither *S. Augustin*, who most diligently confuted those Heretikes, nor any other ancient Writer, for answering of these objections, did euer see to this Arte of *Equiuocation*; or once say, that those Fathers and holy men did not lye in any of those speeches, for that they spoke the truth by a mentall reservation. Which answer, if it had bin true, had bene most pertinent and easie; as our late *Equiuocators* doe not only confesse, but bragge of it too. For *Nathan* saith; that from his doctrine of *Equiuocation*, there ariseth, or may bee gathered, *nouns modus excusandi a mendacijs Patriarchas*, a new way to excuse the Patriarches from lyeing. Where, when he saith that it is a new way, he acknowledgeth that it was not knowne to *S. Augustin*, or those other Worthies, who in former times did beate downe these Errours of the Heretikes. And when he saith, that this way ariseth out of his doctrine, he intimateth, that if the Fathers had knowne this, they might easily haue answered the *Persecutionists*, by interpreting those Texts after his new way. Now from hence it followeth, that the Ancients did not vnderstand these passages of Scripture, as making any thing for *Equiuocation*. And therefore, when *Equiuocators* alledge *S. Augustin*, and some others of the Fathers, for their interpretation, they abuse both their Readers, and the ancient Fathers.

These things being first noted, I come to giue a more direct answer to the objections; and it is this; As they affirme, so I deny, that these or any of these sayings alledged,

* Comm. in C.
Human. aures.
9. 3. nu. 7.

ledged, were meant, or are to bee vnderstood and construed with any *Equiuocall reservation*.

Yes, say they, that they are. For if they bee not so construed, they are *apparent lyes*, which may not be supposed of those holy men.

Answ. 1. If they be not vnderstood and made true by *mentall reservation*, they are *apparent Lyes*, say they. If this doe not follow, then our *Equiuocators* doe great wrong to those ancient Worthies. And plaine it is, for diuers of them, that they doe so. For when *Abraham* said of *Sarah*, *She is my Sister*; and when *Moses* said to *Pharaoh*, *We must goe three dayes &c.* and when *Samuel* said to the Elders of *Bethleem*, *I am come to sacrifice vnto the Lord --*; and when *Jeremie* said, *I presented my supplication &c.* these speeches were all of them true, in the words as they lye, and according to the common acception and meaning of them. And therefore there is in them no *Iesuiticall Equiuocation*, in which the words are false, till a secret thought doth make them true. And in this sence, and to this purpose, *Abraham* doth interpret his owne meaning, and explaine his words. For when *Abimelech* challenged him for concealing his wife, and asked, *What sawest thou, that thou hast done this thing?* he answered for himselfe, *Because I thought, Surely, the feare of God is not in this place, &c.* and yet indeed she is my Sister; she is the daughter of my Father, but not the daughter of my Mother. In which answer we may note three things. 1. He sheweth the reason which moued him to conceale her to be his wife; *Because I thought the feare of God, &c.* 2. He defendeth his speech to be true as the words doe sound; and yet indeed she is my Sister. *q.d.* That which I said is very true. And hereby it appeareth, that *Abraham* did not equiuocate; because *Abrahams* words in their vsuall signification, and as they were vttered by him, were true: but the words of an *Equiuocator*, as
L they

Gen. 10. 11, 12.

^a Apologie for
Ecclef. Subord.
c. 12. in the end
fol. 202.

^b So S. Aug. in-
terpreteth this
place, lib. con-
tra mendac.
cap. 10.

they are vttered, are false, till an inward *reseruation* do patch them vp, and make a truth of them. And it further hereby appeareth also, that *F. Persons* did not on-ly belye *Abraham*, but Almighty God himselfe, when he saith, that ^a both *Abraham* and *Sarah* said, that shee was not his Wife, but his Sister: and that this was one among diuers sayings and speeches in Scripture allowed by the Holy Ghost. Thirdly, *Abraham* explaineth his words, or rather sheweth how they were true and vn-fained, and that is, because she ^b was his neere kins-woman on the Fathers side, and such women in the v-sual language of those Countries, were called their *Sisters*. *Abraham* then sheweth that his speech was true, because the thing was so, as his words did sound; and not because he had some secret *reseruation* in his minde, by additiō wherof they became true. And this sheweth againe, that in these words of *Abraham*, there was no *Equiuocation*, such as our new Doctors doe imagine. And *Abrahams* example in interpreting his owne words, may serue vs for a patterne to interpret the rest by. And so; as he said, *Indeed she is my Sister*, as I said: so we may say of them, *Indeed*, and intruth the things were so, as they said. Only in these examples, though all that was said, was true: yet something that was true, was concealed; which we grant to bee lawfull: nor doth it any way helpe the Iesuites, or fauour their imaginary fiction.

Answ. 2. When they say, If the speeches be not vnderstood with *mentall reseruation*, then those men told a *Lye*: I answer, that that may be granted of some of them, without any absurdity, or wrong of those worthy men. For if we be forced to confesse, that *Dauid* did commit murder, why should we bee afayrd to confesse that he told a *Lye*, if he vttered any such words as had not a true meaning, as our *Equiuocators* say that he did? And if we grant it in *Dauid*, what harme is there,

there, to acknowledge it in others of Gods best seruants, if by the Text and their owne speeches, any such thing doe appeare? If then any of these holy men did speake words which were vntrue, wee may without inconuenience grant, that as they did sinne in other things, so they might in this: and therefore herein we must not take example by them, to doe as they haue done before vs. This answer S. *Augustin* maketh to the *Priscillianists*, when they alledged the example of ancient men and women, to proue that *Lying* was lawfull. For *when we reade of these things in the Scriptures* (saith he) *we must not therefore thinke that wee may doe them, because we know that they did doe them; lest we violate Commandements, while without choice wee follow examples.* Say then, that the words of some of those holy men cannot haue a good meaning or true construction, in themselves considered; it will be no inconuenience, to grant that such good men did therein doe amisse, and made a *Lye*. And (to speake more particularly to the point) so I thinke *Iacob* did, when hee said, *I am thy first-borne Esau*: and *Danid*, when hee said, *that hee had made a rode against the South of Iudah*, &c. *1. Sam. 27. 10.* And so wee may say of *Rahab*, and the *Mid-wiues of Egypt*, and some others.

Obiect. But S. *Augustin* doth excuse those words of *Iacob*, from being a *lye*.

a *Hac quando in Scripturis sanctis legimus, non ideo quia falsa credimus, etiam facienda credamus, ne violemus precepta, dum passim scellamus exempla. Aug. contra mendac. c. 9. p. 18. A.*

b *Contra mendac. cap. 10.*

Ans. 1. Be it so. Yet S. *Augustin* doth not interpret them to be vnderstood and made true by any *reformation* in the mind. And this doth no way helpe our *Equiuocators* at all.

2. Say that S. *Augustin* doe giue vnto those words a more fauourable construction; yet *Cornelius a Lapide* disliketh that, and preferreth the other opinion, which granteth that *Iacob* did *lye*, before this of S. *Augustin*. in *Gen. 27. 19.* And for that interpretation, he citeth S. *Chrysostome*, *Lyra*, *Caetan*, *Lippoman*, *Pererius*, and others.

Relect. de Se-
creto memb. 3.
q. 3. Concluf. 7.
Pag. 321.

3. *Dominicus Soto*, a learned Frier, doth defend or excuse both Saint *Augustine* & *Jacob* in this manner; It may be (*quod puto sentit Augustinus*, Which I thinke was *Augustines meaning*) that those words of *Jacob*, were used in that Countrey, in that signification and meaning that they might be vttered by him, without telling a lye.

But howsoever it be, *Jacob* was so plaine a man, (saith a *Lapide*) that it is not to be supposed that hee did vse equivocation in his speech: nor doth any of former time so vnderstand his words.

2. The second head of Arguments, containeth the example of Almighty God, the God of Truth. But what hath this iust God, this God of Truth done or said, for which hee should be thought to equivocate, that is, to keepe one meaning to himselfe, and to deliuer another to his people, and by a double-sensed proposition to deceive them, whom he professeth to teach? Yes, say these men, he said to *Niniveh*, Yet forty daies and *Niniveh* shall be overthrowne, *Ion.* 3. 4. And he said to *Ezekias*, Set thine house in order: for thou shalt die and not live. *Iſ.* 38. 1. And yet neither of these came to passe, according to these words spoken. And therefore they are not true, vnlesse they be helped by some inward reservation; seeing in the sence that the words yeeld, they were not fulfilled.

Ans. These and other such speeches of God, are words of Commination and threatning. Now words of Commination in Scripture, are meant by Almighty God that spoke them, and are vnderstood by men that heare them, with exception of repentance and amendment, or some such conditions in the persons against whom they are vttered, as may moue GOD to reuoke the sentence. For God himselfe hath declared his owne meaning to be so, in such like sentences and speeches. *At what instant* (saith he) *I shall speake concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdome, so pluck*

a *Ier.* 18. 7, 8.

up and to pull downe, and to destroy it : if that Nation against whom I haue pronounced, turne from their euill, & will repent of the euill, that I thought to doe vnto them. And^b when I shall say to the Righteous, &c. And when I^b Ezek. 33. 13. say to the Wicked, Thou shalt surely die : if he turne from his sinne, &c. none of his sinnes, that he hath committed, shall be mentioned vnto him. &c. And according to this plaine Rule giuen by God himselfe concerning his own words, we are to vnderstand Gods threatnings, with some such exception. As for example, yet fortie daies, and Ninueh, &c. that is, vnlesse Ninueh repent, and obtaine Gods fauour for their preservation. And, Thou shalt die, &c. that is, vnlesse thou by prayer and humiliation obtaine Gods fauour, to lengthen thy life beyond the ordinary course, or such like. And these exceptions are not secret *reservations*, kept in Gods owne brest, and concealed from the hearers, as the *Iesuites reservations* are ; but they are conceiued and euer haue beene vnderstood by men acquainted with Gods language, to be meant by the very words. And therefore when God had threatned the Iewes, yet the Prophet exhorteeth them to repentance, that so they might moue God to stay his iudgements. ^c Who knoweth ^c Joel 2. 14. (saith hee) if hee will returne and repent, and leaue a blessing behinde him ? And Daniel, when he had told Nebuchaduezzar of Gods Decree against him, yet hee giueth him counsell^d to breake off his sinnes by righteousness, and his iniquitie by shewing mercy to the poore, that this might be a meanes to lengthen his tranquillitie. Yea, and in the very examples alledged to the contrarie, when Jonas pronounced, yet fortie dayes, &c. the men of Ninueh, as either hauing had some aduertisement thereof by Scriptures, or by some of Gods people, or conceiuing so much by the common light of reason; they did vnderstand these words of the Prophet as a threatning, that implied an exception of repentance.

And therefore the King with his Nobles proclaimeth
 a Ionah 3.8.9. a Decree, ^a *Let Man and Beast be couered with sackcloth, and cry mightily vnto God, &c. For, who can tell if God will turne and repent, and turne away from his fierce anger, that wee perish not?* And when God had threatened Ezekiah, *See thine house, &c. yet Ezekiah* b *turned his face to the wall, and prayed to the Lord, &c. Where his prayer for freedome, sheweth that hee vnderstood not Gods threatning to be meant without exception. And thus the people of God haue euer beene wont to vnderstand such like speeches, till our late Doctors of Rome haue made God to be an Equiuocator, that they might alledge him for a patrone of their sinne.*

The third head of Arguments, containeth the example of our blessed Sauour; who though hee were the Truth it selfe, and that there was neuer any guile found in his mouth, yet these men will needes draw him in, to be a fauourer and ring-leader of their falshoods and vntruthes. And so did their Predecessors, the Priscillianists doe before them. For they (as c Saint Augustine faith of them) for defence of their Doctrine of lying, brought testimonies out of Scriptures, and encouraged their Schollers by the examples of Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Apostles, and Angels, non dubitantes addere etiam ipsum Dominum Christum, making no scruple to adioyne also our Lord Iesus Christ, as a patterne of their lyes. And right so for all the world, doe our Equiuocators deale now-a-dayes. They bring examples of Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Apostles, and blessed Angels, not fearing to draw in God himselfe, and Iesus Christ his blessed Sonne, to be Abettors of their frauds.

But of God wee haue heard what they say already: let vs now heare what they say of Iesus Christ: and how, and when, and wherein hee vsed this Arte of Equiuocation. Yes, say they, he did equiuocate, when
 d Luk. 24. 28, being with two of his Disciples, ^d *hee made as though hee*

hee would goe further : and when speaking of the day of Iudgement, he said, ^a *But of that day and that houre knoweth no man --, nor the Son, but the Father onely :* and when hee said to his Brethren, ^b *Ego non ascendam,* ^c *I will not goe up to Ierusalem to this Feast,* and yet hee meant to goe vp, and so went ; and diuers other times.

^a Mar. 13. 31.

^b Ioh. 7. 8.

Persons Mitig.

^c 7. num. 19.

pag. 293.

Ans. Neither in these, nor in any other place, was our Lord, the spotlesse Lambe of God, euer found to equiuocate, according to the rules of this new Arte.

Not in the first place, *Luke 24. 28.* For first, there our Lord is said to doe something; hee made as though hee would goe further : but he is not said there to haue said any thing, in which this supposed reservation might be vnderstood.

Ob. Yes, but deedes also may signifie as well as words.

Ans. Deedes sometimes are equiualent to words, and doe signifie as well as words doe : and that is, when as words, so they doe declare our meaning, *ex inscripto*, or by some kinde of compact and agreement among men. And that may be done two wayes. First, expressly, when some words ioyned with the deedes, doe declare that to be the meaning and purpose of him that vseth them. As when *Iudas* kissed his Master : this signified that hee was *Iesus*, whom they came to apprehend, because before hee had giuen them this signe, ^c *Whomsoever I shall kisse, that same is hee.* And ^c *Matt. 26. 48.* when *Iesus* gaue a sop to *Iudas*, that signified that hee was the Traitor, because hee had told them before, ^d *Hee it is, to whom I shall giue a sop, when I haue dipped it.* And so, when an oath is ministred or tendred vnto vs, if wee lay the hand vpon the Booke, and kisse it, this signifieth that wee consent to the taking of the Oath, because that is appointed and required for this purpose. Secondly, deedes may bee equiualent to words,

^d Ioh. 13. 26.

a *Falsa nihil
huc alliment, nisi
certam & expe-
ctatam ab altera
parte, siue signifi-
cationem siue
quasi responsione
continere de-
beant.* Abbat.
Antilog. c. 2.
pag. 26. And
again, *Otiōse
totum hoc de
strategematis u-
surpatur, quia
nulla ibi consi-
liorum commu-
nicatio, nulla
signorum inter-
cessio, que men-
tibus nostris in-
uicem aperiendis
constituta sunt.*

Ibid. pag. 26.
b *Non magis in
hoc facto video
mendacij speciē,
quā in eo quod
simulauit se pere-
grinum seu via-
torem.* Lucas
Brugens. in
hunc locum.

c *Magnum dif-
ferentia est inter
verba & opera:
verba ex prima
institutione signi-
ficandi vim ha-
bent; non item
opera.*

words, when by some outward circumstances wee doe declare, that we intend them as signes of our meaning, and doe referre and vse them to that purpose. In this kinde, wee may see a man, who is borne deafe and dumbe, to talke and conferre with his neighbours. And in this kinde a *shrugge of the shoulder*, (if as *Persons* saith, it be so meant and taken in *Italie*) may be a signe, and haue the signification of a Negation or deniall. And when a man openeth his mouth, and sheweth a defect in his tongue, and maketh a gabbling noyse and vndistinct sound, this is a signifying deede, and doth import that that man is dumbe. In either of these kindes, deedes and gestures are equiuallent to words, and may containe truth or falshood in them, as well as words doe. But else, deedes and gestures, if in some such manner, *ex instituto*, by appointment and agreement among men, a they be not referred and intended for signification of our minde, though they may carry shew, and men may gather some meaning from them, yet they are not equiuallent to words; neither is there any lye contained in it, though the shew be not answerable to the thing. And such a deede as this, was that of our Sauour, when hee shewed by his gesture, a purpose of going further: and therefore this needeth no reservation to make it true; seeing without any reservation it hath no false or lying signification, such as words haue. And thus *Lucas Brugensis*, a learned Diuine of the Roman Church, doth vnderstand and interpret this place. His words (that the Reader may iudge of his meaning the better) are these, b *I see no more shew of a lye in this fact of Christ, then when before he seemed to be a stranger or a way-faring man.* And he giueth his reason, why hee thinketh there is no vntruth in this deed and gesture, c *for there is a great difference betweene words and deedes. For words by their first institution haue the power or vse of signifying; but so haue not deedes.* And hence

hence he inferreth that deedes, actions, and gestures, though oftentimes they be, yet they are not alwaies signes either of some ensuing action to follow, or of our present purpose and meaning; nor haue they the nature of a lye in them, *etiamsi ad decipiendum aliquando sunt*, though they be sometimes done, to deceive the vnderstanding of the beholder, and to make him belecue that which is not true. So that if our Lord did make shew of ~~going further~~, and intended it not, as Father Persons saith; yet in this learned mans iudgement, there was no lye in it: and consequently there needeth no mentall reservation to saue it from being a lye.

Secondly, and more agreeably to our Sauours mind, wee may answere and say, that our Lord made as if he would goe further: yea, and meant it too, if their intreaties and importunitie had not stayed him. Therefore the Text saith, *They constrained him*; that is, they importuned him to stay; and he, ouercome by their intreatie, stayed with them. The clearer meaning of which words, we may the better conceiue and vnderstand by a like speech, *Luke 9. 53*. For there it is said, *The Samaritans receiued him not, because his face was as though hee would goe to Ierusalem*; that is, by his behaiour it seemed that hee meant to goe thither: and so hee did meane it indeed. And so in this place, when it is said, that *hee made as though hee would goe further*; the meaning is, that hee tooke his leaue, and bad them farewell, or vsed some other such like behaiour, which made it seeme, that hee meant to goe further. Yea, and so hee meant indeede, sauing that at their request hee was contented to abide with them. And thus *Barradins*, and *Ribera*, two famous Iesuites, doe interpret this place. Wee may answere saith the one of them, *a Dominū valuisse ulterius progredi, si non retineretur à Discipulis, &c.* That our Lord indeed would

a Barrad.co.
4. l. 8. c. 13.
pag. 356. 2.

- have gone further, had bee not bene detained by his Disciples, and that there was no vnttruth in this shew. And the other, ^a *Nihil veritas fingit, Christ who is the Truth doth not feine any thing.* But the common sort might thinke that hee did feine, but it was no fiction or counterfeiting; ^b *For if they had not detayned him, he out of doubt had passed by, and had gone on further.* Thus not onely the euidence of truth, but the authoritie of Romish Doctors and Iesuites doe vindicate this place from that false glosse that *Persons* putteth vpon it; and doe free our Lord Iesus from that slanderous imputation, which the Iesuite doth lay vpon him, when ^c he saith that Christ in this place did *equiuocate*: and when ^d hee calleth this dealing of his, *The dissimulation and fiction of our Sauour.*

- The second place mentioned, and produced for Equiuocation, is that speech of our Sauour, *Mar. 13. Of that day, and that houre, &c.* This proposition (saith ^e *Persons*) had some reseruatiō of mind, for that otherwise it had bene false.

- Ans.* Not so. Nay this inference of the Iesuite is false and foolish too: for our Sauour, according to his wonted manner elsewhere, speaketh of himselfe, as he was reputed and knowne to be, that is, as he was man. And in that sense, the words haue an usuall and cleare construction and signification; which is, that as he was man, he knew not of that day. This interpretation (as ^f *Persons* doth acknowledge) is given by ancient Fathers in great number. Nor is this a *mentall reseruatiō*, as *Persons* would haue his ignorant Reader to beleeue: but an interpretation vsuallly meant and vnderstood by Christians, in these and such like speeches as these. And therefore our Sauour in this sentence did not keepe one *secret sense* to himselfe in his inward minde, and signifie another to his Disciples in the words vttered.

But

But if it be an Equiuocation, such as they fancy, what then shall the reseruatiō be? *Persons*, knowing that no man before the late inuention of this new *Art*, did euer thinke of secret *reseruatiōs*, or mentall imaginations in our Sauours words; calleth euery Exposition that any good Author giueth, by the name of *reseruatiō*, and reckoneth that Author, for a fauourer of his, like the mad man in *Athenens*, who when any ship came to the Hauē, put it in his Tables as one of his owne. But that which carrieth most shew of a *reseruatiō*, is this; *The Sonne doth not know* the day of iudgement, meaning that hee knew it not so, as hee would discouer it vnto them. For this explicatiō is giuen by Saint *Augustine*, and other *Fathers*, saith *Persons*; and hee addeth, (as triumphing in so plaine a prooffe) that this exposition *expresseth the very same reseruatiō in Christs words*, which they talke of in their mixt and equiuocall propositions. L.c.nu.49.

Ans. To this I answer two things: First, That the Exposition giuen by those *Fathers*, doth not imply any equiuocall reseruatiō. Secondly, That it doth not giue the true sence or meaning of the place.

First, It containeth not any Iesuiticall *reseruatiō*. For those *Fathers* which giue that interpretation, *The Sonne knoweth not*; that is, *not to make you know it*: or rather, *the Sonne knoweth it not*; that is, *hee doth not make you to know it*; doe fetch and gather this exposition, not from any secret conceit reserued in our Sauours minde, but from the vse and acception and signification of the word, as it is vsed in Scripture. For so, say they, this word, *scio* or *noui*, is often vsed. As when God said to *Abraham*, *Now I know that thou fearest God*: and to the *Israelites*, *The Lord your God proueth you, that hee may know, whether yee loue the Lord, &c.* the meaning is, *that hee may make you to know*. And from this vse of the word *scio*, to know,

Rob. Abbot
Antil. cap. 2.
pag. 22, & 23.

frequent, as they say, in Scriptures; they thinke they may by the like reason, keeping the same proportion of speech, interpret the word *Nescit*, *knoweth not the day*; that is, *hee doth not make you to know it*. Concerning which meaning of the Fathers exposition, if the learned Reader desire any further prooffe, he may haue enough to satisfie his minde, in that reuerend and learned Bishop who wrote against *Eudamon-Joannes*. Now this interpretation of the word, being drawne from the usuall acception of it in Scripture, is nothing at all to the Iesuities purpose, who fancieth a *secret* clause kept in the minde, but no way included in the use of the word.

Secondly, This interpretation, *The Sonne knoweth not*; that is, *hee doth not reueale or make it knowne to you*, as it maketh nothing for the Iesuities Equivocation, so it is not greatly to our Sauours meaning. My reasons are two. First, If that were the meaning, then it would follow, that the Father did so know the day of iudgement, as that hee did *reueale* it vnto them. For that which this sentence doth deny of the Sonne, it doth by vertue of a *he* exceptiue particle adioyned, affirm of the Father; *No man*; no nor the Sonne doth know it, but the Father. Where, if wee fill vp the construction, and make the sentence perfect, the whole speech must be this; *No man, nor Angell, neither the Sonne, doth know it, but the Father hee doth know it*. Now in this speech take the word [*know*] in the sense of those Fathers, *hee knoweth*; that is, *hee maketh to know*, and then the sentence thus expounded, in plaine words will be this, *No man, nor the Angels, neither the Sonne, doth make you to know the day of iudgement: but the Father hee doth make you to know it*. But this is not true of the Father; and therefore that is not the true interpretation or meaning of the word.

My second reason is, Our Sauour in these words,
No

No man — knoweth; meant to shew how secret and vnkowne the day and houre of Gods iudgement was; but take the word in this sence, *hee knoweth not*; that is, *hee reuealeth not, or doth not make you to know*: and then this sentence doth not imply or inferre or signifie any secrecie of that day. For, if thousands knew it, yet it might be said of them all, *They know it not*; that is, *they doe not reueale it, or make you to know it*. And consequently, this interpretation doth crosse our Sauours meaning, and ouerthrow that, for which hee intended it. Now, lay these together, and then there is lesse then nothing in our Sauours speech for the Iesuites purpose: both because the word cannot beare that sence in this place, which onely might seeme to fauour them; and because, that sence, as it was vnderstood by the Fathers, was not meant to include any such reservation. And so I haue done with this second place, which is the one of the places, that Doctor Norrice did defend his Equiuocation by.

Onely, lest some Popish Caniller, according to their vsuall manner, should raise clamours after mee, that I doe deny and gain-say the exposition of the Fathers: let the Reader remember, that the other interpretation, which I follow, is confessed by Father Persons to be giuen by other Fathers in great number. And againe, if any shall quarrell with mee for leauing an exposition of some Fathers, where I haue so good reason for it; let him know, that I can produce diuers of their owne Writers, who doe reiect as great a number, and perhaps vpon lesser reason.

Thirdly, The third testimony is from the words of our Sauour, *Iohn 7. 8.* which Father Persons and other Equiuocators recite thus, *Ego non ascendam ad diem festu istum, I will not goe vnto Ierusalem to this Feast*; and yet (say they) he meant to goe vp, and so he went. And therefore here he had a secret reservation.

Asw. They corrupt the Text two waies, 1 by altering the words. 2 by peruerting the sence.

^a Roman. Cor.
ro. 2. Ioh. 7. 8.

1. By altering the words. For the Originall Greeke is, *Εγω ενω αναβαινω*, that is, *I doe not yet goe vp*. And their authentick Latin, *Ego non ascendo, ꝑ̄ doe not goe vp*. And whereas some Copies had corruptly read it, *non ascendam, I will not goe*; ^a Lucas Bragensis, lest any man might afterward mistake, hath giuen admonition, that according to the *Roman Correction* of their Bible, set forth by the Popes authority, they may not change *ascendo* into *ascendam*. Yea, and their Rhemists reade it in their English Translation, *ꝑ̄ goe not vp to this Festiual day*. Which was true in the very Letter, & meant by our Sauſour according to the expresse words. For he did not meane then to goe vp, but afterward when time serued. And yet our *Equiuocators*, to gaine some shew from our Saniours words, doe corrupt not onely the Originall and truely authentick Greeke, but their owne Latine Text too. But it is no maruell: for such a false Arte could neuer be vpheld by true dealing.

2. By peruerting the sence. For say the words had beene, *ꝑ̄ will not goe vp*, as *Persons* and Doctor *Norice*, and others would faine haue it: yet the circumstances of the Text doe shew, that that could not be meant of the whole time during the feast, or that hee would not go vp at all; because it followeth in the next words by way of reason, *because my time is not yet accomplished*, as the Rhemists translate it; or *because my time is not yet fully come*, as it is more plainly in our Translation. Which words doe plainly shew his meaning to be this, that he would not then goe, when they would haue him: but would goe when he saw his owne time. And this he might both doe and meane, according to the plaine sence of the words spoken. By which it may appeare, that it is want of prooffe, and weakenes of their cause, that made them to drawe in this Text, which is so

decre

cleere against them. And so, it is the very same reason also, that forceth them (*for necessity hath no law*) to produce the many other speeches of our Saniour, which haue as much asinitie with Popish *Equiuocation*, as there is agreement betweene Christ and Belial, or betweene Christ and Antichrist: as I could easily shew, if it were conueniēt to stand vpon all their frinolous & idle allegations. But I thinke it not worth the while, either to tire the Reader, or to trouble my selfe with such fond Cauils. Only for a generall answer to them all, let this be remembred; that there is neuer a Text produced by them for this purpose, but that learned expositors, both ancient and moderne, as well of their Church, as of ours, do interpret and expound it in some determinate sense, which they gather or obserue either from the signification of the words, or the vse & application of them in the Scriptures, or from some circumstances or considerations in the Text it selfe. And therefore such Texts, in the iudgement of all such Interpreters, are not to be expounded or vnderstood of any *Popish reseruations*, kept secret in the Speakers minde. For such *reseruatiō* as I shewed before, may be any that themselves will fancie. Insomuch, that the Priests do frame seuen seuerall and distinct *reseruatiōs*, all alike fit for Father *Lifers Equiuocation*, when he deceiued his Keeper; and doe intimate that they might haue framed many more, and all to as good purpose. And no doubt, as they imagined those seuen, they might haue inuented seuentie more, that would haue serued the turne. In all which it is not possible, for the Hearer or Reader of such a speech, to imagine, what the Speakers *reseruatiō* is; it beeing not such as the signification of the words, or any circumstances of the businesse doe yeeld, but as the minde of the *Equiuocator* will fancie within his deceitfull heart. Nor do they in their *Equiuocations* meane, that the Hearer should knowe their

their *reservations*. For their intent is, to reserve one sense in their owne breast, and to imprint another in the Hearers minde. This only short note being obserued, it will be easie for euery Christian, that will open his eyes, to see that no place produced by them out of the Bible, doth include their secret and hidden *reservations*. Or if any Equiuocator will cauilt, or can say, that there is any testimony of theirs, which may not receiue satisfaction by this generall Rule, and is in his opinion worth the standing vpon; let him produce it: and I will promise him either a solution of his reason, or a recantation of mine opinion. And thus much shall serue to be said concerning the Grounds and Reasons which Equiuocators doe build vpon.

Now I proceede to set downe some few reasons against this new-found Arte, and fond deuice of *Equiuocation*. And those for this time shall be these five.

1. Because this late doctrine of *Equiuocation* destroyeth the true nature of *Equiuocation*, whose name it beareth.

2. Because it maintaineth a practice of lying, vnder a colour of Truth.

3. Because it disturbeth humane society, and hindereth mutuall commerce.

4. Because it impeacheth God of folly, in making his Lawes against Lying.

5. Because it freeth the Deuill from all iust imputation of being a Lier.

Arg. 1. The Iesuiticall doctrine of *Equiuocation*, doth destroy the true nature of *Equiuocation*, which hitherto hath beene receined of all men, and now (for ought I know) is not reiected of any. This I prooue thus; *Equiuocation*, in the true nature thereof, is, when a word or speech hath more senses than one. This the word doth import. For *Aquinocum*, by the very notation of the name, is *vox aquè plura significans*, a word indifferently

rently betokening *moe things*. And in some such manner as this, doe Writers of all sorts explaine and describe *Equivocation*. But in this new-devised *Equivocation*, there is no word, nor no sentence, or saying, that hath *moe* significatious or senses than one. For in their *mentall equivocall Proposition*, which they fancie, neither the words taken by themselves, nor the whole saying and sentence intended by the speaker, haue any *Ambiguity* or doubtfulnes of signification, or any *moe* senses then one; as I haue shewed ^a before, out of the *Equivocators* own Rules. And hence I may inferre, that either their *reserved Proposition*, is not an *Equivocall* and *double-sensed Proposition*, as they call it without reason, and consequently, that they doe not by *Equivocation* speake truth in one sense, and mis-leade the Hearer with another sense: or else, if notwithstanding this, that Proposition bee *Equivocall* and *double-sensed* still, then we must say, that there may bee an *Equivocation*, where there is but one single sense and meaning. And that destroyeth the true nature of *Equivocation*.

^a Cap. 1. p. 14.

To this reason, first their confession is, that ^b *verball Equivocation*, which is, When a word or speech signifies ^b *Perf. mitig.* *cap. 8. num. 8.* *diuers things equally*, ^c *indeed is onely true and proper Equivocation*, and agreeth onely to the Definition of *Equivocation*, deliuered not onely by Philosophers, but Orators also: and that ^d *it is properly called Equivocation*, When ^d *Perf. ibid.* *num. 8.* *a speech or word signifies diuers things equally*, if we consider the proper nature of *Equivocation*: and, ^e *that mentall Equivocation in rigor is none.* ^e *ibid. num. 15.*

2. Their answer is notwithstanding, that their mixt Proposition may be ^f *called Equivocation*, in a more ^f *Perf. mitig.* *cap. 8. num. 10.* *large and ample signification*, as *Equivocall* may signify an *amphibologicall*, doubtfull or *double-sensed Proposition*, in respect of the Speaker and Hearer, whereof the one understandeth the same in one sense, and the other in another. And the cause why it is so called, is rather by a certaine simili-

pag. 313.

ende, then propriety of speech: to wit, that, even as Equivocation properly by communitive of name in things of different natures, by variety of significations in the selfe-same words or speech, by custome of phrase and composition of sundry sorts, doth make different and doubtfull senses and meanings to the Hearer: so in this case, by mentall reservation of some part of the foresaid mixt Proposition, the like effect of doubtfulness is bred in the Hearers understanding. For more ready vnderstanding of which perplexed speech, I note that there are three things said by this doubling Equivocator. 1. That it is *only true and proper Equivocation*, & such as is comprised in the Definitions given both by Philosophers & Orators, when there are diuers senses and significations in the words. 2. That *Equivocation* as they meane it in this question, hath no such propertie in it, nor is comprised in the Definition, that Philosophers and Orators haue described *Equivocation* by. 3. That notwithstanding all this, yet it may rightly be called *Equivocation*, because as true *Equivocation* breedeth diuers senses to the Hearer, by the Ambiguity that is in the words; so this new-devised *Equivocation* may breed diuers senses, one in the Hearer, and another in the Speaker, by reason of the secret reservation that the Speaker imagineth in his own mind. And this may seeme not so vnreasonable, because words doe signifie *ad placitum*, and may be changed euery day. And therefore it is no such fault, to frame a new meaning and another signification in this word, then euer any body did thinke of heretofore.

Rep. This answer doth not weaken mine Argument, it confirmeth and strengtheneth it rather. For first, I doe not except so much against their new signification of the word, as against the new explication and description of it. For they say, that they call it *Equivocation*, because it is a *double-sensed Proposition*; and a *double-sensed Proposition* there fore they call it, because

cause by it they signifie one sense to the Hearer, and imagine another to themselves. But this doth vtterly destroy the very essence & entity of true *Equiuocation*. For true *Equiuocation* cannot be conceiued to be without a diuersitie of meanings in the speech: nor was it euer heard of, that a Proposition could be *double-sensed*, which had none but one single meaning: nor is it imaginable that that saying should be ambiguous, which the Hearer can take or construe but one way.

Secondly, Their change and alteration of the word, to another different meaning, as it is by them here v-
sed, doth conuince them of false and naughty dealing; such as we may obserue Thieues to vse, when they haue purloyned other mens goods. For Thieues (saith *Tullie*) when they haue taken away other mens goods, doe change the *markes* of them, that it may not be knowne whose they are, or to whom they belong. And right so doe our Equiuocators deale in this case. For they change the *names*, which are true *markes* of things; that hereby they may conceile and hide the nature and propertie of the things themselves. I grant then, that names may change with times; nor is it any fault to alter the vse of a word, so there bee no wrong done to the thing, by the misse-applying of the word: as likewise it is no fault neither, to change the *markes* of goods, when there is no fraud intended by it. But if the *markes* of goods be changed, that the propertie of them may be conceiled, that is a plaine trick of thieuerie. And so, if names be changed, that the nature of the things may be peruerterd or obscured, that is a trick of iugling, not inferior to that counsonage of the Thiefe. And so it appeareth to be in this case. For this mungrell Proposition of theirs, if it should be censured by Philosophers, Orators, or other learned men, no man but would iudge it at the first sight to be a lye: and so hitherto all men haue euer called such speeches. But now

* *Vi reliqui flures, earum rerum quas ceperunt, signa commutant: sic illi -- nomina, tanquam rerum notas, mutantur.* Cic. de finib. bon. & mal. l. 5. nu. 74. pag. 111.

our new Artificers haue found another name for their new Arte: they call it, Equivocation. And this they doe for a colourable shew, that it may be thought that there is no vntruth, but onely an Ambiguity in the speech: and that they in deceiuing men by *mentall reservations*, doe nothing but what honest men are wont to doe, when they vtter sentences, that may haue diuers meanings. Thus, while they change the names, they doe also confound the things, and destroy their true nature, which wise men, and Aristotle among the rest, haue euer acknowledged to agree vnto them.

a Mitig. cap. 8.
num. 16. pag.
310.

Obiect. Nay, saith Father *a Persons*, but if Aristotle did not comprize this our reserved Proposition under some of the three sorts of Logick Equivocation, mentioned by him in his Elenchs, then he erred grossely in making an insufficient Diuision, which comprehendeth not all the parts of the thing deuided. For if the said mixt Proposition (saith he) be an Equivocation, (as Iesuites say it is, in spite of all reason, and against the doctrine of all ages) then must it haue place among some of these three kindes; or else the Diuision should be insufficient.

Rep. A ridiculous conceit: whereto I know no example, that may be paralell; but I will imagine one as neere as I can. Suppose then, a Father deuideth his Lands among his owne Children, and a Conie-catcher there by steppeth in, and layeth claime to a share among them: and when the matter commeth to be debated, in the Court, the Iudge parteth the Lands among the Brethren, to whom onely they belonged, and shutteth out the Conie-catcher for a wrangler, that layeth claime where he hath no right. What if in this case, the Conie-catcher should complaine of the Iudge, for partiall dealing, and reason against him, as *Persons* doth against Aristotle, that if this Conie-catcher haue a right, and a share in those Lands, as himselfe saith he hath, then the Iudge erred grossely, that had excluded

ded him? Would not euery Boy kicke such a wrangling foole or knaue shall I call him? out of the Court? And such a ridiculous wrangler, is Father Persons, who accuseth Aristotle of a grosse error, for not ranning among his kinds of Equiuocation, this of the Iesuites, neuer heard of in the world before; and which the wrangler himselſe doth else-where acknowledge not to be true Equiuocation.

Arg. 2. This doctrine of Equiuocation doth maintaine a practice of lying, because hee whom they call an Equiuocator, is in truth a Lye, and that which they call an Equiuocall Proposition, is a lying assertion. I proue it thus. He that speaketh to another that which himselſe knoweth to be false, is a Lye, and a lye it is, whenſoever there is ^a *falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi*, a false signification with a mind to deceive the Hearer. Or, to speake in a Iesuites words, ^b A Lye is *verbum falsum, cum intentione fallendi*, a false speech, with an intention to deceive. Which description of a Lye, so far as concerneth this purpose, he explaineth thus. A false speech is heere ment, when a ^c man speaketh otherwise, then himselſe thinketh: and it is said to be with intention to deceiue, because ^d Hee that speaketh otherwise then himselſe thinketh, doth deceiue another, and intendeth to deceiue him. For he would not so speake, but that thereby he may engender a contrarie opinion in another mans mind: and this is to deceiue. Thus the Iesuite describeth a Lye, and that agreeably to the receiued Doctrine of the Schooles. But this which is said to containe the nature of a Lye, is all of it found in the new-deuised Equiuocall Proposition. For first, that which the Equiuocator vttereth, is false, and so he knoweth it to be: for ^e it may seeme (saith Persons) to haue falsitie in it; and sometimes also hath indeed, in respect of the words onely, or understanding of the Hearer. And the case is cleere, that the words vttered by the Equiuocator, containe an

^a Aug. contra mendac. c. 12.

^b Tolet Instr. l. 8. c. 54.

^c Non est mendacium, dicere quod non ita est, sed dicere aliter quam homo putat. Tolet. ibid.

^d Qui aliter quam sentit proloquitur, alteri fallit, et fallere intendit. Non etenim sic profert, nisi ut diuersam opinionem in anima alterius generet. Hoc autem est fallere. Tolet. ibid.

^e Pers. mitig. c. 13. num. 2. pag. 484. & cap. 10. num. 33. p. 424.

a Cap. 1. pag.
16. num. 6.

vntruth and a falshood : for else they could not serue him for *evasion*. But the words vttered are all that the Equiuocator speaketh : and therefore that which hee speaketh, is *verbum falsum*, a false word or speech. And secondly, that he vttereth this falshood *with minde and purpose to deceiue* the Hearer, in the sence that *Tollet* here explaineth it, I haue ^a shewed and proued out of their owne writings : nor can it stand with common sence, to conceiue it otherwise. And hence it followeth that the Equiuocator is a plaine lyer.

Ans. Their answer is, that though the words considered by themselves, and as they are vnderstood by the Hearer, be false : yet as they are meant by the Equiuocator, and as they are ioyned with the *reservation* kept in his minde, they are true. The summe is, they are false of themselves, but they are made true by the imagined *reservation*.

Re. This is a weak answer, & an impertinent shift; because their *mentall reservation* hath nothing to doe either with Truth or Lying; as may appeare by this reason. Truth as it is heere meant, and Lying which is the contrary to it, are morall acts contained in the second Table of the Decalogue or Tenne Commandments : and therefore doe include a respect to our Neighbours, nor can they be vnderstood without reference and relation vnto other men : so that lying consisteth in a signification of falshood vnto others, and truth in signifying or vttering of that which is true; and without such signification, either performed by outward signes, or meant and intended to be performed, if occasion should be offered, Lying and Truth morally taken, can haue no place. Vpon this ground, which hath cleare euidence in it, *Bannes* a learned Schoole-man doth refute their opinion, who thinke that there may be a lye, where there is no purpose to de-

b *Mibi visque adeo videtur ille animus fallendi necessarius ad rationem mendacij; quod sine illo mendacium esse non possit. Vt v. g. si Petrus absque aliquo resse proferat propositionem, quæ scit esse falsam; ille non mentitur, quamuis dicat falsum in voce. Similiter si Petrus dicat Ioanni; Tu non es Iohannes: seriè non menti-*

ber. ^b *I thinke (saith he) that a minde so deceiue, is so necessary*

necessary in a lye, as that without it, a lye cannot exist. This hee declareth thus: If Peter, no man being within hearing, should utter a speech, which hee knoweth to be false, yet hee should not lye, though hee should speak an untruth in the words. In like sort, if Peter should say to Iohn, Thou art not Iohn, doubtlesse hee should not lye, though hee spake an untruth, because hee cannot speak that with purpose to deceive Iohn himselfe. And hereof hee giueth this reason, Because a lye is a kinde of fiction or faining, which is in the will, with reference to another, by which a man intendeth that another man may beleene otherwise than himselfe, who telleth the lye, doth thinke. And that a lye doth include such respect and reference to another, is plaine (saith hee) because that veracitie, or the vertue of speaking truth, which is opposite to lying, doth consist also in relation to another, because it is a part of iustice. Thus reasoneth this learned Frier. In this discourse of his wee may note two things. First, His Conclusion, which is, that both lying and truth morally taken, which hee calleth *veracitie*, doe consist in a relation and reference to others; so that no words uttered, without respect of signifying somewhat to some other by them, can be either the sinne of lying, or the vertue of true-speaking. Secondly, wee may note his reason for prooffe of this Conclusion; which is, that *veracitie*, or the vertue of speaking truth, is a part of iustice: and iustice hath a respect to some other, to whom it giueth that which is his due. This reason I take to be vnanswerable; and then his Conclusion must needs be vndereniable. It is proued then that truth morally meant, for a vertue or act of speaking truth, which is a part of iustice, and a dutie which wee owe to our neighbours; doth include a reference and respect to others, which respect consisteth in signifying or declaring our meaning to them, truly and sincerely. But now in the *mentall reservation*, that vp in the

tas, quamuis dicat falsum, quia illud non potest dicere animo fallendi ipsius Iohannem. Huius ratio esse potest, quia mendacium est fictio quedam, quae est in voluntate, propterea quod est ad alterum per quam intendit homo, ut alius credat aliter, quam sentit ille, qui fingit, & mentitur. Quod autem mendacium sit ad alterum, patet. Nam contra veracitatem, quae est virtus opposita, est ad alterum, quum sit pars iustitiae, ut ait S. Tho. Dominic. Bannes to. 3. in 2. 2. q. 1. art. 3. Dub. 1. 6. Pro decisione, pag. 16.

Equiuo-

Equiuocators breast, there is no such reference or relation, nor doth it admit of any intendment, to signifie or declare his meaning to others. Nay, it is therefore suppressed, and broken off from the speech which is vttered in words, that nothing thereby may be signified to the Hearer. It followeth then, that this *reservation* hath no point nor piece of morall truth in it. And therefore, if that part of the Equiuocators proposition, which hee vttereth in words, were a false and lying speech before; it must needs remaine a lye still, for any helpe that this Reservation can yeeld it.

Arg. 3. The Doctrine of Equiuocation doth disturbe humane societie, and destroyeth that mutuall commerce that one man should haue with another. I proue it thus. This societie and commerce must needs be disturbed, when men in wisdome may not belecue one another, vpon their words or oathes: but if this Doctrine of Equiuocation be receiued, men may not belecue one another, either vpon their words or oaths. This is proued thus. The Equiuocator professeth to *equiuocate*, whensoever hee may lawfully hold his peace; and if it be for any aduantage of weight, vpon his Oath too. Which how farre it may extend, I haue declared in part already, and euery man may easily conceiue by himselfe: but sure in what business soeuer I haue to deale with such a man, I cannot tell, but that he may thinke it lawfull to conceale the truth, and consequently to *equiuocate* with mee. And in case his conscience will permit him to *equiuocate* with mee, (as in what case it will not permit him, I know not) then am I as sure to be deceived, and ouerreached by him, if I doe belecue him, as if I beleueed a plaine and downe-right lyer. For, my credence or beleefe can reach no further then to the words vttered; nor can I learne any thing from the Equiuocator, but that which I can gather from his words;
but

but all that is false and lying ; as hath beene shewed by their owne Confession. And therefore if I beleue a man, when hee doth *equiuocate*, I am sure to be deceived. I declare this yet further by a familiar example. Say, two Priests haue layed a plot of Inuasion for the King Iome, and being questioned vpon their oaths concerning the plot, they both deny it. And the one, hee saith, *I neuer meant or intended any such thing*, vnderstanding within himself, *so as I meane to tell you of it*; and the other, hee answereth in the very same words, but hath forgotten to frame a *reservation* in his minde ; the one of these by their Doctrine is a lyer, and the other an Equiuocator. But in respect of being deceived by them, what difference is there betweene them ? Shall I not as soone be deceived by the Equiuocator, as by the Lyer ? Yes certainly, it is no more safe to beleue an Equiuocating Iesuite, then a lying Deuill. And if this be so ; then where men teach and professe the Arte of equiuocation, where in wisdom men may not beleue one another : and consequently, they cannot haue that commerce and societie that men should haue among themselves. I conclude this argument against Equiuocators, in the very same manner, as Saint Augustine did against Lyers, onely putting the name of Equiuocator, where he did the name of Lyer. *Either (saith hee) wee must not beleue honest men ; or wee must beleue them, who wee thinke ought sometimes to tell a lye ; or else, wee must beleue that honest men will not at any time tell a lye. The first of these three is pernicious, (and ouerthroweth societie.) The second is foolish, (and exposeth a man to the mercy of euery cheating companion.) It remaineth therefore to say, that an honest man will neuer tell a lye.* Thus that learned Father: by whose example I may reason against Equiuocators in the very same manner. Either wee must not beleue honest

a Aut non est credendum bonis; aut credendum est ijs, quos credimus debere aliquando mentiri; aut non est credendum bonis aliquando mentiri. Horum trium primum perniciosum est, secundum stultum. Restat ergo, ut nunquam mentiantur boni. Augustin. de Mendac. cap. 8.

men on their words or oathes : or wee must beleue them, who wee thinke may *equiuocate* with vs both in words and in oathes : or else, wee must beleue that an honest man will not *equiuocate*. The first is pernicious, the second is foolish : and therefore wee must resolve vpon the third, which is, that an honest man will not *equiuocate*.

Arg. 4. This Doctrine of Equiuocation defeateth all Lawes made against lying, and doth by consequence impeach God of folly for making any such Lawes. I proue it thus. It is a folly to make such Lawes, as are vnauaileable, and cannot reach to the ends, for which they were made. But if Equiuocation be admitted, Lawes against lying cannot serue for the purpose, to which they are intended. This appeareth by two things. First, Gods Lawes and precepts against lying were made for this purpose, to restrain mens tongues from speaking of falshoods and vntruthes. But by the Arte of Equiuocation a man may speake any and all falshoods that hee will, and yet these precepts against lying shall neuer take hold of him : because by a mental *reservation* warranted by this Doctrine, hee may make any falshood to become true. And therefore the Equiuocator, notwithstanding all Lawes of God and men against lying, yet is at his libertie to vtter what vntruths hee will, without the least transgression of any of those Lawes. Secondly, Lawes against lying doe intend preuention of hurt and deceit to be vsed against our neighbour. But admit once of this new doctrine of Equiuocation, and no deceit toward our neighbour can be prevented by any Lawes against lying. For if this Doctrine be warrantable, then all Lawes against lying must be meant onely against such as doe not keepe a reservation in their mindes, to make true the falshoods that they vtter in their words.

words. And so, for example, when *Moses* saith,
^a *Thou shalt not lye one to another*: and when *Saint Paul* ^a *Leuitie, 19.*
 saith, ^b *Put away lying, and speake truth every man with* ^{11.}
his neighbour; the meaning of these Precepts must be ^b *Ephes. 4. 25.*
 to this purpose, *Speake no vntruth, nor utter no falshoods*
to your neighbours, vnlesse yee haue some secret reseruati
kept in your minde, which if it be added, will make them
to become true. For, by the Equiuocators Doctrine, if
 such reseruati be kept in the minde, then all their
 words become true: and therefore they are no way
 included within these Precepts against lying. But if
 this interpretation of such Lawes may be admitted,
 and such libertie of speech may be granted, without a-
 ny breach of these Lawes: then these Lawes doe no
 way preuent the least danger of deceit and dammage
 that may come to our Neighbour by vntrue and false
 speeches; because I can deceiue him as much by this
 equiuocall reseruati, as by a formall lye: as hath been
 proued already. And from these considerations it fol-
 loweth, that Precepts against lying are vaine, if the
 practice of Equiuocation be lawfull.

Arg. 5. If the Doctrine of Equiuocation be true,
 then neither men nor Devils can be conuincd of ly-
 ing. First, men cannot. For though they speake ne-
 uer so vast and apparent falshoods, yet who can say
 but that they haue some reseruati in their minde,
 that may free their words from being lyes? And yet ^c *D. Ely in his*
 all sorts of men, when they heare euident vntruthes
 vttered, doe without controll of any, charge the
 speakers with falshoods and lying. Which shew-
 eth that all men iudge of lying and truth, by the
 words vttered, and not by fancies reseru'd in the
 minde. As for example, the Secular Priests doe
 charge *Father Persons* with a continuall practice of
 lying, so that ^c *they giue him the Whetstone, and leaue*
 Notes vpon
 the Apologie.
 cap. 9. pag. 311.
 D. Bagshaw in
 his Answ. to
 Persons Apo-
 logic, pag. 42.
 Reply to a
 briefe Apolo-
 gie, cap. 2.
 it pag. 11.

a Apologie
for Subord.
cap. 12. in the
latter end.

it with him, too, as if they thought there were no such a bold and impudent lyer in the World, that could winne it from him. But how did the Priests know, but that *Persons* spake with some *equiuocall* reseruati-
ons? And if so, then they broke the rule of charitie, in censuring him for a lyer, when hee was but an Equiuocator. And againe, Father *Persons* chargeth the Seculars with a *infinite number of vntruthes, lyes, slan-
ders, and open falshoods vttered without scruple of con-
science*; so that the use of Equiuocations was little need-
full for them; because they could take libertie enough without it. But how doth Father *Persons* know, that his Secular Brethren did not vse Equiuocation in all these vntrue speeches: and so made them true by some *reseruati-
on*? Thus all men, when they finde ap-
parent vntruthes vttered, sticke not to charge the speakers with lying. But if the Doctrine of Equiuo-
cation be true, no man can be conuincied of the least lye, vnlesse himselfe will confesse it.

Secondly, The Deuill himselfe, if this Doctrine be true, cannot be conuincied to be a lyer. For who can say, but when he telleth vs most palpable vntruthes, yet hee may reserue within himselfe some clause to helpe all? Nay, if this Doctrine be true, it cannot be supposed with any reason, that the Deuill euer would or euer did tell any lye at all. For, whatsoeuer he hath spoken at any time, be it otherwise neuer so false and lying; yet it might be made true by a *re-
seruati-
on*: and hee neither wanted wit to deuise such *reseruati-
ons*, nor will, by such or any other meanes to free himselfe from the imputation of lying. First, hee wanteth not wit. I shall not neede to proue this; because, as I suppose, it will be confessed, that hee is as quicke and nimble at such deuices, as the finest witted Iesuite in the packe. But, if any man shall

shall question it, I will engage my selfe to proue it. Secondly, hee wanteth not will, by this or any other tricke to saue his credit, and to auoid the imputation of lying. For, hee knoweth that the greatest hinderance to his proceedings, is, because the World esteemeth him for a lyer, and the Father of lyes: and if he could once but gaine to be accounted a true and honest dealer, (as by vsing Equiuocation, he might as well proue himselfe to be no lyer, as any Iesuite can:) then hee might finde more credit in the World. For which cause, ^a the Apottle saith that hee *transformeth himselfe into an Angell of light.* And an ancient Writer ¹⁴ telleth of a Monke, who was a strict and religious liuer, that the Deuill, ^b *purposing by the custome of Visions to winne him, to the beliefe of a future illusion* which hee intended for him, *did for a long time, as a messenger of truth, shew him all true Visions.* And when by this meanes hee had gained credit to be beleued, then by another Vision, hee perswaded him to renounce Christ, and to become a Iew. And it is an vsuall obseruation among Christians, that the Deuill will tell some truthe, that hee may gaine afterward the more credit to his lyes. And therefore it can be no doubt, but that the Deuill desireth not to be reputed a lyer; and would gladly put off from him all such imputation, if by any trickes hee could deuise how to effect it. Now lay these two positions together: first, That the Deuill wanteth no wit to deuise reseruations; and secondly, That hee wanteth no will, by this or any other such deuice, to auoid the discredit of a lyer: and then it will follow, that in reason wee cannot imagine, that the Deuill euer would or did tell a lye, if by an *equiuocall* reseruation hee could cleare himselfe. And hence againe it may be deduced, that as our Equiuocators doe challenge vs for

^b *Quum volens eum consuetudine visionum, ad credulitatem futura deceptionis illucere, verissima quaque multo tempore, Diabolus, velut veritatis nuncius, reuelasset: ad extremum, &c. Cassian. Col. lat. 2. cap. 8.*

flandering them; because wee call them lyers, when they swear falshoods by imagined *reservations*: so the Deuill himselfe might challenge GOD (be it spoken with reuerence to his Maiestie) for iniustice and slander, because hee hath branded him with the note of a lyer, and calleth him the Father of lyes. But these consequents are most absurd: and therefore the Doctrine of Equiuocation, from whence they follow, is most false.

Thus, by Gods grace, I haue declared, and I trust, in some measure also cleared the poynts propounded in the beginning. Now, for conclusion, I will onely commend one Caueat to the well-meaning Christian; and that is, to beware of trusting them, whose profession is to *equiuocate*. For such men are both more impious and more dangerous than any other sort of lyers, that I know beside.

First, They are more impious, because among men of other Religions, though there may be vicious persons, that make too common a practice of lying deceits, yet that is the fault of the men, and not of their Doctrine. But in the Church of Rome, their great Doctors doe not onely practise this deceit, but praise it too: and commend it to their Disciples, as a *good Arte*; very fit for *scrupulous consciences*. Which doctrine cannot be conceiued to be without great dishonour to God, and much disgrace to Religion.

Secondly, They are more dangerous then any other sort of Lyers, because they come masked vnder a vizard of truth, & armed with resolution to protest, and swear, and pawn their soules and saluations, vpon the truth of that which they say, notwithstanding that for so much as they vtter, and for all that you can heare or gather by them, all is most false, which they speake. From the consideration whereof, I inferred before, that
it

it was not safe to belecue a Iesuite, or any of his followers or schollers; for that a man may as soone be deceived by an Equiuocating Iesuite, as by a lying Deuill. Now I adde, therefore wise Christians must be ware of them; and if wee will not be deceived, wee must not belecue either their words or oathes, in what businesse soener wee haue to doe with them. This Cause, that it may the better appeare how farre it is to be extended; I will, for example sake, set downe some speciall cases of ordinarie use, in which it will not be safe to belecue them.

First then we may not safely belecue them, when they are disputing, and arguing for their Religion, and deliuering points of their faith. For they tell vs, that Iesus our Lord did equiuocate, when hee preached of Prayer and Sacraments, and of his office of iudging the World, &c. And I trow, Iesuites will be ready to imitate the example of Iesus, whose name they beare. But we need not doubt of their meaning in this case; for they therefore alledge the example of Christ, that they may defend and make good their owne practise. And therefore when I heare a Priest or a Iesuite telling of Popes Pardons, and preaching of *S. Patrick's Purgatorie*, &c. and when for these, he telleth me, of the consent of the ancient Church, and alledgeth many Fathers to confirme his Assertion; how can I be sure, that hee doth not equiuocate with mee in that case? or what reason haue I to thinke, but that he speaketh against his knowledge, and conscience? or how can I, without a note of rashnes and temeritie, belecue that hee doth not wilfully belye the Fathers, and other Authors to serue his owne turne? and when he hath done all, make vp all with a secret *Refutation*, that I neuer dreamed on?

Secondly, Wee may not belecue them, when they
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giue Answers, or beare witnesse in a Court of Iustice, or before a Magistrate; no, not though they sweare what they say, and take it vpon their soules and saluations. For they professe to *equivocate* in such cases, if either the Iudge be *incompetent*, or if he proceed *incompetently*. And when I heare one of them speake and sweare before any of our *Gouernors* or *Rulers*, either Ecclesiasticall or Ciuill, what can I tell, but hee may thinke either the Iudge, or his proceedings to bee *incompetent*, and vniust? Nay sure, in most cases, in which they haue to doe before our *Gouernors*, they are knowne to hold, either the Iudge, or the proceeding, or both, to bee *incompetent*. And therefore I cannot see how wee may safely beleene them, when they make answer, or giue euidence vpon their oath.

Thirdly, Wee may not beleene them, when they tell of great wonders and Miracles, done by men of their Order and profession; and by Saints and Images of their owne making. For they professe to *equivocate*, when it may bee for some good to themselves, and therefore much more when it may proue so great a good to their Order, to their Church, and to their Religion. And therefore, when they tell mee of many great miracles done by their men in the Indies, and by the Ladies of *Lumetta* and *Hall*; how can I tell, that they doe not fittin and deuise all that vpon their fingers end, to gaine credite to their profession?

Fourthly, We may not beleene them, when they publish and disperse disgracefull tales and reports against the professors and Doctors of our Church. For the disgracing of these men, may breede great aduantage to their Religion: and beside, it is an Axiom of theirs, *He must bee disgraced, because he is an Enemy to their order*. And therefore, when they tell mee of *Luther*,

ther and Calvin and Beza and Bucer and such others, that they either despaired, or recanted, or renounced their Religion; how may I beleue them, that they doe not Equiuocate? Nay it is certaine, that in the forging of these reports, they did either lye, or Equiuocate, or both. And therefore when they now tell vs, that many of our Reuerend Bishops, and learned Preachers and Schollers, are of their opinion, and thinke them to be in the right, but that for the worlds sake, they dissemble their indgement; how can I giue credit to their words, or to their writings? And when they tell vs, that such a Doctor, vpon his death-bed, and such a Bishop toward his latter end, turned Papist, and renounced in their eare, what he had taught in the Pulpit, and was reconciled to the Church of Rome, by one that came and went inuisibly; shall wee beleue them to speake as they thinke? Nay, wee should rather spit in the Lyers faces, that presume vs to bee so simple, as to beleue an Equiuocator in a case so vauileable for his Order, and in a thing so vnlikely and absurde in it selfe; that the narration of such a thing, might call in question the truth of a knowne honest man.

Fiftly, We may not beleue Equiuocators in matters of common life, and ciuill conuersation. For they professe to *equiuocate* in most cases of common practice, and in all cases in which they are not bound to reueile the Truth, if the thing may be for their aduantage. And therefore if one of them should contract to marry a mans daughter amongst vs, how can any of vs tell, that the Equiuocator thinketh himselfe bound to lay open his heart, and to speake the truth in this case; and that therefore in his opinion he may not equiuocate and deceiue vs? And if he promise to pay me a summe of money, how can I tell that

he keepeth not a *reservation* behind, that may disanull his promise aforehand; as that he will pay it, if himselfe shall thinke it necessary, or if he shall haue so much to spare, or if hee haue nothing else to doe with his money? &c. And so, if he vndertake to be my Sollicitor for my Law-businesse, or my Physitian for my body, or my Counsellor in any doubtfull case, &c. how shall I be assured that I may belecue his word, and that he doth not for some secret reasón kept to himselfe, think it lawfull to cheate me by a mental *reservation*? Surely, for mine own part, if I may know him that professeth the Art of *Equivocation*, I wil trust him no further then I would doe a common and noted Lyer, that is no further then I do see him.

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FINIS.